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For African countries like Nigeria, democratic transition is conceived as not only 
in terms of advancing human rights and political freedoms, but also for 
improving political accountability, or quite simply, reducing corruption; and the 
role of the press is said to be central to both through watchdog and investigative 
journalism (Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011b). This 
research therefore asks: How and to what extent do Nigerian newspapers cover 
corruption and what specific role does investigative reporting play in that 
coverage?  
For answer, I content analysed front page news coverage in a sample of 2746 
newspapers from four national dailies over twelve years by selecting every 6th 
edition in each publication from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2012. This is 
supplemented with a total of 8 weeks of two newsroom observation in two of 
the dailies in Abuja and Lagos, and in-depth interviews with 24 respondents, 
including investigative reporters, political reporters, editors, two members of 
staff of anticorruption agencies, and one official of an NGO promoting 
investigative journalism in Nigeria.  
I find three types of corruption stories in the newspapers. First, corruption 
scandals of real or alleged instances of corruption and in which persons and 
sums involved are clearly named in the stories. These constitute 45.72% of the 
total or slightly less than half. But corruption scandals tend to generate follow-
up stories, or subsequent reports of the arrest, trial or conviction of officials 
involved in previously reported scandals. Finally, corruption talk which are 
stories of corruption but without involving any specific instances of corrupt act 
by any person. Corruption is the subject of the story but without the act itself, 
as the statements by two Nigerian presidents indicate above. Furthermore, I find 
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that corruption is extensively and prominently reported in the press, accounting 
for over 8% of total front page news coverage, or an average over two 
corruption stories every week throughout the 12-year the period. Indeed, nearly 
10% of newspapers in the sample carry two or more different stories of 
corruption on the same front page, further indicating a high extent of coverage. 
However, only a small fraction (4.76%) of this coverage issues from independent 
journalism by the four newspapers combined. Almost 90% of scandals, or stories 
of actual or alleged corruption is generated by official or state-level sources such 
as anti-corruption agencies, parliamentary investigations, commissions of 
inquiry and sometimes foreign media, through various practices of information 
subsidy like press releases and conferences. Equally significant, corruption 
stories subsidized for the press tends to involve higher a scale of corruption than 
those independently reported by the newspapers through investigative 
journalism.  
However, whereas existing research conceives information subsidy as having 
the potential to compromise the fourth estate role of the press, I argue that this 
is not the case in the specific instance of corruption stories in Nigerian 
newspapers. Indeed, information subsidy supplied by corruption investigating-
agencies may in fact be a necessary condition for more watchdog journalism 
investigated by newspapers. Watchdog role of the press with regards to 
exposing corruption is positively served, rather than harmed, by information 
subsidy resulting from horizontal accountability functions of state agencies. 
Furthermore, I argue that in the specific context of corruption stories in Nigerian 
newspapers, information subsidy itself should be understood, not only as a 
strategic agenda of sources for gaining coverage, but that it reflects a deeply 
entrenched ‘anti-corruption culture’ in Nigerian politics and society. That is, the 
general tendency for virtually all Nigerian governments to make ‘the fight 
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against corruption’ the centre of policy or political action, and for citizens to 
demand that their governments fight corruption. With the onset of democracy 
over a long period never witnessed before in Nigeria however, this tendency 
finds free expression. This manifests, first, in the establishment of more anti-
corruption agencies, investigative committees, and probe panels, across all 
levels of government, and then in their high-profile investigations and reports 
which then generates most of the news about corruption in the newspapers. I 
illustrate these arguments in chapters four through seven and examine the role 
of the press in these processes, that is, the press as strong watchdogs but weak 
investigators.   
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Chapter One: Introduction: Research context: 
 
1.1 Introduction:  
During his remarks at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2016, U.S 
Secretary of State, John Kerry said, among other things, that, ‘’just this week, we 
saw reports that more than 50 people in Nigeria, including former government 
officials, stole $9 billion from the treasury’’ (Kerry, 2016)1. Kerry was referring 
specifically to the Dasukigate corruption scandal in which then immediate past 
National Security Adviser, retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki and other top officials 
of government were alleged to have siphoned off billions from the security 
budget. But similar cases of grand corruption by top level officials of government 
and corporate executives, typically involving hundreds of millions or billions of 
dollars have been regular features of news in Nigeria since the return to 
democracy in 1999. During this period, Nigeria has consistently ranked high 
among the most corrupt countries in the world, clinching the top place in 2000 
in the Transparency International (TI) corruption perception index2. Hardly a 
week goes by without some news of corruption being reported in the Nigerian 
press. At first glance, this gives the impression of an adversarial press much 
active in its watchdog role. Indeed, journalism practitioners and scholars alike 
have attributed such reporting of corruption to Nigerian media’s bravery and 
vigilance in promoting democratic development and good governance. For 
example, Ojo (2003: 832) notes that “since the advent of democracy in Nigeria 
                                                          
1 John Kerry, Remarks at WEF, Davos, 22 January 2016 (www.cfr.org/economic-development/remarks-
secretary-kerry-world-economic-forum/p37469 
2 Transparency International Report, 2000 (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2000/0/). Since 
then, Nigeria’s position on TI’s Corruption Perception Index has changed significantly, generally lower, although 
TI’s CPI data and their sources have also changed considerably, including more countries than in 2000. Nigeria 
currently ranks 136 out of 176 countries on the TI’s 2016 Index. However, it is possible that Nigerians generally 




in 1999, the media have been alert to their function of watchdog”. Yet, 
corruption of the sort involving millions and even billions of dollars, or grand 
corruption as it is often called, is a highly clandestine affair. First, it normally 
involves a small number of officials occupying high positions entrusted to make 
decisions on behalf of the public. Second, majority of citizens do not have any 
direct experience of corruption of this scale, unlike petty or everyday corruption 
which citizens can experience directly in their everyday engagement with the 
state because it generally involves small sums of money and lower level 
bureaucrats, (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 11; Moody-Stuart, 1997: 2). 
Hoffmann and Patel (2017: 9) report that Nigerians are quick to recall paying a 
bribe to traffic police to escape a fine, and the ethnographer, Smith (2001: 352-
353) recounts the case of a parent bribing an official of the education ministry 
to get a child into school. Both examples above illustrate petty or lower scale 
corruption in Nigeria. But for cases of corruption involving higher level officials 
and much larger sums of money such as the case of Dasukigate cited by Kerry 
above, citizens typically learn about them in the news, rather than through 
personal experience. It is an important question, then, to ask how news of a 
$9bn official theft breaks to the press in Nigeria and on such regular basis. How 
and to what extent is corruption reported in the Nigerian press? What part, if 
any, does independent investigative journalism play in press coverage of 
corruption in Nigeria? How do the specific contexts of politics, economy and 
society in Nigeria influence investigative reporting of corruption? This last 
question is especially significant because specific national contexts influence or 
shape media systems and journalistic behaviour around the world (Hanitzsch, 
2011; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The above then are some of the questions with 
which this research engages. It seeks to understand and evaluate investigative 
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reporting of corruption in Nigeria in the context of the past decade and half of 
democratization.  
(a) Period of study: 
The period under consideration (1999-2012) is itself remarkable for Nigeria in 
many respects. First, it represents the longest stretch of democracy in its 
political history, during which Nigeria has witnessed, for the first time, a peaceful 
transfer of power from one democratic government to another in 2007 and to 
an opposition party in 2015 respectively. Considering that previous attempts at 
democratic transfer of power, even within the same party, had resulted in 
military intervention, these successful elections represent a significant 
milestone for Nigerian political development (Egbefo, 2015; Egwemi, 2010). It 
also points towards some prospects for democratic consolidation, which 
Schedler (1998: 91) describes as the possibility of extending the life expectancy 
of a new democracy beyond the short term. Secondly, the Nigerian economy 
has seen considerable expansion during the same period, due mainly to steady 
increases in oil prices (from 2002 to 2014) and expansion of new sectors such as 
telecoms and the entertainment industry (World Bank Group, 2014: 3-4)3, 
becoming, by 2012, the largest economy on the continent with a GDP well above 
$500 billion dollars.  
Indeed, the economics and politics of oil in Nigeria is central to discussions about 
its political and economic developments, and particularly significant for any 
discussions of corruption in the country. For example, according to Itumo (2016: 
21), since the discovery of oil in 1956, Nigeria’s economy has shifted 
considerably from one based on agricultural and manufacturing exports to a 
                                                          
3 Since 2015 however, the economy has been on a downward trend, resulting in its first recession in two decades 




‘mono-cultural’ economy based almost entirely on oil exports. In 1958, Itumo 
notes further, oil in Nigeria makes up just about 1% of export earnings, but by 
1984, it has risen to 97%, and has hovered in the region of 90% of export 
earnings ever since (ibid). Furthermore, as the thirteenth largest exporter of 
crude oil in the world with total production of more than 2 million barrels per 
day, its oil exports account for over 80% of government revenues and budgetary 
expenditures (Itumo, 2016: 24; Watts, 2004: 50). Similarly, Akanbi (2015: 1579) 
contends that the Nigerian economy remains over-reliant on oil revenues with 
attendant effects on shocks to the economy, each time there is a slump in oil 
prices in the global oil market, as most recently in 2014-2015.  
In addition, the outsized role that oil plays in Nigerian economy also influences 
its politics, and as we shall see presently, the extent and scale of corruption too, 
since, in the main, oil in Nigeria is effectively under the control of the federal 
government. For example, Onapajo et al (2015: 4) observe that abundant oil 
wealth in Nigeria serves to intensify elite competition because access to state 
power also simultaneously guarantees access to oil wealth, in practice if not in 
theory. For Onapajo et al therefore, oil wealth, or at least access to it through 
state power, explains incessant coups during military regimes and win-at-all-cost 
electoral practices during democratic governments in the country. Furthermore, 
Ikelegbe (2005: 208) notes that oil wealth and its politics is the underlying factor 
behind much of the regional and local political conflicts in the Niger Delta 
region4.  
More significantly however, several observers, taking a cue from the literature 
on ‘resource course’ see a connection between Nigeria’s political economy of oil 
                                                          
4 The Niger Delta region, comprising about nine of Nigeria’s 36 states, is the region of the country where most 
of the onshore oil is located, although over 90% of the oil onshore oil is drilled from three core states of Akwa-
Ibom, Delta and Rivers states. A lot of exploration and drilling also goes on offshore.   
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and the extent and scale of corruption in the country (Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2013; Vincente, 2010; Shaxson, 2007; Ades and Di Tella, 1999). 
While records of official malfeasance in Nigeria dates to the early 1920s, the rise 
of a mono-cultural oil economy since the 1970s appears to have intensified it 
(Pearce, 2016). As Osoba (1996: 371) put it, “corruption in Nigeria is aided and 
enhanced by oil revenues”. Similarly, Ogbeidi (2012: 8-10) has noted that a 
series of oil booms, or ‘windfalls’ as they are known in local parlance, from the 
1970s to date tend to correlate not only with frequent changes in government 
by ballot or coups, but also with accusations of corruption in the press and 
popular culture alike, since such accusations of corruption, Pearce (2016: 118) 
notes, are ‘performative’, and thereby doing political work. Thus, if accusations 
of corruption in Nigeria are a form of performative politics, it is worth asking 
what role the press, and investigative journalism particularly, plays in that 
process.  
As we shall see, developments in the country’s political and economic sectors 
since 1999 have in turn occasioned similar developments in the media, far more 
rapidly and extensively than at any time previously. The advent of democracy 
intensified deregulation of the media and improved general operating 
atmosphere, leading up to the adoption of Freedom of Information Act in 2011. 
This, in turn, has resulted in the proliferation of new media outlets across all 
platforms: print, broadcast and increasingly online. Also, new players in the 
economy have expanded the advertising and media markets (Tsegyu, 2015; 
Ciboh, 2007). One implication of these changes is a massive increase in coverage 
of politics, including coverage of corruption in both mainstream and social 
media. Another implication is audience fragmentation, as young voters with 
little or no experience of life under the military seek alternative channels of 
expression made possible by a burgeoning mobile phone market and growth of 
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social media, both of which have been relevant to politics and political 
communication in the country. Third, professional journalism training has 
expanded too, perhaps in response to these and other changes in society. 
Salawu (2009: 84) contends that since the turn of the century, there has been a 
“boom” for journalism and mass communication programmes in Nigerian higher 
education as both old and new universities establish such programmes. And yet, 
rising population, poverty and inequality, corruption, communal conflicts, 
militancy and terrorism during this period have together threatened to 
undermine Nigeria’s very political, economic and social foundations (Egbefo, 
2015; Ani, 2012). And more significantly for our purposes here, the media has 
been the most sites of these conflicts and issues in Nigeria (Hackett, 2003; 
Sampson, 2012). For corruption particularly, Global Financial Integrity (2017) 
estimates that from 2005 to 2014 alone Nigeria lost some $182 billion through 
illicit financial flows out of the country (in Hoffmann and Patel, 2017: IV).   
The connection between investigative journalism and press coverage of 
corruption on the one hand, and developments in Nigerian politics and economy 
on the other, bears restating. Over its long march to freedom, the press has 
become established as an organ of public accountability in a democratic society: 
to check the abuses and excesses of those in power and to keep the state in its 
proper constitutional boundaries (McQuail, 2005: 166-170). For societies in 
democratic transition like Nigeria, these political watchdog functions of the 
press can be particularly important, given that authoritarian tendencies of the 
immediate past, including corruption and impunity, may yet remain deeply 
entrenched in the new democracy (Jebril, Loveless and Stetka, 2015: 90-91; 
Voltmer, 2013: 103; McConnel and Becker, 2002: 2). The implication then is that 
the media helps to ‘deepen’ or ‘consolidate’ democratic development in a 
variety of ways, but particularly through its watchdog function. At least, as we 
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shall see, it is this function that Nigerian media and journalists conceive for 
themselves. My argument here is that an empirical evaluation of investigative 
reporting of corruption and press coverage of corruption more generally5 over 
the same period would be a useful way of making valid statements about media 
and democratization in Nigeria. Therefore, in this chapter, I first examine 
democratization and corruption in the context of Africa and Nigeria, and the 
ways in which both connect to investigative journalism and the press in order to 
define the starting point of the research.   
1.2 Democratization in Africa:  
A broad understanding of democratization sees it as any incremental change 
towards more democracy, “no matter how small” (Bogaards, 2010: 476), 
implying that democratic governance can always be perfected, for both new and 
established democracies alike. But a narrower definition focuses on democratic 
transition and is more common in comparative literature. Whitehead (2002: 27) 
defines democratization in this sense as “a complex, long term, dynamic, and 
open-ended process ... of progress towards a more rule-based, more consensual 
and more participatory type of politics”, (in Jebril, Loveless and Stetka, 2015: 
85). This implies a starting point characterised by an authoritarian political 
system such as military rule or single party dictatorships that dominated African 
political systems before the 1990s, and a movement away from that point to 
more rule-based and popular participation of citizens in the governance system. 
This process is usually marked by a founding multi-party election, such as 
                                                          
5 The distinction between investigative reporting of corruption and otherwise general press coverage of 
corruption is important to this research. The assumption is that newspapers can report news of corruption which 
they have not independently investigated (general coverage or reporting of corruption), for example news of 
corruption investigated by the police or anticorruption agency; but they can also report news of corruption 
which they have independently investigated (investigative reporting of corruption). The key difference is 
independent journalistic initiative and independent sources in the case of investigative reporting of corruption. 
The coding procedure is based on this distinction.   
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Nigeria’s 1999 transition election, which symbolize a point of departure from 
the previous authoritarian system (Monck, 2001; in Bogaards, 2010: 476).  
Research on democratization has turned full circle since Huntington’s idea of a 
‘Third Wave’ of democratization (Haggard and Kauffmann, 2016: 126). 
Huntington (1991) argued that a ‘third wave’ had arrived on the historical 
horizon of democratization, following two previous waves and reversals 
stretching over a century and half. He attributed this to a range of factors 
including “performance legitimacy” crisis of authoritarian governments, post-
war economic boom in the 1960s, the collapse of Soviet Union and the decline 
of the Cold War, among others. These factors, Huntington argues, sparked off 
the collapse of authoritarian regimes first in Spain and Portugal in the mid-
1970s, and then in Latin America and former Soviet republics of Eastern Europe, 
consequently ‘snowballing’ to other regions like Africa (ibid: 13-14). This idea in 
turn sparked off a flurry of research on the causes of regime change and 
transition in many formerly autocratic systems. In her review of extant research 
two decades after liberalization in Southern Europe, Geddes (1999) identifies 
several such causes, including poor economic performance or outright economic 
crises, factionalism and splits within outgoing regimes, benevolent elite-initiated 
transitions, the influence of external events and institutions such as IMF and the 
World Bank, etc. Carothers (2002) notes, however, that observers of the third 
wave had assumed democratization follows a straight path from political 
liberalization to consolidation. Such a straightforward conception of 
democratization, Carothers notes further, overlooks structural impediments like 
viability of the state, political tensions arising from ethnic diversity, continuing 
legacies of an authoritarian past and entrenched socio-cultural traditions. But as 
the contradictions of these factors became apparent in the new democracies, 
enthusiasm in scholarly and policy circles waned. The findings of many studies 
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reveal a common theme: despite the elections, many third wave democracies 
came to be regarded as falling short of even minimalist conditions for effective 
democracy. Consequently, the research agenda turned to the search for 
explaining the ‘democratic deficits’ and a barrage of new terms and concepts 
emerged for describing and measuring the ‘quality’ of democracy in the third 
wave countries: defective democracies, illiberal democracies, competitive 
authoritarianism, electoral democracies or semi-democracies, hybrid regimes, 
and so on (Haggard and Kauffman, 2016; Bogaards, 2009; Croissant, 2004; 
Croissant and Merkel, 2004; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 1998; Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997). What then are the implications of the foregoing for 
democratization in Africa, and Nigeria specifically?  
(a) African Experience:  
African countries make up a sizable number of third wave democracies. Some 
44 out of 48 Sub-Saharan countries held multiparty transition elections between 
1990 and 2003 (Lynch and Crawford, 2011: 279; Hassim, 2006: 931). Perhaps for 
this reason, Africa has featured considerably in many scholarly investigations of 
political change in the developing world. This work was first to explain the 
emergence, and then to assess performance so far. Hassim (2006: 931) points 
out that the recent push towards more democracy in Africa results from “dual 
pressures on corrupt, heavily indebted, and authoritarian states” by 
international lending agencies and local grassroots movements. She argues, 
however, that this wave of democratization must be understood within the 
context of a longstanding trend of resistance against foreign or local 
authoritarianisms on the continent. By this view then, current democratization 
in Africa is but a stage in a long march towards freedom and development 
stretching back decades. Brown and Kaiser (2007: 1140-1142) hold that 
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structural factors such as political culture and an underdeveloped economy have 
long been viewed as either incentives or impediments to democracy in Africa by 
modernization and dependency theoretical schools. But more recent 
explanations, they note, have emphasized civil society mobilization. Morency-
Laflamme (2015) finds elite factionalism and civil society mobilizations as the 
drivers of democratization in South Africa, Benin and Togo. Vanhanen (2004) 
follows his earlier work on democratization in other regions to argue that the 
African experience is also explained by the struggle for power and limited 
resources among elites and masses alike. But perhaps the most influential 
theory of democratization in Africa is advanced by Michael Bratton and 
colleagues (Bratton, 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 1997).  
In this formulation, civil society organizations in Africa evolved in response to 
urbanization and modernization of the economy during the early colonial 
period. Some of these civil society organizations were ethnic welfare 
associations in towns and cities, but also church organizations, professional 
associations like those of journalists and lawyers, trade unions of railway or mine 
workers, women’s groups and so on. They differed in prominence in respective 
countries, but everywhere civil society organizations provided alternative fora 
for expression and pursuit of common goals, and occupied the informal 
economy, which in Africa can be as large as the formal economy, if not more so. 
Soon enough, Bratton (1994: 5-6) argues, they became involved with nationalist 
political parties and politicians in the anti-colonial movement. After 
independence however, most became politically dormant but again morphed 
into ‘alternative institutional framework to officialdom’ when military and 
single-party authoritarian regimes became the norm shortly after. For Bratton 
(1994: 6) then 
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the fact that African citizens autonomously undertook a wide range of 
organized economic activity had profound political implications. As 
trade shifted to illegal or informal networks, taxes became difficult to 
collect and public revenues diminished, especially in valuable foreign 
exchange, thereby exacerbating the fiscal crisis of the state. 
Financially deprived governments had little option but to loosen 
restrictions on autonomous networks and organizations by permitting 
them to perform some of the functions previously monopolized by 
government. By the end of the 1980s, independent associations and 
alternative economic networks together provided a recruiting ground 
for a popular upsurge against post-colonial autocracy   
 
By mobilizing marginalized groups through discourses of human rights and anti-
corruption and strategies such as the national conference, civil society 
organizations successfully dislodged authoritarian governments from power, 
with the active assistance of the donor community (ibid: 1994: 10). For a theory 
of democratization, the Huntingtonian origins of this idea are apparent, even if 
it substitutes the role of the Catholic Church in Southern Europe and Latin 
America in the original for civil society in Africa. But it has two implications for 
this research. First, for its persuasiveness, it depends on a ‘neopatrimonial’ 
model of the African state in which political, economic and even social 
organization are based on a patronage system by the bigman at all levels of 
governance (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 1997). It thus explicitly links 
democratization to corruption, both major themes of the present research. 
Secondly, it puts civil society, and by implication the press, at the core of both 
democratization and anti-corruption. As Bratton (1994: 6) claims, “African 
journalists have been a driving force within civil society”, through their political 
reporting and commentary. Indeed, it is within this ‘civil society’ model of 
democratization that several scholars locate both media and journalists, and by 
implication watchdog journalism in much of African political communication 
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research, as I discuss subsequently (Berger, 2002; Olukotun, 2002; Tettey, 2001). 
But to what extent has democracy fared in Africa after over two decades? 
There is some good news. Carbone et al (2016) compare 30 years of GDP data 
and find that democratic governance has improved economic growth for 43 
African countries. Also, Lindberg and Clark (2008) provide evidence to support a 
declining possibility of military intervention in African politics. Coups are 7.5 
times less likely to occur and 18 times less likely to result in regime collapse in 
the more democratic countries, because of election turn-overs and relative 
expansion in civil liberties. Thus, over time, repeated elections have a self-
reinforcing effect on democratization in the region (Lindberg, 2006). Most 
findings are less upbeat however. Wahman (2014) finds that electoral turnovers 
and opposition victories enhance democratization in only a few countries like 
Ghana, but not in others like Kenya and Senegal, due to weak party 
institutionalization. Gyimah-Boadi (2015) has observed that initial enthusiasm 
for democracy on the continent has been followed by a “waning commitment” 
to it, due to several factors, above all, lack of constitutionalism among the 
players, in government and opposition alike. Similarly, Adebanwi and Obadare 
(2011a) contend that deliberate rigging of elections, or their outright 
annulment, and instigation of post-election violence have combined to 
“abrogate the electorate”. Lynch and Crawford (2011) offer evidence that point 
to both prospects for hope and conditions for concern, such as endemic 
corruption and rising inequality, even amidst rising economic growth over a 
decade.  
(b) The Nigerian Experience:  
The specific case of democratization in Nigeria reflects the general trend for 
Africa described above. Indeed, several of the studies cited for Africa include 
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Nigeria in the analysis or draws examples from its experience. Still, some studies 
show that Nigerian elections have been fraught with irregularities, 
manipulation, vote-rigging, vote-buying and suppression of popular will by 
several means, sometimes in concert with security agencies, the electoral 
management body itself or its field agents or by the outsized influence of 
“election merchants and political barons” (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006; 
Adejumobi, 2000). Other researchers look at lack of ideology and poor 
institutionalization in all the parties (Dode, 2010; Omotola, 2010). Yet, others 
investigate the connection between democratization and ethno-religious 
conflicts that have been a major characteristic of the transition period since 
1999 (Ukiwo, 2003), some of which involves active participation by some civil 
society organizations (Ikelegbe, 2001). Consequently, Fasakin (2015) reasons 
that Nigeria at present is de-democratizing since democracy has not delivered 
sufficient dividends to citizens in economic terms or expansion of political rights, 
and thus threatens the security of it the state. For all the foregoing, however, a 
series of surveys by Bratton and Lewis (2008) still find that although 
democratization has not delivered socio-economic goods, preference for 
democracy among Nigerians remains high, since over time, the process has 
increased ‘political goods’ such as civil liberties and political rights. Moreover, 
Alebiosu (2016: 69) observes that the introduction of ‘smart card readers’ which 
track voter details in the 2015 general elections has greatly improved the 
integrity of the electoral process and recommends its further use in future 
elections. Similarly, Lewis and Kew (2015: 94) contend that the defeat of the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)6 at the polls during the 2015 general elections 
and its peaceful concession to the opposition are indications of a maturing 
                                                          
6 The PDP had controlled both houses of the federal parliament, the presidency, and majority of the states since 
the 1999 election, but was overwhelmingly defeated in the 2015 general elections by the opposition All 
Progressives Congress (APC).     
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democracy in the country. Finally, some studies consider corruption and bad 
governance as the ‘bane of democracy’ in Nigeria (Ogundiya, 2010), because 
corruption erodes popular legitimacy (Fagbadebo, 2007: 28), particularly at the 
grassroots and local government level (Lawal and Oladunjoye, 2010). Indeed, 
Adebanwi and Obadare (2011b) claim that corruption “arguably” led to collapse 
of previous attempts at democratization in Nigeria, but nonetheless expect that 
“the ebullience of civil society, the freedom of the press, and the accountability 
of political institutions, among others, will sound the death knell of corruption” 
(ibid: 187). It should be noted however, that, few of these studies present 
scarcely any systematic data to support the claims they make about 
democratization in Nigeria. Nevertheless, they highlight some conceptual 
connections between democratization, corruption and the press in Nigeria. 
1.3 What is Corruption? Defining and measuring corruption:   
Perceptions of corruption are ubiquitous everywhere. A poll of 24,000 people in 
26 countries sponsored by the BBC ranks corruption as the frequently most 
discussed issue among the public globally (Holmes, 2015: xiii). The World Bank 
estimates that about $1 trillion is paid in bribes annually around the world (Goel 
and Nelson, 2010: 433). And yet, few concepts are more difficult to define than 
corruption. However, the most widely cited definition is that by Transparency 
International: corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain (Holmes, 
2015: 2). But this definition is also the most contested. There are several grounds 
for the contestation. First, the definition assumes that corruption occurs only in 
contexts involving a ‘public official’ or ‘office’, and thus rules out illicit gain or 
abuse of power and trust in the private sector. But as Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 
(2016: 7) point out, corruption occurs in the private sector as well, even without 
any public officials involved, and its impacts can be just as damaging. 
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Furthermore, Harris (2003) has observed that the question is not one of misuse 
of office for private gain, but of its extent, since “misuse of power for private 
gain is normal political behaviour and corruption comes in only at some 
qualitative or quantitative threshold deemed unacceptable” (ibid: 5-6). For 
Harris, personal gain of some kind is a normal consequence of holding public 
office which most politicians exploit in the form of patronage, political spoils, 
revolving doors into directorships of companies after public office, 
consultancies, paid speeches, book contracts and so on. Thus, he offers a 
different definition of corruption as “an illegitimate extension of normal political 
activity” (ibid: 29). Scholars also disagree about what constitutes “abuse” of 
office, since societies differ in culture and normative values (Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka, 2016: 239; Gregory, et al, 2012: 7). There is disagreement also over the 
boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’ gain, particularly in societies where 
ethnicity and identity politics more generally are high (Orjuela, 2014: 759) or in 
societies with more ‘collectivist’, rather than ‘individualistic’ cultures (Li, Triandis 
and Yu, 2006). Sometimes, corruption is simply perceptual. Graycar and 
Monaghan (2015: 592) report that a national poll in Australia found that 43% of 
respondents believed corruption was increasing, even though only 1% reported 
that they had paid a bribe in the previous year.  
In other words, corruption is difficult to define because it varies significantly in 
form and content across countries and is sometimes intricately linked to 
legitimate transactions. However, I follow Michael Johnston’s definition that 
corruption involves “the abuse of trust for private benefit, which often, but by 
no means always, comes in the form of money” (Johnston, 2005: 11). That is, 
corruption involving financial misconduct by public officials, institutions or top 
executives in the private sector. This definition is useful here as it explicitly 
conceives money as the foremost value gained through corrupt transactions, 
25 
 
which fits with the way news of corruption is generally expressed in Nigerian 
newspapers, and hence my adoption of it.  
(a) Measuring Corruption:  
There are several measures of corruption most of which are contested because, 
as a clandestine activity, corruption is difficult to measure both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. For example, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) does not measure corruption itself, but its perception by citizens, 
businesses and other observers through aggregations of surveys. The World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI) is like Transparency International’s CPI 
but includes data on anti-corruption institutions such as electoral integrity and 
freedom of the press (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 19). Both CPI and CCI 
publish cross-national data on corruption annually and are “extremely highly 
correlated” to each other (Treisman, 2007: 213). Yet, Johnston (2005: 20) 
observes that because the CPI is based on a single numeric value, the index 
reduces the complexity of corruption to quantitative matters of degree, and by 
implication obscures qualitative differences both within and across countries. 
For Orjuela (2014: 756), the CPI simultaneously covers too much and too little: 
it subsumes many different practices under the same label, but still separate 
them from the social, political and cultural contexts within which they occur. 
Finally, some studies observe that perceptual measures of corruption fail to 
capture the more complex ways in which corruption occurs in more advanced 
economies and democracies, such as influence peddling, campaign finance, 
lobbying for self-interested legislation or de-legislation, breach of trust and 
conflict of interest, distortion of level-playing field or gaming the system, or the 
role of multinational corporations and banks in corruption in developing 
countries (Andersson, 2017; Cockcroft and Wegener, 2017; Stapenhurst et al, 
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2017; Graycar, 2016; Graycar and Monaghan, 2015; Johnston, 2014; Harris, 
2003; Moody-Stuart, 1997). 
(b) Corruption in Nigeria: 
African countries occupy the bottom rungs of most cross-national corruption 
indices (Collier, 2000: 192). But since millions of Africans are as honest as people 
everywhere (ibid: 201), this has posed the difficult problem of locating the 
causes of corruption in Africa. It is estimated that Africa has lost nearly $1 trillion 
to illicit financial flows and continues to lose $50 billion a year in such illicit 
outflows, or several times more than donor inflows (Schlenther, 2016: 1076). 
For Nigeria, Hoffmann and Patel (2017: iv) estimate that over $400 billion has 
been lost to corruption between 1960 and 1999 and that in 2014 alone, Nigeria 
lost some $12 billion or 9% of total trade volume to illicit outflows. Indeed, 
research evidence shows that corruption harms developing economies, as 
determined by various indicators such as lower economic growth, lower human 
capital development in education and health, foreign direct investment, 
increase in poverty and inequality, etc (Triesman, 2007: 221; Lambsdorff, 2005: 
4-11). Furthermore, Holmes (2015: 19-23) encourages lower levels of trust and 
public morality, and greater attachment to kinship, which in diverse countries 
like Nigeria potentially intensifies ethnic conflict. But what causes corruption? 
Some researchers point to the abundance of natural resources which creates 
opportunities for rent-seeking (Gregory et al, 2012: 8) or unearned income 
(Watts, 2004: 52-54), such as oil in Nigeria. The economist, Paul Collier (2000: 
194) suggests that Africa became corrupt because of a “massive rise in the 
opportunities for corruption” created by excessive involvement of the state in 
the economy and weak monitoring. Other factors such as religion, legal system 
and colonialism are also said to correlate with corruption (Treisman, 2007). 
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However, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) trace corruption to the 
‘neopatrimonial’ state in Africa. In this model, political authority is personalised 
by the chief executive through an informal system of patronage and “relations 
of loyalty and dependency”, superimposed on a formal political and 
bureaucratic system. Neither the law nor political ideology matters that much 
although they exist formally, and public office blurs into private property for 
acquiring personal wealth and status for the holder. The key to this 
neopatrimonial system, they argue, is “the award by public officials of personal 
favours, both within the state (notably public-sector jobs) and in society (for 
instance, licenses, contracts and projects” (ibid: 458). For Bratton and Van de 
Walle, then, this theory explains both corruption and democratization in African 
countries, and of their privileging civil society as the prime instigator of 
democracy. Put simply, a neopatrimonial state does not permit elite 
factionalism; therefore, regime change is possible only through grassroots civil 
society mobilization against the state by appealing to the language of human 
rights and accountability, a process in which journalists and the press play a 
leading part (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). There is a lot to say for this idea 
about corruption in Nigeria. For example, Adebanwi and Obadare (2011b), find 
it appealing for their analysis of corruption in Nigeria. However, Bratton and Van 
de Walle still ignore two facts. First, as several researchers have pointed out, 
many African civil society organizations are in fact lackeys of the state or of 
certain sections of it, rather than autonomous agents of democracy (Obadare, 
2005); conflict-ridden and often as despotic and corrupt as the state, especially 
with aid dollars (Berger, 2002; Fatton, 1995). Moreover, civil society 
organizations in Africa are sometimes motivated by particularistic ethnic or 
religious interests, rather than broadly national or universal goals of democracy 
(Agbaje, 1993). Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, vertical accountability 
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by civil society against the state as assumed here might be hard to discern 
empirically, as I show in this research. For Nigeria and possibly for much of 
Africa, the state is still the most active agent of anti-corruption, far more than 
any organs of civil society such as the press. It is useful, at this point then, to 
examine press and political development in Nigeria.  
1.4 Press, politics and political development in Nigeria:  
Carl LeVan (2015: 375) states that “by several standard measures, Nigeria is an 
incredibly diverse country. It is home to 5% of all known languages, it is the 
largest country with roughly the same number of Christians and Muslims, and 
several data sets counting ethnic groups consider it among the most 
heterogeneous nations in the world”7. In constitution and structure, the 
Nigerian political system is unique in Africa, closer to that of the United States 
than it does to any other country on continent (Haruna, 2016; Jega, 2016). Under 
the current arrangement of the 1999 Constitution, the latest, and so far, the 
most enduring of Nigeria’s many short-lived constitutions, it is a federation of 
36 states, 774 local government councils, and one federal capital territory in 
Abuja, administered directly by the federal government (Okpanachi and Garba, 
2010: 3). The federal government comprises three independent arms: a 
presidential executive, a bicameral legislature and a hierarchy of federal courts, 
at the top of which is the Nigerian Supreme Court. This basic structure is 
replicated across the 36 states with slight variations, such as a unicameral 
legislature for the states (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). 
It has taken six decades of constitutional negotiation and innovation to arrive at 
the current structure however. At independence in 1960, the federal system 
comprised three ‘Regions’: Northern, Western and Eastern Nigeria respectively. 
                                                          
7 In my view, such descriptions of Nigeria are influenced by the self-reinforcing ethno-religious politics dominant 
in the country, otherwise, Nigeria is not diverse as such, unlike say South Africa.    
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By 1967, the country had been subdivided into 12 ‘States’ by the first set of 
military governments, a process that continued periodically until reaching the 
present number of 36 states in 1996. Suberu (2010: 460-461) notes that the 
Nigerian federalism project has undergone six phases, from the late colonial 
period (1954-1960), through two stretches of several military governments 
which supervised three failed democratic transitions (1966-1979; 1983-1999), 
and finally, to the ongoing Fourth Republic (1999 to date). For him, therefore, 
the federal system today ‘’represents a reasonably viable and successful 
mechanism for managing inter-group conflict and preventing ethno-political 
disintegration’’ (Suberu, 2010: 460). But Suberu’s is one of very few positive 
views of Nigeria’s political development. Other observers see a rather bleak 
future for Nigerian federalism and understand it as a major cause of these very 
conflicts (Kendhammer, 2014; Okpanachi and Garba, 2010; Adamolekun, 2005; 
Anugwom, 2000). But what is the place of the press in the structure described 
above?  
(a) Media development in Nigeria:  
Nigeria has the most complex and diverse media ecology in Africa (Olukotun, 
2004: 74). In addition to a plethora of locally owned broadcast, print and online 
media, there are others like the BBC, VOA, Radio France etc, which though 
foreign owned, are mostly staffed by Nigerian journalists and report mostly 
Nigerian issues, and participate fully within Nigeria’s media culture. Broadcast 
media in the country number about 350 radio and television stations, mostly 
owned and controlled by various governments. Since deregulation of the sector 
in 1992 and democratization in 1999 however, there has been a growing private 
participation in the sector, with well over 100 private broadcasters. These are 
mostly FM radio stations with limited reach and concentrated mainly in the big 
cities and towns (EU, 2015: 22). While Nigerian newspapers and magazines are 
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generally recognised as the most vibrant on the continent mainly for their 
political reporting (Rønning, 2009: 165; Olukotun, 2000a: 33; Kasoma, 1995: 
544; Agbaje, 1993: 458), it is not clear how many publications there are in the 
country. Recent estimates range from 100 to 400 dailies, weeklies and monthlies 
(EU 2015: 22; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2015: 143; Oxford Business Group, 2013: 
278). Most of these are owned by proprietors who were themselves former 
journalists and editors, although an increasing number are owned by politicians 
or businessmen with alliances in politics (Musa and Domatob, 2007: 322). State 
governments and the federal government also own and operate a handful of 
newspapers, most of them dormant or sporadic and hardly read by anyone. In 
other words, the media system is characterised by a dichotomy of ownership: 
government ownership dominates the broadcast sector, while private 
ownership is dominant in the print sector. Finally, while broadband penetration 
remains poor at less than 10% (Fielding-Smith, 2014), internet access is available 
through mobile phones which nine in ten Nigerians now have (PEW Centre, 
2015). Indeed, Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and a few others account for the 
largest share of the ‘mobile revolution’ said to be transforming Africa’s 
democratic, economic, financial, as well as socio-cultural landscapes (Mutiga 
and Flood, 2016; Wallis, 2016; PEW Centre, 2015). Still, broadcasting and the 
press remain the dominant forms of Nigerian media system and account for 
much of the political news in the country.  
Yet, broadcasting and the press have had very different histories in Nigeria. For 
one, while broadcasting was a direct offshoot of the state, the press was not. 
Indeed, broadcasting development has tended to mimic political development 
directly. It emerged through the BBC’s Empire Service ‘repeater’ mechanism 
then known as radio rediffusion service (RDS) in Lagos in the 1930s (Ihechu and 
Okugo, 2013: 13; Udomisor, 2013: 2; Opubor, Akingbolu and Ojebode, 2010: 62) 
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which functioned primarily for keeping ‘’expatriates and colonial officials 
abreast of events in Britain’’ (Ojebode and Akingbolu, 2009: 205). Exigencies of 
the Second World War and its aftermath necessitated expansion to regional 
demographic hubs like Ibadan, Enugu and Kano (Tafida, 2015: 53) in a BBC-styled 
Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) in 1957. Subsequent developments in 
the sector transformed the NBC into Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) and the 
Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) in 1976, both of which, though 
owned by the federal government, remain the dominant players in the 
broadcast sector to date (Opubor, Akingbolu and Ojebode, 2010: 64-65). 
Moreover, just as radio broadcasting grew out of colonial politics, television, 
too, was a consequence of then emerging post-independence politics. The NBC 
Act of 1957 also granted powers to the regions to establish, control and legislate 
on broadcasting stations in their own respective domains, which they all did by 
1962. Similar developments occurred in the print sector as each regional 
government sought to establish and run its own newspapers, often controlled 
by the dominant party in the respective regions, in the name of developing their 
own states or for the need to have their own voice heard within the political 
space (Ojebode and Akingbolu, 2009; 206; Umeh, 1989: 56-58). In this sense, 
therefore, political competition between the regions was a major factor in 
media development in the country. Since then, the impacts of broadcasting 
deregulation in 1992, the return to democracy in 1999 and rapid global 
developments in new media technologies have resulted in the proliferation of 
broadcast, print and online media in the country (Kur and Nyekwere, 2015: 135-
140; Tafida, 2015: 58; Ciboh, 2007: 25).  But unlike broadcasting which was a 
deliberate policy of the state, and therefore heavily regulated by it, the 
newspaper press predated the Nigerian state itself by well over half a century. 
Initially inspired by missionary zeal for proselytization and literacy in the late 
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1850s, the press had become established as educational, political, and 
commercial organ of an emerging local elite long before the colonial state itself 
was consolidated in 1914. By 1910, Lagos alone had 12 daily, weekly and 
monthly newspapers, all of them owned by Nigerians, a development that had 
no comparison anywhere else in Africa (Omu, 1978). Since then, the print press 
in Nigeria has remained predominantly private and independent of government 
control (Hall, 2009: 249; Shaw, 2009: 493; Agbaje, 1993: 458).  
(b) Media and political development in Nigeria:  
As the above shows, the media has been at the heart of the major themes that 
dominate scholarly discussions of political development in Nigeria. The first of 
these themes is the ‘national question’ which refers to the challenge of 
managing pluralism and diversity at various levels of identity: ethnic, religious, 
regional and so on that have impacted significantly on political and institutional 
development in the country since its founding in 1914 to date (Osaghae and 
Suberu, 2005; Gana, 2003; Ukiwo, 2003; Anugwom, 2000). Debates about the 
‘national question’, is a central theme in the scholarly literature on politics and 
political development in Nigeria, and by extension, in Nigerian political 
communication research. Some studies argue that this ‘national question’ 
mitigates against the development of a meaningful national identity and fosters 
discriminatory citizenship practices in politics, economy and society, regardless 
of the ‘federal character principle’, itself a constitutional innovation based on a 
quota system aimed at redressing regional and ethnic disparities in federal jobs 
(Fourchard, 2015; Kendhammer, 2014; Majekodunmi, 2013; Kraxberger, 2005; 
Anugwom, 2000). Others are more concerned with how questions of ethnic, 
religious and regional diversity have shaped political institutions and practices, 
particularly the development of political parties, electoral politics and voting 
patterns of Nigerians, and the ownership and political behaviour of the media 
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(Kuenzi and Lambright, 2015; Kendhammer, 2010; Yusha’u, 2010; Olukotun, 
2004; Omenugha, 2004; Osaghae, 2003; Agbaje, 1993). This last point is 
especially significant for our purposes here. For example, Umeh (1989: 57) has 
noted that the rush by the regional governments to establish and run expensive 
broadcasting ventures shortly after independence merely served ‘’partisan 
political purposes for their governments’’. This was manifested in the first post-
independence general elections in 1965 during which opposing radio and 
television stations across the three regions presented very different and 
conflicting results of the same elections to their audiences; as they did for census 
results only two years earlier (Galadima and Enighe, 2001: 65). In other words, 
partisan competition between regions or states also influenced media output, 
as national and global political events and issues were presented and 
interpreted from regional, often mutually exclusive perspectives (ibid).  
But if broadcasting has been much influenced by the politics of ethno-regional 
competition in its ownership patterns and political economy, so too has the 
press; perhaps even more so. Agbaje (1993: 459) has observed that the Nigerian 
press ‘’has always been one with a cause- committed, agitational and often 
political’’ right from its inception. During the anti-colonial struggle for example, 
some of the ‘nationalists’ like Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo were 
themselves publishers who used newspapers like the West African Pilot, 
Tribune, The Comet, etc, as platforms for their anti-colonial campaign (Tsegyu 
and Ogoshi, 2016: 73- 74; Shaw, 2009: 493; Jibo, 2003: 214; Agbaje, 1993: 459). 
Indeed, Nigeria’s most prominent nationalists and first post-independence 
Governor-General and later President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe had by 1937 created 
the first newspaper chain, comprising of 8 newspapers at different parts of the 
country (Omu, 1978). With independence on the horizon in the 1950s however, 
the press succumbed to the ethno-regional fissions in the wider politics, 
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becoming inextricably linked to the dominant elites and political parties in the 
three regions that emerged at the adoption of the federal system in 1954. Each 
regional government was controlled by a different political party, comprising 
predominantly of members of the same geo-ethnic groups: Action Group (AG) 
mainly by the Yoruba in the West, the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) comprised mainly of the Igbo in the East, while the Hausa-
Fulani dominated Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the North. So too did the 
press. According to Idang (1973: 100), almost all newspapers during that period 
were owned and operated by the regional parties and were ‘’therefore, 
intensely partisan’’ in editorial policy and output (in Jibo, 2003: 219). As one of 
Nigeria’s foremost journalists, Peter Enahoro (1994) put it, most newspapers in 
the country are “in fact regional publications whose loyalties are to the 
personalities and courses espoused by the apparent majority of the people of 
that area. It is tantamount to a monopoly of a vital resource with a crucial 
bearing on the democratic process” (in Olukotun, 2004: 77). This ethno-regional 
partisanship of the press has remained a dominant feature of political reporting 
in Nigeria to date and is manifested in such varied contexts as the reporting of 
elections (Galadima and Enighe, 2001), conflicts (Omenugha, et al, 2015; 
Omenugha, 2004), and even reporting of corruption (Yusha’u, 2010; Jibo and 
Okoosi-Simbene, 2003; Ojo, 2003). For example, in her analysis of a specific 
interethnic conflict in 2002, Omenugha (2004) finds that coverage reflected the 
‘ethnic coloration’ of the newspapers’ ownership and geopolitical location in 
tone, content and even such basic statistical facts as casualty figures. Thus, she 
concludes that in Nigeria, ‘’the newspapers are interested not in reporting the 
truth, as it is, the events as they occurred, but to construct and re-affirm their 
ethnic and cultural positions and identities’’ (ibid: 2004: 74).  
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The above may well be true. However, part of the explanation lies in the political 
economy of the press, rather than deliberate politicization of news. As 
mentioned earlier, many state governments also have their own newspapers or 
magazines, while the federal government owns two of the country’s oldest 
newspapers, the Daily Times in Lagos, and the New Nigerian in Kaduna 
respectively. These government owned newspapers were established for a 
variety of political and developmental reasons and are funded and controlled by 
the governments that established them. And like in broadcasting, the journalists 
in these newspapers were also at once civil servants, although much like the 
private newspapers, state owned newspapers had tended to be independent. In 
the past, many of these were strong and had large readerships. But years of 
military governments and a stagnating economy means that many are now 
defunct or dormant, although a few have been resuscitated since return to 
democracy (Ciboh, 2007). For the private newspapers however, the story is 
different. Newsprint and machinery are imported against declining and volatile 
currency exchange market. This is aggravated by poor infrastructure in the 
country such as electricity and transport networks, resulting in higher 
production costs, for example in running diesel generators to power offices and 
presses, often located in different parts of the country (Oxford Business Group, 
2013: 278). In the face of these, circulation figures have dwindled drastically 
from 400, 000 copies in the mid-1970s for Daily Times alone to less than 300,000 
copies for all the top 15 dailies combined, though rising to about 600, 000 copies 
in an election year (Aliagan, 2015: 12; Oxford Business Group, 2013: 278). Wages 
are generally low, well below what other private businesses like banks and 
telecoms companies pay to graduate recruits, and often goes unpaid for many 
months for some of the newspapers, helping to fuel corruption in the sector 
itself (Adeyemi, 2013: 133; Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe, 2012: 514; Akinwale, 
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2010: 59). For all these however, some parts of the country fare better than 
others. Lagos is the commercial, industrial, educational and cultural nerve 
centre of Nigeria. Its GDP exceeds that of Kenya (Economist, 2013)8, and is 
therefore home to a larger percentage of the country’s burgeoning middle class. 
These factors make Lagos and the South West attractive for newspaper 
publishing, and private media in general, which partly may explain the high 
concentration of private media in Lagos and Ibadan in the South West, and to a 
lesser extent Abuja and other major cities in both the North and South. Thus, 
being so situated, the press tends to reflect the dominant worldviews of its 
respective ‘host’ communities, sometimes in the form of sensational reporting 
or screaming headlines with little story body, all in a country that remains deeply 
polarized along ethnic, regional and sectarian lines.  
1.5 Defining the research problem and brief outline of thesis:   
The foregoing discussion represents the general context within which the 
present research is situated, namely the debates around democratization and 
corruption in Nigeria, and by inference, Africa and other developing 
democracies. Also, this chapter has opened a conceptual door between these 
debates on corruption and democratization on the one hand, and the press as 
part of civil society on the other. We have seen that questions about 
democratization in Nigeria are intimately connected to those of corruption, and 
within these, of civil society and the press; indeed, this scholarly connection 
between democratization and reduction of corruption or improvement of 
political accountability is not limited to Africa, but also to Eastern Europe 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). First, as detailed above, democratization in Africa is said 
to have been brought about through political opposition to authoritarian 
                                                          




regimes by civil society activism, grassroots mobilization and strategic counter 
discourses of human rights and accountability. Journalists and newspapers were 
said to have played prominent roles in these processes. For Nigeria particularly, 
the press has long been thought of as agents of democracy and accountability. 
Newspapers and magazines, we observed, have been deeply entwined in some 
of the major questions of political change and political development in the 
country, from the struggle to independence, to questions of managing ethnic 
and regional pluralism, to bringing an end to military intervention in politics, and 
by implication, bringing about democratization. Two decades after 
democratization in Africa and elsewhere however, scholars and policy makers 
have gone back to the structural features of African countries to explain 
democratic performance, resulting in several nomenclatures, or “democracy 
with adjectives” as Collier and Levitsky (1997) put it, for describing democracy 
in the developing world. One of these structural features, as Lynch and Crawford 
(2011: 275) point out in their review of research on democratization in Africa, is 
“endemic corruption”, which undermines democratic processes such as 
elections and effective power of citizens by impoverishing them. Corruption, 
then, “weakens democratic governance”, in general, but even more so for 
developing democracies (Gregory et al, 2012: 8). And for Nigeria specifically, as 
we have seen, some observers note that corruption is in fact, the very ‘bane’ of 
democratization because it undermines popular legitimacy, scuttles grassroots 
democratic development and threatens presents efforts at democratic 
consolidation, the same way it had led to the collapse of previous attempts 
(Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Lawal and Oladunjoye, 2010; Ogundiya, 2010a).  
But again, in Africa, corruption itself is understood as a central feature and 
consequence of personalized rule or presidentialism, prebendalism, patronage 
and clientilism, the open sores of the state within which corruption is located 
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(Lynch and Crawford, 2011: 283; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994: 458). Thus, 
just as personalized rule, that is, rule by the bigman rather than by the 
constitution or political ideology legitimated through free and fair elections, is a 
feature of authoritarianism, it is also the cause of corruption. To dislodge both 
requires democratizing the state from bottom-up and ensuring greater freedom 
for individuals and civil society, including an independent media to challenge the 
state and hold it accountable (Lynch and Crawford, 2011: 291-292). In other 
words, the media, as the foremost organs of civil society, are assumed to play 
the dual function of furthering democratic development and ensuring political 
accountability, which in countries like Nigeria, simply means exposing 
corruption and engendering its reform (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011b: 187). As 
Jebril, Loveless and Stetka (2015) contend in their analysis of media and 
democratization research in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America, 
political socialization of citizens towards democratic values and behaviour as 
well as and political accountability are the foremost issues of scholarly concern. 
But how are the media to do these, particularly, how would the media hold the 
state accountable? The answer, as I discuss in detail in the next chapter, is an 
old one: watchdog journalism, and by implication, investigative reporting. 
Herein lies the specific location of this research, although with a focus to Nigeria. 
Journalism and the press have long had connections to corruption, at least to its 
disclosure. Indeed, beyond studies of media and politics, the literature on 
corruption, from a variety of social science perspectives (politics, anthropology, 
sociology, public economics, etc) have long explored these connections. In one 
aspect, lower levels of press freedom correlates strongly with higher levels of 
corruption, a consistent finding of several researches in political science and 
public economics (Gregory et al, 2012; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). In another 
sense, press coverage of corruption influences measures of corruption based on 
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perceptions of it, in such a way that higher measures of corruption may be 
reflecting the degree of press freedom rather than incidence of corruption 
(Cordis and Milyo, 2016: 121; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 20). 
Furthermore, Gupta (1995: 376) contends that the “discourse of corruption” is 
the prism through citizens imagine the state. But for Gupta, this discourse of 
corruption is itself constructed, and contested, in press coverage of corruption, 
particularly newspapers, so much that anthropologists who study corruption 
should pay attention to local media (ibid: 385). More significantly, some of this 
literature conceives newspapers and the press as institutions of accountability, 
or quite simply as an anti-corruption agency of sorts. In this sense, a free press 
is listed among ‘extra-governmental’ institutions that contribute to checking 
corruption such as strong civil society, competitive markets, property rights and 
so on (Johnston, 2014: 21; Mulgan, 2000: 563). As Holmes (2015: 116) point out 
in his concise introduction to corruption, in a democratic system, “the mass 
media, both print and electronic, have a significant role to play in combatting 
corruption. They can investigative allegations and publish their findings, and 
both directly and indirectly pressure the authorities to pursue the claims”. In 
other words, investigative reporting and press coverage of corruption are at the 
heart of these debates on the linkages between democratization and corruption 
in new democracies. This research, then, investigates the extent to which the 
press in Nigeria performs these functions over the nearly two decades of 
democratization in the country.  
The next chapter links up some of these discussions with literature and research 
in mainstream political communication, particularly that concerns assumptions 
of liberal media in relation to press freedom, investigative reporting and 
corruption, comparatively from the established democracies, to societies under 
democratic transition in Africa and elsewhere, and finally Nigeria. This is to cast 
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a broad theoretical and empirical glance at the context within which the 
research is situated, as well as to outline how it contributes to the field, and 
hence the specific research questions. Chapter three outlines the methodology 
and research design on which data was collected, namely a triangulation of 
content analysis, participant observation and semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with investigative reporters, editors and others over two field trips in 
Nigeria. Following that, chapters four to seven present, analyse and discuss the 
data collected, both in connection to the research questions, as well as to the 
researcher’s interpretation of the data. Chapter four presents content analysis 
data on press coverage of corruption. I find that corruption is extensively 
reported in Nigerian newspapers, accounting for over 8% of all frontpage news 
coverage in the newspapers sampled. But most of this coverage results, not 
from independent investigations of corruption by the newspapers, but from a 
longstanding ‘anti-corruption culture’ in Nigerian politics, by which I mean the 
general tendency by virtually all governments in Nigeria since independence, 
military and civilian alike, to make the fight or ‘war against corruption’ the 
centrepiece of policy and political action. Indeed, as a leading Nigerian journalist 
and author remarks recently, Nigerians always demand a fight against 
corruption from their governments (Adeniyi, 2017: 11), indicating a deeply 
entrenched anti-corruption culture, as I use the term here. But in the context of 
the longest period of democratization ever experienced in Nigeria9, that is, our 
research period, this anti-corruption culture finds renewed vigour and free 
expression. This renewed vigour can be seen, for example, in the activism of 
anti-corruption agencies and parliaments towards investigating corruption, or in 
literarily hundreds of probe panels and reports on corruption in the country over 
                                                          
9 As noted above, the present period of democracy since 1999 is longest ever in Nigeria, following three previous 
and failed attempts to establish democracy in the country.  
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this period. The result is that the majority of corruption stories reported in the 
press are generated by the activities of what I call ‘corruption-investigating-
authorities’ or CIAs for short. These are state-level agencies with permanent or 
adhoc statutory mandates for investigating and publicising corruption, rather 
than investigative reporting by newspapers or journalists. Thus, I argue, in 
chapter five, that at best Nigerian newspapers are strong watchdogs, but weak 
investigators regarding journalistic reporting of corruption. In chapter six, I 
examine the organizational and operational context of investigative reporting in 
the newspapers sampled, by drawing on ethnographic data from the interviews 
and observation. I find that investigative journalism is scarcely institutionalized 
in the newspapers and is no more than adhoc practice by the few journalists 
who do not. The result is that there is limited investigative stories of corruption 
in the press, less than 5% of overall coverage of corruption. But again, by 
comparing corruption stories independently investigated by the newspapers to 
those reported from the CIAs, I show, in chapter seven, that investigative 
reporting is not only low in terms of quantity of reporting, but also in terms of 
the scale of corruption independently reported in comparison to the corruption 










Chapter Two: Literature review and theory 
 
2.1 Introduction: Liberal media theory: Universals and particulars 
Liberal thought on the centrality of free media in a democratic society is legion, 
dating to the origins of modern democratic theory and practice. It can be seen 
in the writings of philosophers and theorists like Thomas Paine and de 
Tocqueville, and statesmen like Jefferson and Madison (Besley and Prat, 2006: 
720; Carpini, 2005: 27). It also forms part of 18th century constitutions like those 
of the U.S and Sweden, and in early reports of inquiries into the press such as 
Hutchins and Royal Commissions on the Press in the U.S and Britain respectively 
(Curran, 2007: 33; Nord, 2007: 517). Much the same idea runs through all these. 
For example, in one of his letters, James Madison wrote that "a popular 
government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a 
prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both" (in Carpini, 2005: 27). 
Madison’s point is that the press is the ‘means of acquiring popular information’, 
without which democracy will be reduced to a parody. This indicates the 
significance of the press in a democracy. For Thomas Jefferson, the press is even 
more vital to democracy than the government itself, as he would choose press 
over government for democracy (Golden and Golden, 1993: 194). It is not 
surprising then that these ideas form the core of the First Amendment in the U.S 
Constitution and have been enshrined in many democratic constitutions around 
the world (Street, 2011: 303).  
The liberal ideal stipulates three interconnected functions for the media in a 
democracy: to provide public information to enable citizens to make informed 
choices and decisions; forum for political and policy debates; and ‘watchdog’ 
against the state and other powerful members or institutions in society 
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(Voltmer, 2013: 26; Aalberg and Curran, 2012; McNair, 2011; Davis, 2010a; 
2007; Curran, 2007; 2002; Louw, 2010). First, the media are collectively 
expected to provide the public with the necessary information they need to be 
able to make sense of political events and to participate fully in the democratic 
process as an engaged and engaging citizenry. Secondly, the media should 
provide a platform for debate among the widest possible view points on the 
political and ideological spectrum. Also, this principle implies that the media 
should provide a “linkage” between citizens and policy makers to debate and 
form public opinion on all matters of public interest before, during and even 
after these matters are formulated into policy or enacted into laws (Koch-
Baumgarten and Voltmer, 2010; Kennamer, 1992). Finally, the media are 
regarded as a government ‘watchdog’ that monitors the exercise of power by 
public officials and institutions to safeguard the rights of the citizens and keep 
the state in its proper constitutional and legal boundaries. This is to be achieved 
through watchdog or investigative journalism by the media to expose instances 
of corruption and abuses of power as famously illustrated by the Washington 
Post’s ‘Watergate’ case and others like it (Louw, 2010: 53; Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004b: 1144). The present research is concerned with this third 
function of the press, that is, the watchdog function, often considered as the 
most important (Davies, 2009: 2; Jones, 2009: 5).  
Dahlgren (2009) has argued that these functions of the media in a democracy 
derive from strands of democratic theory concerning the exercise of political 
power, and citizenship and citizen participation in the political process in a 
democracy. Furthermore, these ideals also form part journalistic identity, since 
a recognition of the functions of the media in a democracy helps to ensure the 
extent freedom media and journalists enjoy (Mellado, 2015: 596). But it is also 
through these roles that media democratic performance is often judged by 
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citizens and scholarly observers alike. In addition, assumptions about the 
democratic functions of the media also shape media policy, at least media policy 
about the content and form of media regulation in a democratic society 
(McQuail, 2005: 196; Davis, 2007: 4). In a sense, much of what goes as political 
communication research, both theoretically and empirically, is informed and 
concerned with the finer details of these democratic functions of the media: at 
the level of individual media organizations, the media system of a country, or 
even larger comparative studies at regional or global levels. For example, the 
work of Freedom House on the press, which has been influential in many fields 
beyond political communication, is based on assumptions about the extent to 
which individual countries or media systems move closer to the normative ideal 
of the press in a democracy (Becker, Vlad and Nusser, 2007).  But more 
significantly for this research, liberal media theory has served as a model for 
many countries and societies undergoing democratic transition in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Africa (Voltmer, 2013; Hallin and Mancini, 2012). In 
short, the liberal media model tends to be universally influential in theory or 
application, or both (Hallin and Mancini, 2010: 113). Surveys and interviews of 
journalists in many countries around the world suggest that liberal journalistic 
norms such as reporting the news as it is, provision of political information and 
acting as a watchdog of the government are ranked among the top role 
perceptions journalists hold everywhere (Hanitzsch and Vos, 2016; Weaver and 
Willnat, 2012; Hanitzsch et al, 2011; Berkowitz, 2007; Herscovitz, 2004).  
Still, the liberal model is historically and culturally located (Curran and Park, 
2000: 3) and can be problematic when uncritically extrapolated to other 
contexts. For example, Meyer (2002: 1) has observed that ‘‘democracy is not 
possible without a functioning public sphere that puts the individual in a position 
to decide and act autonomously’’. This point reflects the unending debate about 
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the central place of ‘quality’ political information in the democratic process 
evident in many researches about the media, democracy and public knowledge 
(Aalberg and Curran, 2012; Street, 2011; Curran et al, 2009; Carpini, 2005; Prior, 
2003; Zaller, 2003; Baum, 2002). But Meyer’s point is also an affirmation of 
individualism which is hardly a universal norm. In Africa at least, personhood 
and agency are often embedded in a ‘politics of belonging’ and thus tied in to 
the expectations of others in some cultural or regional communities (Nyamnjoh, 
2005). In such contexts, political information provided by the media may not 
necessarily be understood or acted upon ‘autonomously’ by the individual. 
Furthermore, policy debates, if they exist at all, may not be presented or 
perceived simply in terms of ideological divisions of Left versus Right as in the 
West. In Nigeria and many other African countries, politics is less a matter of 
ideology than of ethnic, regional and religious identity considerations. In 
addition to this, the media system itself is similarly structured and thus often 
ends up promoting centrifugal forces and tensions within the political system 
and the society (Kalyango, 2010: 6-7; Mukhongo, 2010: 348-350; Nyamnjoh, 
2005: 57; Agbaje, 1993: 460). This often takes a violent turn, as in the extreme 
case of the Rwandan genocide in which the media were indicted by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for playing ‘an undoubted’ role (Thompson, 
2007: 2). This example indicates limitations for the liberal model as applied in 
different political, cultural and historical contexts. This study is grounded within 
liberal theory of the media, due to the centrality of press freedom and 
investigative journalism to the research. However, I approach it with the 
assumption that the performance of a liberal press depends not so much on its 
normative principles or media policy and regulatory framework, important as 
these are, but also on the specific contexts of political culture within which the 
press operates (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). I illustrate this argument empirically 
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in the next chapters. At this point, I examine further two crucial norms of the 
liberal press, namely, press freedom and watchdog journalism, and their 
connection, specifically, to investigative reporting and press coverage of 
corruption in Nigeria.   
2.2 Norms of liberal press: Press freedom and watchdog journalism:  
For McQuail (2005:169), press freedom, or the idea that the press should be free 
of restrictions to enable it to perform its democratic duty, is the most respected 
of all theories of the press in Western democratic tradition. In its classic essence, 
it refers to freedom from the state which had historically been the main agent 
of press censorship, and from which the press had struggled to first establish its 
own freedom, and then worked to advance the cause of freedom and 
democracy in the wider society (Curran, 2002). In other words, press freedom, 
whatever its intrinsic value, also has an immediate instrumental dimension, that 
is, to enable the press to work in the service of democracy through watchdog 
journalism and other functions. Without press freedom, then, watchdog 
journalism is impossible, since the concept of the watchdog presupposes a 
vertical source of accountability on the state or its agents. Voltmer (2013: 28) 
remarks that the press requires only a “minimum of regulation and a maximum 
of rights”. Her point is that since watchdog role presupposes holding the state 
to account, it is only fitting that the press be free and independent from the 
control of those it monitors, so that journalists can take a “proactive, adversarial 
role vis-à-vis political officials’’ (ibid).  This narrative of a causal relationship 
between a free press and political accountability in a democratic society is what 
makes press freedom attractive to developing democracies, and therefore a 
central concept in comparative political communication research. In sum, press 
freedom is nowadays conceived in terms of media autonomy from the state, but 
also in terms of autonomy from the market, ownership, editorial management 
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and even by individual journalists (Nam, 2012: 552, Street, 2011: 167-176; 
Hanitzsch and Mellado, 2011: 404). Moreover, a strand of this research suggests, 
with mounting ‘econometric’ evidence that press freedom is correlated with 
levels of official corruption across countries, such that the higher the extent of 
freedom and diversity in the press, the lower the levels of corruption (Camaj, 
2013; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013; Nam, 2012; Whitten-Wooding and James, 
2012; Besley and Prat, 2006; Chowdhury, 2004; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; 
Djankov et al, 2003). But such econometric evidence ignores or holds constant 
several crucial variables that mediate the distance between press freedom and 
reduction in corruption. At most, newspapers can expose corruption. But the 
effectiveness of such press exposures in leading to reform will depend not on 
newspapers, but other political actors, such as the willingness and ability of the 
judicial branch or parliament. Furthermore, other actors such as anti-corruption 
agencies may in fact play more crucial role than the media in reducing 
corruption. And it is difficult to imagine how the impact of the press alone can 
be isolated, since the media are but an integral, not necessarily independent, 
part of what can be called anti-corruption complex comprising the judiciary and 
the courts, the legislature, demonstrable political will of the executive, the press 
and so on. For example, Stetka and Örnebring (2013) contend that in the context 
new democracies in Eastern Europe, journalists report that their investigations 
of corruption hardly result in resignation of the officials exposed for corruption, 
let alone to instigate reforms. Similarly, Waisbord (2000: 210-216) is quite 
sceptical about the extent to which investigative reporting in South America has 
led to any significant changes or reforms in policy across the region, and even 
citizens tend to be much more concerned about media revelations of human 
rights abuses, than of corruption. Rønning (2009: 156) makes a similar 
observation in the case of Africa where, he contends, politicians are generally 
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unperturbed by the ‘pillory effect’ or ‘naming and shaming’ effect of 
investigative reporting in the absence of effective legal punishment for 
corruption or other wrongdoing. Moreover, Gunaratne (2002) has argued that 
press freedom may not mean the same thing in different societies, since 
societies differ in their understanding of ‘freedom’ in the first place. And in the 
specific case of many new democracies arriving the theoretical and empirical 
scene of liberal watchdog journalism in recent years, media independence still 
does not necessarily guarantee investigative practice (Voltmer, 2013: 104). In 
other words, press freedom is one thing, reduction in corruption another, and 
the causal link between one and the other can be much more complicated than 
quantitative evidence would allow as the observations above indicate for much 
of developing democracies in vastly different regions.     
But more significantly, this empirical evidence which predicts lower corruption 
for higher freedom of the press is itself predicated on the ‘watchdog’ role of the 
press, which is often regarded as most important function of the media in a 
democracy due to its accountability or monitoring function (Jones, 2009: 5-6; 
Curran, 2007: 33; Feldstein, 2006: 105). For example, Pippa Norris has observed 
that the question of how the media serves the democratic process is to be 
considered in terms of its ‘institutional’ role as watchdogs over the powerful, in 
addition to their agenda-setting and gate-keeping functions (Norris and 
Odugbemi, 2010: 5). Moreover, watchdog journalism is privileged above other 
democratic functions of the press because classical liberal theory assumed that 
publicity and openness were the most effective guarantees from the corrupting 
influence of power. Hence, this notion of journalists and the press as watchdogs 
who tell truth to power has become embedded in journalism’s self-definition 
(Coronel, 2010: 111), or rather its very professional ideology (Broersma, 2010: 
21). But how is watchdog journalism realised in practice?  
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Empirical evidence on this question, in the context of the Swedish press at least, 
suggests that the watchdog function is ‘enacted’ at two key moments in the 
production of political news (Eriksson and Ӧstman, 2013). Journalists 
demonstrate ‘cooperation’ with politicians at the first ‘interactional’ phase of 
news production in which journalists interact directly or indirectly with 
politicians, in say press conferences, since cooperation serves both parties and 
ensures a longer-term access to the journalist. But the point of news 
construction and publishing, reporters tend to be more adversarial and 
questions of politicians (ibid: 304). The differences in journalistic performance 
between these two stages, the authors argue, are to be understood in terms of 
journalism’s ‘strategic ritual’ in projecting itself as scrutineer of power (Eriksson 
and Ӧstman, 2013: 321). In a similar research, Gnisi et al (2014) contend that 
watchdog journalism and its adversarialism are enacted interviews with 
politicians, particularly during elections. Their research is based on content 
analysis of interviews with politicians in Italian television, in which they measure 
the ‘level of toughness of questions’ journalists pose to politicians during such 
interviews. Their findings suggest that in such contexts, journalists are more 
adversarial towards politicians leading in the polls10, although more senior 
journalists are less adversarial to all; that politicians of less known parties face 
tougher questions and that some of the ‘toughness’ exhibited by journalists 
when questioning politicians on television can be due more to the journalists’ 
own political affiliation than the watchdog principle per se. Thus, they conclude 
that journalistic adversarialism, on television at least, can be predicted by the 
power of the politician, the political affiliation and status of the interviewer 
                                                          
10 In an article in the London Review of Books, Rebecca Solnit makes a somewhat similar argument about the U.S 
2016 general election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, although from a feminist perspective. Her 
argument is that Hillary faced far tougher scrutiny than Donald Trump, because she is a woman, not because 
she was thought more likely to win the election as Gnisi et al (2014) research suggests (Solnit, R. (2017) ‘From 
lying to leering: Donald Trump’s fear of women’, London Review of Books, 39(2):3-7).  
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(Gnisi et al, 2014: 112). The point of these studies is to illustrate that in practice, 
watchdog journalism encompasses a wide range of different journalistic 
activities practices broadly lumped together under the same label of watchdog 
journalism and which can be performed at several moments of the reporting 
process (Coronel, 2010).  
In her typology of news contents denoting how various journalistic role 
perceptions are ‘performed’ in actual news output, Mellado (2015: 602) 
suggests that all news types that involve ‘questioning,’ ‘critique’, ‘denouncing’, 
‘conflict’, coverage of ‘trials and processes’, ‘external research’ and 
‘investigative reporting’ are to be considered varying degrees of performing the 
watchdog role. That is, while investigative reporting is regarded as the most 
important aspect of watchdog journalism, it is not the only one. This finer 
distinction between varying degrees of watchdog journalism is important 
because findings of this study indicate that Nigerian newspapers could be 
regarded as strong watchdogs, but weak investigators in relation to reporting of 
corruption. Independent investigative reporting of corruption is scant in the 
newspapers, but overall coverage of corruption is extensive. Equally significant, 
our findings illustrate that investigative reporting and coverage of corruption, in 
the specific context of Nigeria, are shaped as much by the regulatory 
environment or political economy of the press, as by the lingering culture of anti-
corruption in the country, perhaps even more. In other words, watchdog 
journalism represents a broad journalistic concept, and practice, from critical 
political commentary, to questioning and fact checking, to in-depth analysis of 
news, or what Fink and Schudson (2014) call contextual reporting, and of course, 
independent investigative reporting of corruption, wrongdoing and even social 
ills. It is useful, at this pin then, to examine investigative reporting itself and its 
connections to reporting of corruption in detail, both elsewhere and in Nigeria. 
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2.3 Investigative reporting as a liberal norm:  
As noted above, watchdog journalism covers different practices. Yet, within 
these practices, investigative reporting is ranked highest, since it presupposes 
independent initiative on the part of the reporter or their media. Thus, in this 
functionalist ranking of news, investigative reporting is regarded as second to 
none, that is, the ‘iron-core’ of democratic journalism (Jones, 2009: 5). As Nord 
(2007: 518) points out, ‘‘investigative journalism is universally perceived as the 
cornerstone of journalistic practice and a more or less uncontroversial function 
of independent media organizations in a free and democratic society’’. It is for 
this “uncontroversial function” of investigative reporting to democracy, that is 
to expose wrongdoing and hold the powerful to account, that Mary Walton 
(2010: 19) describes investigative reporters as the “elite special forces of Fourth 
Estate’s armies”, higher in rank and professionalism than other journalists. In 
addition, one reason why it is “universally” regarded as “the cornerstone” of 
journalism by both practitioners and observers alike is because it stresses the 
independent initiative of the reporter or their media in generating the story, in 
the way other kinds of journalistic practices do not. In fact, definitions of it vary 
not much because it means different things to different scholars as because of 
what sets it apart from other kinds of reporting practices. Therefore, in defining 
investigative reporting, several scholars have emphasised journalistic initiative, 
the rigour of methodology used in collecting evidence and writing up the story, 
and the impact of the story on the social and political institutions and processes 
(Lanosga, 2015; Starkman, 2014; Stetka and Ӧrnebring, 2012; Jones, 2009; 
Ettema and Glasser, 2007; Feldstein, 2006; Blavens 1997; Protess et al, 1992). 
Furthermore, Pilger (2005) also notes that the highest form of investigative 
journalism is that which investigates, not just wrongdoing or governance failure, 
but also ideas; to investigative ideas and lay them bare for the public, since ideas 
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can be more influential in shaping the direction of society. Ettema and Glasser 
(1998: 189) identify three ‘core values’ that inform the democratic potentials of 
investigative journalism, namely: publicity (bringing abuse of power into public 
attention to instigate reforms), accountability (calling wrongdoers into account) 
and solidarity or creating bonds of compassion between the public and victims 
of wrongdoing. Finally, investigative journalism is said to be particularly effective 
in checking violations of the human rights of citizens, or breaches of rules in 
ways that go against public interest, for example when the state crosses its 
boundaries during protests by citizens, or when actors in the market breach 
rules for private motives (Whitten-Woodring and James, 2012: 120; Bonner, 
2009: 296; Waisbord, 2004: 1090). I follow Lanosga (2015: 370) who defines 
investigative journalism as a “comprehensive, in-depth reporting about public 
affairs that involves wrongdoing, failure or social problems brought to light by 
journalists”. This is useful because it implies uncovering ‘corruption’ in some 
sense; that is, as wrong doing; that is, I restrict the definition to investigative 
stories of corruption. In addition, it also correspondents to how Nigerian 
reporters interviewed here understand investigative journalism.  
However, investigative journalism is not always praised. Neither the ideal nor 
the practice is without critics. First, investigative journalism is criticised for going 
to sleep when the public needs it the most, particularly for failing to investigative 
and report the regulatory failures and malfeasance that led to the near collapse 
of the global economy in 2007/2008 (Starkman, 2014). Secondly, is said to 
exhibit double moral standards by invoking two conflicting values of ‘detached 
observer’ and ‘custodian of conscience’ (Glasser and Ettema, 1998: 1-9), at least 
in American Journalism. Secondly, this paradox of ‘objectivity’ and ‘watchdog’ is 
often responsible for the media’s notable failures in investigating official claims, 
especially during political or economic crisis (Cunningham, 2003: 1-5), or which 
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make investigative journalists fall prey to manipulative media strategies of 
interested parties in the media in the name of providing ‘leaks’ to official 
wrongdoing (Feldstein, 2007: 546-457). In addition, Waisbord (1997a: 121-124) 
argues that investigative journalism’s claim to ‘truth-telling’ can only be an 
approximation at best, since investigative reporters often depend for sources 
with powerful political and economic interests of their own. In this way, media 
scandals about corruption and wrongdoing, may be no more than coverage of 
ongoing conflicts among political and economic actors, rather than simply the 
initiative and effort of ‘solitary’ investigative reporters (Waisbord, 1996: 344). 
Waisbord is here questioning the supposed ‘independence’ of investigative 
reporters, since ultimately, they lack direct experience of the events, corruption 
and wrongdoing they expose. Similarly, in his study of investigative reporting in 
television documentaries, Raphael (2005: 248) reasons that while investigative 
reporters frequently target public officials and institutions, these same groups 
are often among its best sources, collaborators and even protectors (in Lanosga, 
2015: 371). Indeed, for Altschull (1995) by merely exposing instances of 
corruption of regulatory failure, investigative reporting is in fact protecting the 
capitalist system, rather than exposing its underlying systemic contradictions (in 
Lanosga, 2017: 368). For this reason, investigative reporting in mid-twentieth 
century U.S leftist magazines sought not only to expose individual cases of 
corruption but interpreted these cases as evidence of the failure of the capitalist 
system itself and called for its outright overturn (Aucoin, 2007: 562).    Others 
worry about increasing ‘celebritization’ of investigative reporting, or of the rise 
of scandal politics which has transformed Watergate into ‘Zippergate’ or 
‘churnalism’ in the media, thereby undermining the democratic potentials of the 
press (Street, 2011: 192; Castells, 2010: 6-7; Davies, 2009; Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004b: 1145; Tumber and Waisbord, 2004a; 2004b; Tumber, 2004).  
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For new democracies in Africa and elsewhere, problems of investigative 
reporting highlighted above are compounded by legacies of authoritarian past 
for press and politics, since a new democracy has but a short democratic 
memory.  Waisbord (2000b:44) shows that while South American journalism has 
long been influenced by Euro-American liberal models, attempts at practical 
application have resulted into what he describes as fitting ‘square pegs into 
round holes’ because of the obvious conceptual and practical gaps between 
liberal values and illiberal political environments. Furthermore, Waisbord notes 
that the media are precariously situated between the ‘rock’ of the state and the 
‘hard place’ of the market. But this statement in fact sums up much research on 
media and democratization in the region by Waisbord himself and others (Stein, 
2013; Pinto, 2009; 2008). Also, in the former communist countries of Europe, 
the media remain ‘’constrained by forces of the social subsystems, particularly 
politics and economy’’ (Stetka, 2012: 435-436), a situation worsened by the 
trend toward ‘de-Westernization’ of media ownership whereby local elites with 
ties to local and international business and politics are taking over ownership of 
the media (ibid: 439). Furthermore, in most of the region, the media are 
characterised in varying degrees by increasing ‘instrumentalization’ and 
‘clientilism’, both of which are features of the high degree of the political and 
economic parallelism of the media. The result is that the media tends to be 
deeply implicated into informal clientilist networks of elites in politics, business 
and the bureaucracy who use the media to further their own political and 
economic interests and ambitions, especially during elections (Coman and 
Gross, 2012: 469-472; Ӧrnebring, 2012: 505; Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012: 402; 
Stetka: 2012:446; Szabó and Kiss, 2012: 480; Kovacic and Erjavec, 2011: 329). 
For example, Coman and Gross (2012: 464) observe that in Bulgaria, while the 
political structures replicate Western models, the hierarchical structures and 
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values of the former communist political environment continue to prevail, 
making any practical application of the watchdog journalism problematic. Such 
contextual ambivalences have resulted in peculiar media behaviour like 
‘advertorials’ or positive and promotional news content prepaid for by external 
interests and ‘Kompromat’ or negative profiling of political and business 
opponents often passed off as investigative reporting, without or without facts 
(Ӧrnebring, 2012: 506). Thus, investigative journalism in these new democracies 
is seldom the product of independent journalistic effort or initiative (Stetka and 
Ӧrnebring: 2013: 420).  
Similar observations as the foregoing have been made for Africa.  First, according 
to Nyamnjoh (2005: 3), ‘’African media continue to extol liberal democracy and 
liberal media, their practices can be very different, even contradictory’’. In 
Ghana, Hasty (2005a) observes such contradictions, saying that while Ghanaian 
journalists locate themselves within the universal discourse of liberal journalism, 
their everyday practices can be profoundly particular, shaped by historicized 
cultural understandings of political authority and resistance as well as notions 
of African sociality and discursive propriety’’ (Hasty, 2005a: 5). Secondly, African 
media have long invoked two competing, even contradictory, professional 
values: a statist ‘development journalism’ model and ‘civil society’, ‘public 
sphere’ watchdog model, both of which are variously influential among 
journalists and scholars alike (Kalyango, 2010: 2; Hasty, 2005a:11; Musa, 1997: 
141).  The result of this contradiction is a confusion of roles, norms and practices 
among journalists working for different media, often leading to internal tensions 
within their ranks or unions (Hasty, 2005a). A second general concern of media 
and democratization research regards media freedom, especially in respect of 
critical Fourth Estate reporting. As Wasserman (2011: 111) points out, ‘’press 
freedom, development and democracy are the core issues of journalistic 
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research and theory in the developing world’’. Third, researchers are concerned 
by African variants of ‘kompromat’ and ‘advertorials’ which exist in much of 
journalism on the continent under different names like ‘Brown Envelope 
Journalism’, ‘Gambo’, ‘Soli’, etc, depending on local parlance (Kasoma, 2009:26; 
Lodamo and Skjerdal, 2009: 140-141; Rønning, 2009: 167; Ndangam, 2006: 179). 
In general, this is a practice whereby journalists solicit for or are given money, 
freebies, kickbacks and other kinds of rewards for news publication by 
government officials or other news sources. The above examples therefore 
illustrate what Tong (2012: 1), speaking of investigative journalism in China, 
observes that the nature of investigative reporting and journalistic work more 
broadly is “socially situated and contextually constructed”, as we shall see here 
in the specific case of Nigeria. So far, we have examined press freedom, 
watchdog journalism and investigative reporting around the world. This 
represents the general literature within which this research is situated. In the 
following two sections, I focus specifically on Nigeria.   
2.4 Press freedom in Nigerian:  
Almost by a rare scholarly consensus, Nigeria is said to have the freest press in 
Africa (Oso, 2013: 17; Dare, 2011: 12; Hall, 2009: 256; Rønning, 2009: 165; 
Olukotun, 2000a: 33; Eribo and Tanjong, 1998: 43). According to Omu (1968: 
285) has noted that by the end of the 19th century, Nigeria already had 
“unfettered press” partly due to the reluctance of some colonial administrators 
to actively persecute the press and partly because African journalists at the time, 
most of whom also doubled as ‘nationalists’ in the independence struggle, were 
convinced that press freedom was theirs to enjoy as British subjects, much like 
the journalists in metropolitan Britain itself. Agbaje (1993: 458) argues that the 
Nigerian press had gained its freedom by building long-standing alliances with 
other ‘’powerful elements in civil society’’, such as professional associations and 
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trade unions. And whenever occasion has demanded, the press draws upon 
these alliances to “hold on to and expand its sphere of autonomous action” in 
relation to the state. Another is that, press freedom, understood as absence of 
governmental control (Kasoma, 1995: 537) is explained by a deeply entrenched 
liberal ideal and its emphasis on a free press. As Oso (2013: 17) observes, ‘’liberal 
ideas’’ of free press and watchdog journalism have been espoused and practiced 
by the Nigerian press since before independence. This professional ideology of 
the Nigerian press has had two consequences. First, it explains why newspapers 
in Nigeria have tended to be overwhelmingly owned and controlled by private 
individuals or organizations. Secondly, it partly explains why print and 
broadcasting in the country operate, in general at least, on two different 
professional ideologies and regulatory environments. In the print media, the 
ideology of Fourth Estate journalism is dominant, while development journalism 
is more dominant in broadcast media. Broadcasting came of age in Nigeria 
during the golden period of ‘the ideology of development’ in Africa, following 
independence in the 1960s (Odhiambo, 1991: 20), bringing with it the idea of 
development journalism in which the media in the developing world are 
expected to facilitate national development (Xiaoge, 2009: 357; Musa and 
Domatob, 2007: 316).  
By contrast, spurred on by a liberal ideology and private ownership, the print 
press has been at the forefront of the defence of press freedom since the 
colonial period (1914-1960), but especially during its many brushes with various 
military governments in the 1970s through 1999. Many incidences have been 
cited to illustrate state repression of the press, and in turn media defence of it. 
For example, on 30 July 1973, Minere Amakiri, then chief correspondent of the 
Nigerian Observer (now defunct) in Port Harcourt, Rivers State wrote a story in 
his paper about looming industrial action by the teachers’ union in the state. But 
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the then Rivers State Military Governor, Navy Commander Alfred Diete-Spiff, 
who happened to be celebrating his birthday that same day, found the story an 
‘’embarrassment’’ and ordered Amakiri be detained, shaved and whipped 24 
strokes of the cane on his bare back. In analysing this event, Ogbondah (1991: 
111-113) contends that it sparked off media outrage and condemnation across 
the country because it was the first time physical violence would be used against 
a journalist on duty in Nigeria. Therefore, he concludes that ‘’the press resented 
the action because it was concerned that such an action could potentially 
incapacitate its watchdog function… The press felt that, if it was going to be 
successful as a watchdog, the Amakiri-style governmental action taken to 
muzzle the media must not be condoned’’ (ibid: 121). From that point however, 
state repression got worse as successive military regimes promulgated various 
decrees aimed at muzzling the press. For example, Ogbondah (1994: 22-23) 
enumerates a total of nine different decrees by which various military 
governments sought to muzzle the press between 1967-1979 and 1983-1993. 
One such decree, the ‘Public Officers Protection against False Accusation Decree 
No. 11 of 1976’ expressly made it an offence liable by imprisonment or fine for 
‘anyone to publish a false report or rumour alleging that a government official 
was corrupt’ (ibid:23).  The most infamous of these decrees however, was the 
Public Officers Protection against False Accusation Decree No. 4 of 1984, more 
popularly known simply as Decree 4, which ‘’criminalized false press reports, 
written statements or rumours that exposed an officer of the military 
government, a state or the federal government’’ (Ogbondah, 1992: 10). 
Furthermore, both the author and publisher of a story were guilty of an offence 
punishable by imprisonment and or fines, if (a) the publication is false in its 
entirety; (b) the allegation made in the publication is made in every material 
detail; and (c) even if the whole story was true but embarrassed the government 
59 
 
(Pate, 2011: 97). Under this decree, two reporters with The Guardian, Nduka 
Irabor and Tunde Thompson were sentenced to one year in prison, while the 
paper itself paid N50, 000 (then $20,000, now about $250,000) for reporting and 
publishing a scoop on the government’s redeployment of its diplomatic staff 
which contained one inaccuracy (Pate, 2011: 97; Uko, 2004: 90-91). Thus, the 
1984 decree had merely upped the ‘game’ in the 1976 version by making it an 
offense to publish a story ‘that embarrassed the government’, even if it was 
true. Such repressive measures against the press, several studies have noted, 
even became more draconian during the twilight years of the military in the late 
1990s, including banning of publications, outright mass purchases of editions, 
withdrawal of government advertisement from oppositional publications, 
arrest, torture and detention of journalists without trial or access to legal 
services or intimidation of journalists’ friends and family members 
(Akinfemisoye, 2013: 9; Alozieuwa, 2012: 378; Ojebode, 2011: 267-268; 
Akinwale, 2010: 50; Sowunmi et al, 2010: 8-10; Olukotun, 2002: 323-324; Eribo 
and Tanjong, 1998: 43; Agbaje, 1990: 226)11.  
Yet, all this only emboldened the press, the argument goes, to fight on in 
defence of its cherished freedom, and consequently, even the military could not 
reign in the press (Oso, 2013: 17; Olayiwola, 1991: 36). One outcome is that 
constitutional guarantees for press freedom have formed part of all 
constitutional debates and arrangements throughout the various transition to 
democracy programmes overseen by the military in the country. For example, 
Section 22 of the current 1999 Constitution12 guarantees press freedom, in 
                                                          
11 It should be noted, however, that although all the researches above cited instances of military suppression of 
the press, these were more or less the same examples cited by the different authors, implying that the events 
in question are few. Virtually every study on press and politics in Nigeria has cited the same example of 
journalists detained under Decree 4 above, meaning that these were the only cases in which the law was put to 
use. 
12 Between 1960 and 1999, Nigeria had about 7 different constitutional assemblies, each of which culminated in 
the adoption of a particular constitution, though some of these were never in operation for one day, as they 
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addition to Freedom of Information Act in force since 2011 (Ojebode, 2011: 
270).  
The Freedom of Information Bill was passed into in Nigeria in May 2011 by then 
President Goodluck Jonathan, after years of bickering and buck passing between 
both houses of the federal legislature and the presidency on the one hand, and 
legislative advocacy and pressure by the media and civil society groups on the 
other (Ojebode, 2011: 268). The Freedom of Information Act (2011) began life 
as the ‘Draft Access to Public Records and Information Bill’ sponsored by a 
coalition of three civil society groups (Nigerian Union of Journalists, Media 
Rights Agenda, and the Civil Liberties Organization) during the aborted Third 
Republic in 1993, that is, six years before return to democracy in 1999 (Berliner, 
2014: 483; Ojebode, 2011: 269). These groups kept up their collaborative efforts 
during the years leading to return to democracy through a series of meetings to 
fine-tune provisions of the bill, with support from external groups such as Article 
19 (Ojebode, 2011: 270). In 2000, two former journalists turned members of the 
federal House of Representatives, Tony Anyanwun and Nduka Irabor13 
sponsored this draft before parliament and there began nine years of back and 
forth debates between the federal legislature and the presidency, culminating 
in the passing bill into law in 2011, after several changes to it its original 
provisions.  
Berliner (2014: 484) observed that former President Obasanjo was reluctant to 
sign the bill into law on several occasions, after it had passed in both the Senate 
and House during 2004 and 2006 respectively, despite his proclamations about 
anti-corruption and transparency. But according to a newspaper editorial (The 
                                                          
died along with the transition to democracy programmes for which they were designed. Thus, the last of these, 
the 1999 Constitution, presently in operation, is the longest running constitution in the country.   
13 As noted above, Nduka Irabor was one of two journalists sentenced to life imprisonment under Decree 4, 
Nigeria’s most draconian libel law in 1984.  
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Guardian 2008), the former president was reluctant to sign the bill because he 
thought it did not provide for sufficient exceptions about national security. The 
editorial notes further that he preferred ‘Right to Information’ to ‘Freedom of 
Information’ in the title of the bill. Furthermore, the legislatures too had 
amended some of the bill’s provisions, requiring journalists to obtain court 
orders even before requesting for certain ‘sensitive’ information from public 
offices and officials. Yet, the media and other civil society groups kept up the 
pressure until a compromise was reached between all parties and the bill was 
assented to by then sitting President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011.  
Among its provisions, the FOI Act aims to make information more freely 
available to Nigerians, not only journalists, to improve access to and provide 
protection for public records, to protect journalists and officials who disclose 
official information in the public interest, etc. Moreover, the law was specifically 
designed to further the fight against corruption with provisions that compel 
public officials to disclose information, while providing protections for whistle-
blowers “who can be allies for investigative journalists” (Ojebode, 2011: 278). In 
this sense, the Freedom of Information Act itself is better understood as part of 
the media’s long drawn struggle for its freedom from the state as well as to 
further democratic development in the country as described above.    
But even before this law, for almost a century, attempts by various governments 
to regulate the press were successfully rebuffed by the press, until 1992 when 
the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) was established jointly by the federal 
government and the Nigerian Press Organization, an amalgam of industry 
associations (Christopher and Onwuka, 2013: 33). Even then, the NPC has been 
mostly ineffective and hamstrung. Consequently, in the opinion of some 
observers, journalists and media owners continue to ‘’exult in unrestricted press 
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freedom’’ without due regards to professional ethics (Christopher and Onwuka, 
2013: 33). Overall then, most of press history in Nigeria is the story of how the 
press has established and expanded its freedom and sphere of operation within 
the political system. This then raises the question of what the press does with 
its freedom. If the struggle for press freedom has been a recurring feature of 
political development in Nigeria, as shown above, what then does the press do 
with the freedom so gained? The answer, in the literature at least, is that the 
press has used its freedom to advance the course of democracy and good 
governance by, among other things, fighting against corruption through 
investigative journalism, or more broadly, watchdog journalism. And it is to this 
that I now turn.   
2.5: Watchdog journalism and investigative reporting in Nigeria:  
Political communication research in Africa addresses investigative journalism 
under ‘media and democratization in Africa’, ‘good governance’, or 
‘accountability’, implied by a generic ‘watchdog’ role of the media as an 
institution of ‘civil society’. In this regard, some studies argue that African media 
have played important roles in Africa’s struggle for independence against 
colonial rule and for return to popular democracy, through press criticisms of 
colonial administrations or by its exposure of bad governance and corruption of 
sit-tight military or civilian African governments (Mukhongo, 2010: 340; Shaw, 
2009: 494-496; Tettey, 2001: 5-6; Kasoma, 1995: 537). Indeed, by one account, 
this watchdog function of the African media has its roots in traditional African 
communication systems in which local cultural figures such as griots, bards, 
comedians and musicians deployed satire to criticise traditional social and 
political order, and hence serving as watchdog to society (Shaw, 2009: 494). For 
Shaw, this function was taken up by educated Africans in the newspapers they 
established and were often stringent in their criticisms of the human rights 
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abuses, breaches and corruption of the colonial government, and indeed of the 
colonial system in general. During this period, it is believed, “the press rivalled 
the colonial government” in political impact (Omu, 1968: 279), because African 
journalists thought that in the absence of elected governments in the colonies, 
the press “was the most effective constitutional weapon for ventilating 
grievances and influencing the trend of events” (ibid). Olukotun (2004: 74) 
contends that colonial governors in Nigeria were known to complain “bitterly” 
about the critical coverage of colonial administrative affairs by newspapers like 
The Comet and West African Pilot which were active in the 1930s and 1940s. This 
anti-colonial instinct in the African press, for Shaw (2009: 496) later “proved 
quite instrumental in the struggle for independence” on the continent in the 
1960s (ibid: 496).  
The press renewed its adversarial stance against corruption during Nigeria’s first 
independent government in the 1960s. Olukotun (2004) notes that newspapers 
targeted Nigerian politicians, ministers and top civil servants and criticized them 
for their corruption and ostentatious life style. For example, in 1965, the Daily 
Times, then privately owned, exposed a land scam in Lagos, allegedly by then 
Minister for State, M.K.O. Mbadiwe and called on him to resign, and a few years 
later, it successfully forced the resignation of then Minster for Communications, 
J. S. Tarka over allegations of corruption (Olukotun, 2004: 74; Jibo and Okoosi-
Simbene, 2003: 181). Thus, press exposure of corruption, human rights abuses 
and general ‘abuse of office’, became even more relentless during the years of 
various military dictatorships in the country, ultimately leading to the collapse 
of military governments and their disengagement from Nigerian politics 
altogether (Olukotun, 2002a: 318; 2002b: 210-211; Obadare, 1999: 38; 
Ihonvebere, 1996: 206, 211-212; Kieh and Agbese, 1993: 419-420). On this, 
Olukotun (2002a) and Dare (1998) provide details of how the press resorted to 
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‘underground’ or ‘guerrilla’ journalism by deploying unconventional means of 
news gathering and reporting to get pro-democracy news out to the public while 
at the same time escaping the long arms of the state during the closing years of 
the military in the late 1990s.  
Similarly, others believe that the media in Africa has contributed towards 
democratization on the continent from the 1990s to date, by giving people 
voice, demanding democratic governance and generally supporting other 
critical elements within African states (Mukhongo, 2010: 340). Tetty (2001: 9-
11) claims that private newspapers in countries like Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria 
were “very active in exposing activities within the state that would otherwise 
have been unknown to the citizenry”. Thus, he concludes that the private media 
contribute “in significant ways towards democratic governance and 
accountability on the part of state officials” (ibid: 26). In sum, the media in Africa 
is in the frontline of the struggle for democratization by, among other practices, 
providing a forum for dissenting voices, promoting democratic values and above 
all by serving as watchdog against authoritarianism. Furthermore, Ojo (2003: 
831) contends that since the return to democracy, the Nigerian media have 
pursued what he calls a ‘’relentless war against corruption in high places” (ibid: 
833). Other researchers agree with this broad position, giving specific details and 
instances of how the Nigerian media has so far been active at uncovering and 
reporting cases of corruption in the country. Iwokwagh and Batta (2011: 327-
328) hold that the media in Nigeria have been “extremely useful in the fight 
against corruption” through their investigations and news report of corrupt 
practices which have in turn lead to “resignations from public offices”. They cite 
three instances of such high-profile resignations from public office because 
media investigations and reports. The first of this involves a former speaker of 
the Federal House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari who, as the media 
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uncovered in a huge scandal in 1999, had forged degree certificates of the 
University of Toronto, Canada, which he never attended, while also falsifying his 
age at 36 years when in fact he was then 29 and therefore constitutionally 
unqualified to contest his seat in the first place. Another Speaker, Patricia Etteh 
and former Minister of Health Professor Adenike Grange were also forced to 
resign from government over financial scandals uncovered by the media in 2007 
(Iwokwagh and Batta, 2011: 328). Similarly, several other researchers have 
documented many more recent examples where various Nigerian newspapers 
have presumably investigated and reported cases of corruption involving top 
politicians, military and police officers, senior officials of the civil service as well 
as senior executives in banking, pensions management, stocks exchange and 
other private sector businesses (Sowunmi et al, 2010: 13-16; Alikor et al, 2013: 
47-49; Olaiya et al, 2013: 53). Indeed, for Olaiya et al (2013: 57) it was the 
Nigerian media that saved democracy from derailment by serving as the 
vanguard of constitutionalism in 2006 when the former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo attempted to have the constitution changed to enable him to rule 
beyond the constitutional limit of 8 years or two terms. Thus, the implication of 
all the above is that the Nigerian media has continued its long-established 
tradition of promoting probity and transparency in governance during this 
period of democratic experimentation by bravely investigating and exposing 
corrupt practices among top elites in the country.  
Yet, this view of African media as champions of democracy is not shared by all. 
Hatchen (1971: 148-149) suggests that African press criticism of government 
during the colonial era merely follows the general pattern of British colonial 
policy, which encouraged colonial administrators throughout the Empire to 
exercise “restraint in their treatment of journalists and usually acted within the 
bounds of British common law” (in Shaw, 2009: 495). For Hatchen then, it is not 
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the African press that was an active watchdog by itself as such; rather, colonial 
administration was tolerant of the press based on established norms in British 
politics and society (ibid). Other studies hold that African media, particularly the 
newspapers, are as antidemocratic and elitist as the governments they claim to 
challenge. The idea is that since the media in Africa are generally based in cities 
and close to the seats of power, they mostly reflect the views of elites rather 
than the experiences of ordinary Africans (Traber, 1987; Domatob, 1991, cited 
in Kasoma, 1995: 541). Also, Musa (1997: 132) contends that watchdog 
journalism in Africa is often overshadowed by the practice of ‘development 
journalism’ in which journalists serve as “cheerleaders” of government in the 
name of supporting national development efforts, rather than critical agents 
who hold the government to account on behalf of the public (Bourgault, 1995: 
173). Hall (2009) reasons that considering the poor circulation figures of 
newspapers, and even poorer literacy rates and purchasing power in the 
country, the press could not have had as much impact on the struggle for 
democracy as often claimed. Mercy Ette’s (2000) content analysis shows that 
news coverage of previous democratic transitions in Nigeria reflected frames 
provided by the military. Politicians were presented as incompetent, unruly and 
incapable of leading the country, as against the military who were presented 
offering a more viable and better organized alternative. This is instructive 
considering that throughout successive military regimes, nearly all coups in 
Nigeria had been hailed by the press (Agbaje, 1993: 461). Furthermore, Obadare 
(1999: 38-39) has wondered why press opposition to government 
misdemeanour has not translated into “any moral perfection on the part of the 
press itself”, since Nigerian newspapers are notorious for various forms of 
corruption. Finally, some scholars lament the ethnic and sectarian divisions in 
the press (Alozieuwa, 2012: 379; Jibo and Okoosi-Simbene, 2003, 180), which 
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are effectively anti-democratic tendencies. Moreover, Kasoma (1995: 547) 
notes that sometimes, what is claimed as investigative journalism may be a 
covert attempt by journalists or publishers to settle scores with some people in 
power; or a sensationalist drive to maximize profits (Berger, 2002: 38), or 
indeed, a case of using local media to promote foreign interests (Camara, 2008: 
291). The consequence of these issues, Rønning (2009: 166) observes, is that 
“much of what is presented as investigative journalism in Africa is based on 
poorly sourced material, often only one source, which has not been properly 
checked”. Also, in their analysis of business reporting in Nigeria, Ghana and 
Uganda Behrman et al (2012: 87) find that stories are poorly sourced and 
written, biased, and the journalists themselves lack training and motivation. 
Hence, they conclude that “African media have a long way to go” before they 
could live up to the ideals of watchdog journalism as it is understood and 
practised in more established democracies (ibid: 96).  
 
2.6 The research questions:   
Three observations emerge from the foregoing discussion that serve as a basis 
for the present research. First, most of the researches on press freedom and 
watchdog journalism and corruption in Nigeria tend to be long on informed 
commentary and analysis but short on empirical evidence, itself an indication of 
the still emerging phase of political communication scholarship in Africa (Berger, 
2002: 23). Where systematic evidence exists, it tends to be anecdotal or based 
largely on episodic analysis of a handful of celebrated cases of press reporting 
of corruption, which does not warrant some of the generalizations reached. For 
example, the same cases of exposure in the press and subsequent removal from 
office of two former Speakers of the federal House of Representatives, Senate 
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Presidents, Ministers or Governors for involvement in corruption tend to 
dominate scholarly analysis of watchdog journalism in the country (Alikor, 2013; 
Olaiya et al, 2013; Alozieuwa, 2012; Iwokwagh and Batta, 2011; Ojebode 2011; 
Sowunmi et al, 2010; Olukotun, 2004; Jibo and Okoosi-Simbene, 2003; Ojo, 
2003). In this sense, some of the generalizations made may be farfetched or not 
supported empirically. Thus, analysis of a longer-term coverage of corruption, 
such as attempted here is more useful for generalizing on the subject. Secondly, 
most of the literature reviewed above tends to overlook how other actors like 
anti-corruption agencies may be contributing to news coverage of corruption in 
Nigeria. Indeed, as we shall see, most of the big cases of corruption such as the 
example mentioned by John Kerry above tend to come from official sources, 
rather than through independent initiative of journalistic investigations. In this 
sense, the practice of watchdog journalism in Nigeria and its role in the country’s 
democratization and political accountability is inadequately accounted for in the 
literature. For example, studies by Olukotun (2004; 2002a; 2002b; 2000) have 
documented the extent to which the Nigerian press went to get news out for 
the public during the twilight years of the military by going ‘underground’ and 
engaging in ‘guerrilla’ journalism as a measure of its support for democracy. As 
Adebanwi (2011: 46) put it, African media have often been ‘praised’ for their 
role in demystifying sit-tight dictators or chasing the military back to the 
barracks and out of politics. This role of the African media is presented as part 
of a construction of binary opposites between the civil society and the state in 
Africa (Berger, 2002). Yet, such narratives often overlook the role played by 
elements within the state in providing news leaks or tips for safety to the media 
(Adebanwi, 2011). Thus, research requires providing a measurable performance 
of watchdog journalism in relation to corruption in Nigeria, and by implication 
Africa. Finally, and most significantly, studies of investigative reporting in Africa 
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and elsewhere in mainstream political communication research tend to 
overlook the nature, scale and forms which corruption itself takes in different 
societies. Indeed, corruption, in some sense, is the very object of investigative 
or watchdog journalism, yet corruption itself is hardly problematised within the 
political communication literature. But corruption occurs very differently across 
time and space, and in certain social contexts, such as Nigeria, corruption may 
indeed be a dominant feature of the political culture and would likely shape 
political reporting, including practices such as investigative journalism. Hence, 
such a problematization of corruption is necessary to fully measure and 
understand the media’s political accountability role particularly in new 
democracies such as Nigeria. From the foregoing therefore, the central question 
of this study is: how does the specific contexts of politics and political culture, 
particularly the nature, form and scale of corruption in Nigeria influence the 
practice of investigative reporting in the country? This general question then 
breaks down to the following:  
 
1. How and to what extent is corruption reported in the Nigerian press? 
2. How do Nigerian journalists understand investigative reporting and to 
what extent is there journalistic autonomy in relation to investigative 
reporting in the press?  
3. To what extent is independent investigative reporting reflected in 
coverage of corruption in the Nigerian press? 
4. How has the Freedom of Information Law (2011) impacted or contributed 
to investigative reporting of corruption in the Nigerian press? 
5. How do the specific contexts of politics and culture in Nigeria influence 
news coverage of corruption in the press? 
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Chapter Three: Data Collection Processes and Procedures:  
 
3.1 Introduction:  
This chapter outlines the methodological processes and procedures followed in 
collecting data to answer the research questions for the study, and justifications 
for some of the decisions made during these processes. The next section 
provides an overview of the general framework for collecting data for this 
research, namely, a triangulation of three methods. These are quantitative 
content analysis of press coverage of corruption in four national newspapers 
over 12 years of news coverage, formal and informal interviews with journalists 
and editors, and newsroom observation of journalists at work in two of the four 
newspapers. This is followed by detailed explanation of the specific methods of 
the data collection and the connections between them. Next, I examine 
questions of validity and reliability, and a note on my personal and social 
location to the research, that is, reflexivity. The final section briefly describes 
how the data is analysed and presented in the empirical chapters, that is, 
chapters four through seven. 
While investigative reporting is frequently discussed or implied in political 
communication studies, it is rarely the subject of empirical research (Lanosga et 
al, 2017: 284). However, scholars have asked, and answered through a variety 
of methods, certain questions about investigative reporters, or their reporting, 
or the wider media and political system in which it is practiced, or on occasions 
any combinations of these. Some researches collect survey or interview data 
from investigative reporters in a country, region or media to understand role 
perceptions or other professional assumptions or attitudes of investigative 
reporters (Lanosga et al, 2017; Lanosga and Houston, 2016; Berkowitz, 2007; 
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Waisbord, 2000). Other researchers look at how investigative reporters 
negotiate the changing political, economic and technological environments in 
the media systems of regions or countries, or conversely, the effects of 
investigative reporting on these systems (Larsen, 2016; Li and Sparks, 2016; 
Tong and Spark, 2009; Stetka and Ӧrnebring, 2013; Tong, 2012; Yusha’u, 2010; 
Mudhai, 2007; Waisbord, 2000). For example, a study of investigative reporting 
in 12 Eastern European countries by Stetka and Ӧrnebring (2012) was based on 
interviews with 18 investigative reporters and a ‘small expert survey’. Other 
researches approach investigative reporting from its finished product, mainly 
through some form of content analysis of published investigative stories in 
newspapers or other media. Some of these studies analyse the narrative or 
discursive strategies of investigative reports to make various general statements 
about their moral claims (Waisbord, 1997b), or ideological leanings (Aucoin, 
2007), or narrative strategies (Lockyer, 2006). For example, Ettema and Glasser 
(1998) combine interviews and close analysis of published investigative reports 
to approach the moral claims and narrative strategies of U.S investigative 
reporters. But other researchers make more quantitative content analysis of 
investigative reporting in years of news content, or combine these with surveys 
of or interviews with investigative reporters, to trace the historical or 
contemporary trajectories of investigative journalism or to identify the types, 
quantity or quality or impact of investigative stories published by various news 
media in respective countries (Lanosga and Martin, 2017; Lublinski et al, 2016; 
Lanosga, 2015a; 2014; Carson, 2014; Fink and Schudson, 2014; Starkman, 2014; 
Relly and Scwhalbe, 2013; Kovacic and Erjavec, 2011; Pinto, 2008; Nord, 2007; 
Ekstrom et al, 2006; Rolland, 2006). For example, Carson (2014) conducted a 
quantitative content analysis of a sample of elite Australian newspapers to 
determine the amount of investigative reporting published over forty years. 
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Others analyse award entries such as for the Pulitzer Prize in the U.S (Lanosga 
and Martin, 20017) to determine changing patterns of the entries over time. The 
foregoing is a snapshot of the sorts of questions, methods and findings from 
existing research on investigative journalism in different national or regional 
contexts, and therefore serves as a methodological background for my own 
research and the discussion that follows in this chapter.   
As mentioned above, research on investigative reporting generally focus 
attention on the reporter or their media, the reporting itself as expressed in 
news content, or the wider political or socio-economic context in which 
investigative reporting is practiced. Taken together, my research questions 
cover all three. First the reporting: how much of overall coverage of corruption 
in Nigerian newspapers is the product of independent investigative reporting? 
Secondly, the reporter: how do Nigerian journalists understand investigative 
reporting, and by implication how do they practice14 it? And finally, the wider 
context of investigative reporting: do the specific contexts of politics and culture 
and the regulatory environment in Nigeria influence investigative reporting of 
corruption? Therefore, to answer these questions, I analysed front page news 
coverage in a sample of 2, 920 newspapers from four national dailies15 over 
twelve years by randomly selecting every 6th edition in each publication from 1 
January 2001 to 31 December 2012. However, 174 combined editions (5.96% of 
total sample) were missing from the archives16, so the actual sample analysed 
                                                          
14 By practice here I mean journalists independently investigating and reporting corruption, a process that is 
manifested or expressed in published investigative stories of corruption. Practice, in this sense, also implies 
performance as evaluated by researchers or others. For example, Mellado (2015: 597) notes that “analysis of 
performance requires studying production processes or looking at news product as an outcome”.  
15 Daily Trust, The Guardian, The Punch, and Thisday.  
16 I conducted this part of the research at the Centre for Historical Documentation, Kaduna, which is affiliated to 
Department of History, Ahmadu Bellow University, Zaria, Nigeria. The centre has an archive of several Nigerian 
newspapers dating back many years, even decades, including now defunct newspapers. However, their working 
hours were not much helpful for me: the open at 9am and close at 4pm, but researchers must leave at 3pm to 
enable staff time to re-shelve the resources used, and a member of staff must be in the search room together 
with the researcher(s) to ensure people do not rip off pages or something like that. All these mean that the 
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was 2746 newspapers for all four publications. Overall, the sample represents 
two consecutive years of news coverage, out of the 12-year period covered by 
the analysis, for each publication. The unit of analysis is the complete news story 
on corruption17 reported on the front page. The corruption stories18 were then 
coded into one of nine content categories based on source attribution or type 
of corruption story to isolate what amount (percentage) of corruption stories 
were independently investigated by the newspapers. As I explain in detail below, 
coding decisions were informed by the research questions, two pilot studies and 
the nature of a corruption story itself. The content analysis is then 
supplemented with a total of 8 weeks of two newsroom observation in two of 
the dailies in Abuja (6 weeks) and Lagos (2 weeks), and in-depth interviews with 
24 respondents, including investigative reporters, political reporters, editors, 
two members of staff of anticorruption agencies, and one official of an NGO 
promoting investigative journalism in Nigeria. The observation data did not 
prove to be much useful because, as it turned out, investigative reporting is 
‘fieldwork’, most of which happens outside newsrooms and therefore could not 
be observed directly by the researcher. However, I observed the general 
organization of investigative reporting in the two newspapers and had some 
conversations with reporters, in addition to the formal interviews, and 
combined these with interviews for coding. Transcripts of the interviews and the 
conversations were coded thematically based on the research questions, the 
interview guidelines and the other relevant themes that emerged from my 
discussions with the respondents. I explain all these in detail below.  
                                                          
coding took nine months in total, 5 months (July-November) in 2014 and 4 months for recoding in 2015 and 
(July-September), and completed in January 2016.  
17 Corruption is here operationally defined as financial misconduct involving (Nigerian) public officials or 
executives of corporate organizations, as detailed in chapter one above.  
18 Corruption stories in this research are defined as complete (frontpage) news stories referencing corruption, 
often indicated by words like ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’, ‘graft’, ‘embezzlement’, ‘mismanagement’, ‘loot’, ‘sleaze’, 
etc, or their variants, in the headline or text of the story.  
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3.2   Triangulation and mixed methods research:  
As the research deals with news content, journalists and the wider context of 
media organization and practice of investigative reporting in Nigeria, I adopt a 
triangulation of three methods: observation, in-depth interviews and 
quantitative content analysis of coverage of corruption in Nigerian newspapers. 
Mixed-methods researches are becoming increasingly popular in social research 
in general, and particularly in media and communications research (Treadwell, 
2014: 14; Berg, 2009: 5-6; Bryman, 2008: 379). One reason for this increasing 
popularity of mixed-method research is that most questions that face 
communication researchers are better approached methodologically by 
combining different research techniques and procedures for data collection 
(Deacon et al, 2007: 3). Another reason is that findings from each method can 
be compared with those of others, which improves the reliability of overall data 
collected (Berger, 2011: 25; Hansen et al, 1998: 44-45). In this sense, data from 
each technique complements findings from the other techniques used in the 
research. Third, some techniques lend themselves more suitable to certain kinds 
of questions than others. Berger (2011: 3) notes that communication 
researchers generally focus on one or more aspects of the communication 
process such as sources, messages/contents, channels/media, audiences, 
feedback, etc. This means that techniques for studying audiences may not be 
well suited for studying media content. By this reasoning, research that focuses 
on two or more aspects of the communication process may combine two or 
more techniques of data collection. That is why triangulation of three 
techniques is useful for me here. I study messages (coverage of corruption) 
through quantitative content analysis, but also engage with the journalists 
(producers) and their media through observation and semi-structured 
interviews. One justification for this approach is that some of my research 
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questions are better explored through certain methods than others, and for 
some questions even a combination of two techniques. For example, Research 
Questions 1, 3 and 4 (RQ1, R3 and RQ4) together relate to coverage of 
corruption in the press over time, including news reports of corruption 
independently investigated and reported by the newspapers. I approach these 
questions through quantitative content analysis of coverage of corruption in the 
four sampled publications and complemented with close engagement with the 
journalists themselves through indepth interviews and some of my own 
independent observation of their work. Two reasons informed this decision. 
First, media production is inevitably reflected in media content, a quantitative 
analysis of which can throw up various trends and patterns that illuminate, by 
inference at least, the phenomenon under investigation (Bryman, 2016: 287; 
Croucher and Cronn-Mills, 2015: 208; Deacon et al, 2007: 117-118; Hansen et al, 
1998: 92). In this case, the phenomenon is independent investigative reporting 
of corruption in the Nigerian press. And the content analysis was designed not 
only to measure coverage of corruption, but also to specify what amount of 
coverage comes from independent media investigations. Secondly however, 
inferences from quantitative analysis of media coverage, while generalizable, 
still may not say everything about media contents or reflect their full complexity. 
Specifically, content analysis does not say why coverage of a topic, corruption 
for example, is the way it is in a sample of newspapers, and hence it is typically 
supplemented by more ‘’interpretive procedures’’ (Gunter, 2012: 248). 
Moreover, McQuail (2005: 277) notes that interviews are a useful means of 
generating data from ‘’involved informants’’ who have some detailed and 
experiential understanding about a given subject.  For research on investigative 
reporting, therefore, the interviews and newsroom observation were intended 
to provide an insider perspective and other details about investigative reporting 
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and coverage of corruption in Nigerian newspapers that may otherwise not be 
readily evident in the coded sample.  
Qualitative or textual content analysis is itself appealing for research that deals 
with coverage of corruption or any other topic in the news (Deacon et al, 2007: 
138-140) and we have seen in the brief methodology review above. But 
qualitative content analysis, such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), in general, 
emphasises ‘close’ scrutiny of ‘latent’ or hidden meanings of texts, rather than 
manifest content (Hansen et al, 1998: 100). This makes such techniques 
unsuitable for my research which aims for simple frequency count of the 
occurrence of corruption stories in Nigerian newspapers to account for extent 
of reporting, rather than the latent or hidden meanings of the stories. 
Furthermore, qualitative content analysis techniques are based largely on the 
subjective interpretations of the researcher, itself considerably determined by 
the researcher’s location in the social world, and thus constraining both 
reliability and generalizability (Hansen, et al, 1998: 131; Treadwell, 2014: 234). 
For this reason, qualitative content analysis is often more suitable for small 
samples dealing with representation of ideas, people or ideologies in media 
texts (Deacon et al, 2007) which is not the purpose of this research. Additionally, 
textual analysis methods make identifying long-term trends and patterns of 
coverage over time both cumbersome and problematic, since the sample is 
normally few and the analysis is based on subjective interpretations of the 
researcher. In other words, since the present research seeks to understand the 
extent of independent investigative journalism in the Nigerian press as 
manifested in media coverage of corruption over the period of democratization 
since 1999, the choice of quantitative content analysis seems more suitable and 
therefore adopted here. I also considered structured questionnaires or focus 
groups. However, I regarded them less suitable than in-depth interviews which 
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have the advantage of snowballing to help connect the researcher to other 
respondents, and informal conversations with journalists and editors which 
observation allows. Focus group discussion with journalists would not be 
convenient for them, due to the nature of their work, while questionnaires may 
have poor return rates for the same reason.  
3.3 Data Collection Phase I: Content Analysis:  
Content analysis has a long history and pedigree and remains one of the most 
widely used methods in researching communications media (Berger, 2011: 205). 
It is used to identify and count the frequency of occurrence of certain features 
of media texts which in turn enables researchers to make meaningful general 
comments about these texts and their wider significance to society (Hansen et 
al, 1998: 95). Indeed, as Berelson (1952) famously argues, content analysis 
research ‘’reflects cultural patterns of groups, institutions or societies; reveal 
the focus of individual, group, institutional and societal attention; and describes 
trends in communication content’’ (in Weber, 1990: 12). All these three uses of 
content analysis are directly relevant to the present effort. First, analysis of 
coverage of corruption in the press over a reasonable period would help to 
reveal the trends, patterns and extent of attention given to the issue of 
corruption by the press, and thus provide data for answering parts of research 
questions 1, 2, and 3. By implication, the data collected through the analysis 
could say something about the democratic watchdog performance of the press 
in the country in a way that re-examines and problematizes dominant sections 
of existing literature about press and politics in Nigeria, and by extension Africa. 
A second advantage for the use of content analysis in this research is that the 
method is systematic, involves quantification, and therefore useful for mapping 
long term trends of media coverage and hence enables meaningful 
generalizations (Deacon et al, 2007). Furthermore, such analysis will 
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complement data collected from the other techniques of observation and 
intensive interviews as proposed above, and therefore useful for making a fuller 
sense of the practice of investigative journalism in the Nigerian press. For 
example, Hansen et al (1998: 94) note that ‘’several classic studies of news 
production combine observational methods (in news organizations) and 
interviews (with media professional and sources) with content analysis of the 
‘product’: the news’’. This is one additional reason that I find triangulation of 
content analysis, interviews and newsroom observation useful, since together, 
they help to answer the research questions.  
(a) Sampling procedure: media, content and period selected:  
Sampling in content analysis generally follows a three-step selection procedure. 
This involves decisions about what kinds of media to select, that is whether 
broadcast, print or online, for analysis and what specific titles, period and 
relevant content covered in the analysis (Deacon et al, 2007: 120; Hansen et al, 
1998: 100). I follow this general process in the specific ways described below. 
Sampling the media: As described in previous chapters above, the Nigerian 
media universe is a complex mix of print, broadcast and online media, a variety 
of private and government ownership, and regional spread across the country. 
For this research, only private newspapers were considered, which rules out 
broadcast and online media, all government owned media and magazines. First, 
Nigerian newspapers are mostly privately owned, and therefore tend to be freer 
than broadcast media which, to date, are largely controlled by government. 
Secondly, several scholars claim that Nigerian newspapers are overwhelmingly 
political in tone and reportage (Olukotun, 2000: 33); agitational and adversarial 
(Agbaje, 1993: 459); and have espoused watchdog journalism ideals since 
colonial times (Oso, 2013: 17). Other scholars note that newspapers have 
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reported several cases of corruption (Ojo, 2003: 832); and played crucial roles in 
promoting democracy and accountability in the country (Olaiya et al, 2013: 51; 
Ojo, 2007: 549). Such scholarly observations suggest a print media sector that 
are active in investigative reporting and coverage of corruption. For example, 
Dare (2011: 11-12), himself a former editor, claims that newspapers are the 
“backbone of Nigerian media”, first because they enjoy considerable freedom 
and also because they have been active in watchdog journalism practice.  Also, 
Lanosga and Martin (2017: 8) find that newspapers account for more than half 
of 757 investigative stories submitted to the U.S Investigative Reporters and 
Editors (IRE) prize entries from 1976 to 2012. This indicates that newspapers 
tend to do more investigative reporting than other media. Hence, newspapers 
are considered for the research, but not magazines, mainly for convenience of 
coding, magazines are not included. Among the leading online media in Nigeria 
are Sahara Reporters, established in (2006) based in New York, Premium Times 
(2011), based in Abuja, and the Nigerian Village Square (2003) which has no 
identifiable location. Regardless of location however, these are largely diaspora 
citizen-based media. They are very popular among Nigerians on social media and 
active in investigative journalism and reporting of corruption, particularly for 
Sahara Reporters and Premium Times in recent years (Dare, 2011). However, 
their impact on the political system remains ambiguous, since they are hardly 
taken seriously by the political and business elite in the country, although this is 
changing gradually. Therefore, online media are not also considered for this 
research, although it will certainly be interesting further research to have a 
comparative analysis of coverage of corruption between the traditional print 
media and the newer citizen-based online outlets. Finally, as noted previously, 
most broadcast media are still owned by government at federal, state and local 
levels. Journalists in these media are essentially part of the government 
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bureaucracy as civil servants, with little or no journalistic freedom (Ciboh, 2007; 
Hasty, 2005a; Nyamnjoh, 2005). Therefore, one expects little practice of 
investigative journalism or coverage of corruption from broadcast media. My 
focus on newspapers for analysis of investigative journalism and coverage of 
corruption in Nigeria has precedence in several similar existing studies (Dincer 
and Johnston, 2016; Fink and Schudson, 2014; Pinto, 2008; Ekström et al 2006; 
Lockyer, 2006), although broadcast and online media are also used, or 
sometimes a combination of both. For example, in her content analysis of 
changing patterns of investigative journalism in Argentina, Pinto (2008: 757) 
focused on three newspapers because she believed newspapers there are 
influential in agenda-setting for other media, and that investigative reporting 
had in fact evolved in the print press.      
In sum then, four newspapers (The Guardian, Punch, Thisday and Daily Trust) 
are purposively selected because they are adequately representative of the top 
national dailies in terms of popularity and circulation (Olukotun, 2004:72). Three 
of these publications, The Guardian, Punch, and Thisday are in Lagos, the 
commercial, industrial and formerly political capital of Nigeria, while Daily Trust 
is in Abuja, the present seat of the federal government. This selection also 
accounts for the regional variations in the ownership and location of private 
print media in the country. Sampling at this level is purposive because there is 
no available and reliable data about the total number of publications in Nigeria, 
perhaps because of the very rapid rate of entry and exit of newspapers in the 
media market.  
Time Frame: The time covered by this analysis is also purposively selected to 
cover a period of 12 years from 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2012, to reflect 
the present democratic dispensation in Nigeria, as discussed in the preceding 
chapters above. Several reasons inform this choice. First, analysis of twelve-year 
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coverage could provide a broader view about the watchdog performance of the 
media under democratization, which is one of the specific objectives of this 
study. Secondly, data taken from coverage over 12 years is long enough to make 
meaningful generalizations possible. As pointed out above, previous research on 
coverage of corruption in the Nigerian media tends to be based on a few months 
or years, making their generalizations problematic. Third, this period also 
coincides with the beginning and consolidation of rapid media development in 
the country, including the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law. The 
point about freedom of legislation is particularly important, as it will enable the 
researcher to test, empirically, the assumption that formal legislations could 
change the character of media behaviour in developing democracies such as 
Nigeria. Finally, the longitudinal element in the sampling directly addresses the 
question of the influence certain aspects of politics and culture may have on 
investigative journalism and coverage of corruption in the media, since patterns 
or trends influenced by political culture are better observed over long periods.  
(b) Selecting relevant content:  
Since daily newspapers are dated, and the number of days in a year is fixed (365 
or 366 once in four years), the total population of editions published by a 
newspaper in 12 years (our research period) is readily determined and 
transformed into a sampling frame. Bryman (2016: 174) notes that a sampling 
frame is the “list of all units in the population from which the sample will be 
selected”. For this, work, then, the unit is daily edition of the newspaper 
published by the four publications and the population is all the daily editions 
over the 12-year period from 2001 to 2012. Thus, in sampling the newspapers 
to analyse, I follow the basic procedure of simple random sampling (Bryman, 
2016: 176-177). I first develop a complete sampling frame from all the editions 
published by each of the four titles from 1st January 2001 to 31st December 
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2012, by assigning consecutive numbers 1, 2, 3, … 4380 to each daily edition. 
This gives a total of 4380 editions for each publication, or 17520 for the 
combined four titles19. Lacy et al (2001: 837-838) estimate that for content 
analysis of daily newspapers, a population of six months of coverage requires 
about one month (28 days) of sample when using simple random sampling. 
Following this, 12 years of coverage will require 24 months or two years of 
sample size, which, gives 730 editions for each publication or 2920 for the four 
publications combined (730 x 4 = 2920). Therefore, deciding for a sample size of 
730 editions, I draw a random sample from this numbered frame by an interval 
of 6, that is by selecting every 6th edition in the complete frame, starting from 1 
(January 1, 2001) in each publication20. This gives a minimum of 5 and maximum 
of 6 editions in a 30-day month, or at least 1 edition selected per week in the 
entire period. In my view, this makes the sample large enough to be 
representative of the overall population, and sufficiently adequate to enable 
observation of patterns and trends of coverage.  
3.4 Unit of analysis, content categories and coding scheme/procedure: 
(a) Unit of analysis:  
This content analysis is designed to measure how and the extent to which 
corruption is reported in the newspapers selected for analysis, to determine 
what amount of overall coverage of corruption results from independent 
investigative journalism, and to find out whether FOI legislation increased the 
                                                          
19 I peg a year at 365 days or daily editions and multiply this by 12 for each publication to cover the 12-year 
period of the research, and then multiply by 4, that, is, the four publications (365 x 12= 4380 x 4 = 17520).  
However, this means that 3 editions arising from an additional day in February from three leap years within this 
period (2004, 2008, and 2012) are not included in the sampling frame because their removal would not have 
any impacts on the sample selected or data collected, but also for the sake of convenience in constructing the 
frame.   
 
20 The interval, 6, is arrived at by a simple random sampling fraction of dividing the sampling population by 
sample size (4380/730 = 6), that is, one every 6 editions is selected in the sample.   
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amount of investigation and reporting of corruption in Nigerian newspapers. 
The crucial question is how to differentiate between all three, for example, how 
to differentiate an investigative story of corruption from other stories of 
corruption, and how to determine the impact of FOI legislation on coverage of 
corruption over the research period. I answer these questions through a three-
step coding procedure and designed the coding sheet accordingly to reflect 
these procedures.  
First, the unit of analysis is the complete corruption story on the front page. In 
practical application, this means a frontpage news story which references 
corruption or financial misconduct by public officials or executives of private 
companies, such as contract inflation by a director in a ministry or shares 
manipulation by an executive of a company or bank, all for personal gain. That 
is, we focus on a narrower definition of corruption: that which involves personal 
financial or monetary gain at the expense of the public interest, as Johnston 
(2005) defines it and adopted here21. Iwokwagh and Batta (2011: 331-332) 
capture the way the term is commonly understood in Nigeria as “all 
manifestations of financial impropriety. This includes actions such as bribery, 
over-invoicing, phoney contracts, diversion of public funds, and other indicators 
of financial corruption” involving officials of government or top managers in the 
private sector. That is, the form of corruption that involves tinkering with public 
funds by public officials for private gain or by top executives in the private sector 
in ways that breach the rules. Two pilot studies show that this form of corruption 
tends to be most emphasized in the media and is often indicated by certain 
referents in the headline or body of the story in Nigerian newspapers. Such 
referents include ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’ ‘graft’, ‘fraud’, ‘scam’ ‘scandal’ 
                                                          
21 See section 1.3 on corruption in chapter.  
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‘embezzlement’, ‘misappropriation’, ‘investigation’, ‘probe’, and their different 
variants such as ‘corrupt’, ‘bribe’, ‘fraudulent’, or compounds such as ‘probe-
panel’, etc. Both the pilot studies and the main analysis bear this out. Thus, I 
identify corruption stories by reading through all the stories on the front page 
of a given sample, including their continuation in the inside pages, and code 
those stories that contain the above or similar terms22. Also, a story is coded as 
a corruption story where the overall story makes clear or implies some 
wrongdoing by officials in government or private sector involving various sums 
of money in any currency, typically in naira, dollars, pounds and euros. 
Therefore, forms of ‘corruption’ such as vote buying, election rigging, political 
thuggery, nepotism, sex for jobs or grades, human rights abuses and so on are 
not coded, except where the story makes explicitly clear, for example, that 
election officials abused their position in exchange for their own personal 
monetary or financial gain. In one story for instance, Chris Uba, a candidate 
defeated in a gubernatorial election in Anambra State alleged in a Higher Court 
testimony that then Chairman of Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC), Maurice Iwu received a bribe of £536,000 to turn the election in his 
opponent’s favour. The story was primary about the election litigation, but was 
coded as a corruption story (Daily Trust, 11 November 2007). Similarly, all other 
kinds of financial crimes that do not involve public officials or executives of 
private companies, such as internet fraud, advance fee fraud and other kinds of 
scams known in Nigeria generally as ‘419’, for example Nigerians defrauding 
other Nigerians or nationals of other countries, were also not considered. In his 
book on corruption in Nigeria, Smith (2007: 28) considers such scams as 
probably the most “potent international symbol of Nigerian corruption” which 
should be understood as a “mode of interpretation” by ordinary Nigerians in 
                                                          
22 See coding manual in the appendix for details.  
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response to pervasive official corruption in the country. But I regard stories of 
such activities as instances of crime in general, rather corruption in the sense 
defined here, since these crimes are mostly perpetrated by citizens, rather than 
public officials or business executives. However, there were at least two cases 
of such 419 stories which were coded as corruption stories because they also 
involved public officials. One case is about two Indians known in the Nigerian 
press as Vaswami Brothers who connived with government officials to defraud 
the Nigerian government over privatization of some steel companies. The other 
involved officials of the national oil company who colluded with Nigerian 
fraudsters to defraud a Brazilian businessman. Each of these cases appeared a 
few times in the sample and were coded accordingly. All the details above are 
important because ‘corruption’ is so broad a term and so central to media 
output in Nigeria that a specific definition of it is necessary to make coding 
practicable and meaningful.   
In addition, only news stories on the front page of a sample were coded. 
Therefore, opinion articles, editorials, pictures, adverts, and all other content 
types are not considered. Similarly, corruption stories that are not headlined or 
promoted on the front pages were not coded. However, in most cases, front 
page stories continue into the inner pages, so the researcher follows every story 
on the front page of every sampled edition to wherever it is completed in the 
inner pages. There are several justifications for the focus on front page. First, 
the location of a story in any given edition of a newspaper is an indication of the 
prominence or importance attached to the story by the publication: front-page 
stories are regarded as most important. This is well established in agenda-
setting studies. Thus, the expectation is that investigative reports of official 
corruption would be an important item in the media agenda and therefore given 
front page prominence. This assumption proved sensible as during my 
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interviews with journalists, several of them mentioned the importance of the 
front page to make various points. One editor for example said about 
investigative reports that they do at his paper, that “… our second story, 
sometimes depending on the strength of the story, what we do is we either lead 
or make it second just to give it more prominence or more space to breath”.23 
Second, the focus on only front page news stories makes the research 
manageable since the sample is large, involving 2920 editions over twelve years. 
Finally, analysing front page stories only is also indirectly an analysis of the inside 
pages in the edition: if fewer stories of corruption appear on the front page, then 
it may indicate that corruption is given low prominence in the media, or vice 
versa. Either case would be an important empirical finding in its own right; it is 
not even necessary to analyse stories in the inside pages.  
 (b) Content categories:  
The preceding section describes the first step of the coding process: identifying 
corruption stories by reading all news stories reported on the front page of a 
given sampled edition, and deciding, based on criteria explained above, which 
of the stories are corruption stories, that is, the unit of analysis. In the second 
step, all corruption stories identified are then coded into one of nine categories 
based on source attribution and type of corruption story. The interactions and 
power relations between journalists and news sources, that is, providers of 
information, are central to political communication research. Such interactions 
influence the everyday thoughts about politics and political behavior of 
politicians (Davis, 2009); influence news agenda and frames and by implication 
the distribution of power (Entman, 2007); and help determine what can be said 
in news and who gets to say it (Broersma et al 2013). Furthermore, the diversity 
                                                          
23 Interview with Editor-in-Chief, Daily Trust, Abuja, Nigeria, November 2015.  
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of sources referenced in news stories is an indication of the democratic 
performance of the media, since it shapes the extent to which citizens have 
effective voice or power to participate in the political process (Hansen, 1991). 
However, a strand of research on journalist-source relations focuses on the 
specific matter of source attribution, that is, the practice of referencing a story 
to information sources, as an important element of news production processes, 
particularly news writing. Broersma et al (2013: 388) contend that news 
“sourcing is a central and defining element in journalism” practice, which shapes 
journalistic norms like autonomy and independence, everyday production 
practices like checking and verifying facts, and properties of news texts like 
attribution. For Sundar (1998: 56-56) source attribution is the “backbone” of a 
news story and “the bread and butter” of journalism practice, such that a news 
story is “rarely, if ever, published if it is not properly attributed to a legitimate 
source”. Attribution of sources in a news story enhances the credibility of the 
story and differentiates it from an opinion article.  
But while the concept of source can mean different things in journalism 
scholarship, from media channels and technologies to journalists themselves, in 
a news story, ‘source’ simply refers to the “information providers quoted within 
news stories” (Sundar, 1998: 56). Sources of information for news stories could 
be individuals, institutions, documents or reports and so on (Fink and Schudson, 
2014: 11; Sundar, 1998: 56; Hansen, 1991: 477). In content analysis research, 
coding is often based on news source referenced in a story, named or unnamed. 
For example, Justin, Williams and Franklin (2008a) analyse news sources from 
news reports drawn from a varied mix of print and broadcast media in the UK 
over a two-week period, to determine the influence of public relations and news 
agencies on British journalism. Similarly, Ericson et al (1991) analysed media 
representation of crime, law and justice by coding news sources into several 
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categories, including ‘journalists themselves’, ‘government sources’, ‘private 
sector sources’, ‘individuals’, and ‘unspecified’ sources, etc (cited in Hansen et 
al, 1998: 199). For content analysis of investigative reporting, coding sources has 
been particularly important in distinguishing investigative reports from other 
kinds of news reports in media content. For example, Kathleen Hansen (1991) 
analysed 60 “enterprise” stories (including investigative reports) submitted for 
Pulitzer Prizes and Investigative Reporters and Editors Conference in the U.S. 
She coded the stories based on source attribution and affiliation, that is the 
sources referenced and the institutions to which they are affiliated and 
compared here findings to existing research (ibid: 476). She finds that enterprise 
stories are more likely to refer to information sources, “both people and 
documents”, outside of government circles or “information sources with no 
identifiable affiliation” than daily news content. Only 4 in 10 sources are 
affiliated to government in enterprise stories, as against 8 in 10 for daily news 
content. Pinto (2008: 756) uses two criteria in her qualitative analysis of 
investigative reporting in three Argentinian newspapers: “autonomy, or the 
degree to which news organizations were free to critically cover powerful actors 
and assertiveness, or the ability of the newsroom to seek out multiple sources 
of information and report on topics of their choosing”. Fink and Schudson (2014) 
coded source attribution to distinguish four different types of news stories, 
including investigative stories in which the reporter plays the watchdog function 
by “investigating corruption or coming to the aid of a person who has been 
treated unjustly” (ibid: 11). Thus, in coding such investigative stories, they note 
that “reporters often call attention” to methods of reporting “in the ways they 
attribute their sources: ‘according to documents obtained by [news 
organization]’. For the purposes of our coding, articles that referenced efforts 
like these – obtaining non-public documents or conducting many or lengthy 
89 
 
interviews – were considered to be investigative” (ibid). Finally, Relly and 
Schwalbe (2013) coded news stories associated with corruption and with 
reference to freedom of information requests in three Indian newspapers.  
The studies cited above have several implications for the design of my analysis. 
They show that source attribution is helpful in identifying investigative stories, 
that investigative stories involve some journalistic assertiveness in sourcing 
information, and the techniques journalists use in demonstrating this in news 
stories. For this research therefore, corruption stories are coded into one of nine 
categories depending on source attribution or type of corruption story coded. 
The two pilot studies, which I explain in detail below, show that corruption 
stories in Nigerian newspapers are attributed to a variety of sources, including 
anti-corruption agencies, investigative committees of the federal parliament or 
state assembly, adhoc commissions of inquiry by the federal or state 
government, ministry or agency, or to foreign media, or to police or the courts, 
or yet to individual politicians, civil society organizations, or citizens and 
documents. These sources make up seven of the nine categories into which 
corruption stories were coded, and explain one aspect of the coding process, 
that is, coding by source attribution. It is in this coding process that investigative 
stories of corruption are distinguished from other corruption stories, that is, 
through the sources attributed in the stories. For example, if a story of 
corruption is attributed to any of the anti-corruption agencies or probe panels 
set up by government, or parliamentary investigations of corruption by either 
the Senate or the House of Representatives, etc, then the story is considered an 
instance of routine beat reporting of corruption, rather than of investigative 
reporting. That is, the journalist reporting the story did not investigate the 
instance of corruption herself, rather, she merely reports it in the same way she 
would report a story from a news release, official briefing or press conference. 
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If on the other hand the story is attributed to the reporter’s own independent 
sources, named or anonymous, then it is considered an instance of investigative 
reporting of corruption and a mark of the media’s independent accountability 
role24. In other words, corruption news in the press can be the result of either 
routine news reporting or of investigative reporting, the two forms of reporting 
being decidedly different, although both are examples of watchdog journalism 
broadly defined25.  
Furthermore, it highlights and accounts for the role of other actors in the 
political system earlier identified as being responsible for much of stories of 
corruption in the press. the categories for coding by source attribution are 
therefore seven: Independent media investigations (IMI); Anti-corruption 
Agencies (ACA); National and State Assemblies (NA); Commissions of Inquiry 
(COI); Foreign Media (FM); Diaspora or online media (DOM); and ‘Other’. 
Corruption stories that are independently investigated, that is, investigative 
stories, were coded into the IMI category. These stories were normally 
attributed to the journalists’ own independent sources, sometimes named, 
sometimes anonymous, using techniques such as “investigations by our 
reporter”, “according to our findings”, or “according to sources”, or “documents 
obtained by our reporter”, or “checks by Daily Trust”, or “Punch investigations 
show that…”, etc. Stories that were attributed to any of the three anticorruption 
agencies (EFCC, ICPC, and CCBT26) were coded into the ACA category. Those 
                                                          
24 As discussed in chapter two above, media coverage of corruption through routine processes such as coverage 
of parliamentary investigations or investigations by anti-corruption agencies or criminal proceedings of 
corruption cases in court are still regarded as examples of watchdog journalism by some researchers (Mellado, 
2015; Coronel, 2010), they are not examples of investigative reporting which requires independent journalistic 
initiative. I discuss the complexities of such definitions in the specific case of Nigeria in subsequent chapters.   
25 See also Section 2.2 in Chapter Two above on conceptualizing watchdog journalism and investigative 
reporting.  
26 Nigeria’s main anti-corruption agencies. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC); Independent 
Corruption and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC); Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal (CCBT). As we 
shall see, there are several others.  
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attributed to investigations by either chamber of the federal parliament (Senate 
and House of Representatives) or by any of the 36 state parliaments were coded 
into the NA category. Corruption stories generated by probe panels, 
commissions of inquiry, administrative panels set up various governments 
(mainly federal and state governments) were coded into the COI category. 
Stories from foreign media or diaspora or online media were coded accordingly 
into the Foreign Media (FM) and Diaspora/Online Media (DOM) categories. 
Corruption stories from any other sources such as the police, courts, whistle-
blowers, foreign governments, rather than foreign media (for example, some of 
the stories involving corruption by Nigerian officials were attributed to Scotland 
Yard, or Crown Courts, separate from those attributed to say the New York 
Times or BBC) were coded into the ‘Other’ category. In addition, all corruption 
stories coded into any of these seven categories are corruption scandals, that is, 
stories of corruption in which the alleged wrongdoing is specified, or the 
individual officials named, or public institutions to which the case is associated 
mentioned, and often the amounts or sums of money or other property involved 
in the case is specified, or any combination of these criteria. John Kerry’s 
example of $6 billion fraud in the national security case is a scandal in that the 
persons are in fact named in the stories, as is their affiliations and the sums of 
money involved. However, when then Prime Minister David Cameron said in 
May 2016 that Nigeria is one of two fantastically corrupt countries in the world, 
a statement that generated lots of stories in the Nigerian press, he did not 
specify that anyone had acted corruptly in any specific instance as in the sense 
of Kerry above. Such general statements about corruption in Nigeria are still 
corruption stories. But they are here coded under ‘narrative of corruption’ 
category or corruption talk. In practice, scandal stories are in fact easy to 
identify. Perhaps because of the element of sensationalism, Nigerian 
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newspapers generally indicate the names, institutions, amounts and specific 
wrongdoing alleged even in the headline of corruption stories, hence the use of 
different referents like ‘graft’, ‘bribery’, ‘scandal’, ‘scam’, ‘embezzle’, etc.  as 
naming names and mentioning sums and institutions and mentioned 
wrongdoing clearly mention specific instances of alleged or real corruption by 
specific persons, groups or institutions, often involving specific sums of money 
or other public property. I refer to these as corruption scandals because a 
corruption scandal is the revelation of corruption in the media ((Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004b: 1143). In these stories, the specific forms of wrongdoing are 
clearly mentioned, and the officials and sums involved are also named in the 
stories.  
Two further types of corruption stories were encountered in the sampled 
newspapers however. A single corruption scandal can generate several stories 
over many days or even weeks in the same newspaper. By their nature, 
corruption scandals tend to have a relatively long ‘page-life’ in the news, from 
the initial breaking story of the scandal to subsequent developments in the case 
such as prosecution, trial and conviction in court. Reporters tend to follow these 
developments to keep the scandal in the media agenda. For this reason, 
corruption scandals are often called ‘media frenzies’, but it is also how 
investigative reporting or revelations of corruption result in reforms (Tumber 
and Howard, 2004a; Esser and Hartung, 2004). Indeed, investigative stories of 
corruption or other breaches are often presented in series, that is, in in parts 
over several days or even weeks after the initial breaking news. One example is 
the recent Panama Papers case in the world media. In sum, corruption scandals 
often generate follow-up stories of the same scandal. But to give a more 
specified example, on 23rd January 2005, The Punch reported a story that EFCC 
was investigating then Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun for corruption 
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totalling over 1 billion naira. The story was attributed to the EFCC and presented 
as lead story, that is, with the boldest headline on the front page. It was also the 
first time this case would appear in the sample. But then again on 12th March 
2005, (about six weeks after the first story), The Punch reported another story 
on the same case and the same person, reflecting additional charges of 
corruption. And then on 30th March 2005, The Punch reported a third story on 
the same case, this time that the IGP has been arrested. On 5th April 2005, 
another story on the same case that the IGP was refused bail in court. And yet 
another story on 23rd April that a former Inspector General of Police Mohammed 
Dikko Yusuf had refused to stand surety for the ‘embattled’27 IGP. Thus, we have 
six different corruption stories on the same case. Indeed, stories on this case 
continued until the IGP was released from prison after serving a brief term. In 
this research, I coded the first story as a corruption scandal in the ACA category, 
but all subsequent stories were coded into the Follow-Up (FS) category, and 
there were, in fact, several similar cases, which explains why the FS category 
contains the largest number of corruption stories. And then, there is the 
‘narrative of corruption story’ which is a corruption story but does not involve 
any specific wrongdoing by anyone. For example, on 23 March 2004, Thisday 
reported the then Minister of State for Finance, Mrs Esther Usman to have said 
that about 30% of corruption in Nigeria can be traced to the Nigeria Customs 
Service. In another example, President Olusegun Obasanjo was reported to have 
asked Transparency International to expose Western companies that offer 
bribes to Nigerian officials (Daily Trust, 23 March 2005). Both stories are news 
about corruption in the press; but clearly, they do not involve any specific 
instance of wrongdoing in the same sense as the previous examples above. In 
this sense, the source of the story is not important to coding, since no specific 
                                                          
27 This word is in fact a common referent in reporting corruption in Nigerian newspapers.  
94 
 
cases of corruption is involved. Hence, such stories were coded in the Narrative 
of Corruption (NC) category. In the third and final step of the coding process, 
stories were coded based on simple frequency counts, with each corruption 
story representing a numeric unit from 0 (no occurrence of corruption story on 
front page), 1 (one corruption story on front page of a sample), 2 (two corruption 
stories), etc. As we shall see in the next chapter, slightly over 9% of the sample 
carried two or more corruption stories, the maximum being five different 
corruption stories on the same front page of sampled newspaper in The Punch. 
Additionally, stories were also coded A if they were reported as lead story, or B, 
if they were not, as a further measure of prominence given to corruption stories 
in the newspapers.  
(c) Borderline Stories:    
A final point about the coding procedure requires clarification however. Based 
on the criteria described above, coding was quite straightforward for the bulk of 
the stories.  The coding process itself was time-consuming and laborious, as with 
all content analysis research, but especially since the researcher had to read 
through an average of 6 stories per front page to identify any corruption stories 
reported. However, the way Nigerian newspapers write corruption stories make 
the task of the researcher easier. Several identifiers or referents such as words 
relating to corruption are generally indicated in the headline or body of the 
stories. Also, the newspapers tend to announce their own independent 
investigations with a rider or kicker, mostly the term ‘investigation’. In addition, 
names of established sources like anti-corruption agencies, parliamentary 
committees, commissions of inquiries, foreign media or several other sources of 
the stories are attributed in the headline or the first paragraph, or both. Thus, 
names like EFCC, ICPC, CCBT, Senate, House, Adhoc Committee, etc are quite 
common in the headline of the stories coded. Furthermore, names of the public 
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officials, institutions or prominent people involved in the corruption cases also 
generally form part of the headline and lead. All these make the analysis 
straightforward. Still, there were borderline stories that proved quite 
challenging for coding. Broadly, these are of three types. In some cases, it was 
difficult to decide whether the story is a corruption story, or not. One example 
is the story of a sitting president doing a public fundraiser for his presidential 
library in which he raised N6 billion (about $16 million in today’s exchange 
rates). No laws were breached, but it was still denounced and framed as 
“executive extortion” (The Punch, 17 May 2005) in the news. Secondly, some 
“pretend” to be investigative stories, but were not. For example, a story of delay 
in the Lagos light rail as reported in The Punch (12 November 2010). Another 
example is of a story in N3.5 billion (about $10 million today) raised by then 
ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party by selling nomination forms to candidates for 
various elective offices in an election year, (The Punch, 25 September 2010). But 
this is in fact a legitimate means of funding for political parties in Nigeria and is 
recognised in the electoral law and the forms are normally advertised openly. 
Indeed, samples from all four publications had at least one story of this kind all 
about the “Jumbo” pay for legislators, that is, in Nigerian parlance, the high pay 
for politicians in the country, especially federal lawmakers. But while in a 
country like Nigeria, such high pay for lawmakers offend public sensitivity, they 
are captured in law or extant regulations, and in many cases, not even by the 
legislators themselves, but by a supposedly independent commission which sets 
salaries of public officers, including those of legislators. Finally, some of the 
stories were about corruption and reported in the front page of the sampled 
newspapers, but they are of corruption in other countries, such the case of a 
former Israeli Prime Minister, Jacob Zuma of South Africa, etc. In sum, such 
borderline stories were either not coded at all or coded in the other category, 
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based on my subjective judgment at the time, as we shall see in chapter five, 19 
of such stories in total were coded in the ‘Other’ category.  
3.5 Data Collection Phase II: In-depth interviews and newsroom observation: 
Stokes (2013: 92) notes that intensive interviews are widely used in media 
studies to collect data ‘’on ideas, opinions and attitudes about certain practices’’ 
of media workers or processes of media work. The number of interviews held 
for a given research depends on the questions at hand or the availability and 
access to informants. Stetka and Ӧrnebring (2013), for example, conducted 270 
interviews during their research on investigative journalism in the new 
democracies of eastern and central Europe. Similarly, Tong (2012) did over 100 
interviews (formal and informal) with reporters during her research on 
investigative journalism in China. Yusha’u (2010; 2009) did about 22 interviews 
while researching investigative journalism in Nigeria. Kaplan (2008) did 10 
interviews to complement a survey of 281 print journalists in his study of the 
attitudes, perceptions and experiences of U.S investigative reporters. 
Participant observation, on the other hand, places the research at the centre of 
what is being studied, often requiring immersion of the researcher into the 
social setting or phenomena being studied. It’s an approach that involves, even 
requires, the researcher to have access to the social behaviour being studied. 
Data is then collected through field notes, conversations with involved actors, 
formal and informal interviews, analysis of documents etc (Bryman, 2016: 422; 
Treadwell, 2014: 192; Stokes, 2013: 105; Berg, 2009: 191-193; Deacon et al, 
2007: 250-258; Hansen et al, 1998: 36). This makes the approach suitable for 
studying ‘’social phenomena that are not easily studied by quantification or that 
are quite simply best observed in their actuality’’ (Deacon et al, 2007: 257).  
Finally, participant observation enables researchers to verify the professed 
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claims of social actors in various settings, that is, to determine what social actors 
actually do, as opposed to what they claim to be doing or to relate findings to 
theoretical literature (Stokes, 2013: 105). The method has been particularly 
useful for studies of news production processes and practices in relation to 
assumptions about journalistic objectivity, media ideologies such as watchdog 
journalism, news routines and so on (Hansen et al, 1998). Although media 
ethnography is scant in Africa, it’s been used to explore political journalism in 
Ghana (Hasty, 2005a; 2005b), Nigerian broadcasting (Golding and Elliot, 1979), 
Nigerian audience consumption of Indian films (Larkin, 1997), censorship in the 
Nigerian film industry (McCain, 2013), influence of oral culture on African 
journalism (Bourgault, 1995), and relationships between alternative media and 
traditional newspapers in Nigeria (Akinfemisoye, 2013).   
But newsroom observation is rarely used for studying investigative journalism 
and reporting of corruption. As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter 
above, interviews, content analysis (both qualitative and quantitative), surveys 
or traditional historical method tend to be the predominant methods for 
researching investigative journalism. Still, a few studies collected data from 
investigative reporters by observing them at work, although in combination with 
other techniques (Tong, 2012; Hasty, 2005a; Waisbord, 2000). As Tong (2012: 7) 
remarks, ‘’if we want an in-depth understanding of how investigative journalists 
do their work, it is necessary to go to the work place of investigative journalists 
to observe their real practices’’. These studies (and more) provided me with 
some general guidelines on how to approach media ethnography, but the 
newsroom observation I carried out was determined by the specific 
circumstances of my research and the initial research questions. 
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(a) Media ethnography: Sampling, interviewees, access and interviewing: 
The ethnographic aspect (newsroom observation and in-depth interviews) of 
this research stems from the findings of the content analysis phase as well as 
some of the initial research questions. Research Question 5 (RQ5), for example, 
is concerned with how certain aspects of political culture in Nigeria may shape 
investigative journalism and press coverage of corruption in terms of general 
news output, relations between investigative reporters and public officials being 
investigated, or relations between sources of corruption stories such as anti-
corruption agencies and the media. This requires interacting with journalists to 
get their views and experiences on such issues through in-depth interviews with 
a sample of them. Similarly, RQ4 examines the extent to which freedom of 
information legislation has impacted on investigative reporting of corruption 
over the study period, which in addition to the content analysis data, is further 
explained by data from interviews with reporters and editors. Furthermore, 
sampling for the media to observe and interview respondents also follow from 
sampling for the content analysis. Therefore, the four newspapers purposively 
selected for content analysis are also considered for observation, namely The 
Punch, The Guardian, Thisday and Daily Trust. However, unlike the content 
analysis data which coded coverage of corruption in all the four newspapers 
selected and over the same twelve-year period, the observation was conducted 
at two of the newspapers, Daily Trust in Abuja and The Guardian in Lagos during 
September-October 2015 and November-December 2015 respectively. This had 
to do with both access and convenience. First, gaining access to Daily Trust in 
Abuja was not much of a problem, perhaps because I had worked there before 
and some of the editors know me. I spent a total of 6 weeks at Daily Trust 
collecting data. However, gaining access to the sampled media in Lagos was a 
completely different experience. It was not until the third week of my stay in the 
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city that I was able to gain access to The Guardian where I spent a further two 
weeks.28 Also, it was simply more convenient for me to spend more time in 
Abuja than in Lagos. In total, then, both the newsroom observation and the 
interviews about four months, from late September 2015 to late January 2016. 
Overall therefore, ethnographic data for this research comprise field notes taken 
from my observations and conversations at two newspapers, as well as notes 
and recordings from formal and informal interviews with a total of 24 people.  
The interviewees were selected through a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling procedures. Purposive sampling is used because of the 
nature of the research itself and the questions it seeks to answer. Stories of 
corruption, particularly corruption scandals, are a form of political news, since 
corruption, as defined in this work at least, is a political activity involving public 
officials. Thus, coverage of such activity is a form of political journalism, much 
like coverage of election campaigns or public policy. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, media coverage is a key element that turns a corrupt act into a scandal, 
although the role of the media goes beyond mere reporting of corruption to 
actively constructing and framing scandals (Clemente and Gabbioneta, 2017: 1; 
Waisbord, 2004a: 1077). This further makes corruption news a form of political 
news. Moreover, as discussed in previous chapters, investigative journalism is 
itself a core aspect of the political function of the press, since it aims to hold the 
state and its functionaries accountable to the citizens, at least, within liberal 
                                                          
28 On arrival, I wrote a letter to each of the papers, stating clearly what my mission was and how long I intended 
to stay and the things I would do. This was the same process I followed at Daily Trust in Abuja. However, none 
of the Lagos papers replied me. They kept telling me to come back the following day, or next week. In the end, I 
had to find a way to contact some of the journalists directly and through them was able to reach the editors to 
state my case. Still, my letter was not officially replied, not even at The Guardian where I was eventually allowed 
to spend two weeks. As we shall see, I considered this a finding in its own right, precisely similar to how some of 
the respondents said government organizations treat their FOIA requests for information.  However, I still visited 
and did in-depth interviews with some journalists at The Punch and Thisday where I could not gain access for 




democratic theory of the media. However, there is a sense in which stories of 
corruption are also a form of economic or business news, since corrupt practices 
and their exposure have implications for both political and economic sectors of 
a country. Indeed, for countries like Nigeria, corruption is both a political and an 
economic issue, and is often engaged in by individuals and groups drawn from 
both politics and the corporate world, as our working definition here indicates.  
In addition, investigative journalism is often practiced by specialist reporters or 
units within newspaper organizations (Doig, 1992: 46), particularly 
investigations of wrongdoing or corruption that is our concern here. This further 
makes purposive sampling appropriate for selecting interviewees for this study. 
Accordingly, I purposively selected and interviewed investigative reporters, 
political reporters, business reporters, several editors in each of the newspapers 
under study, including daily or weekend editors and senior editors like two 
editors-in-chief and one deputy editor-in-chief. My working assumption here is 
that this cohort of respondents are competent to speak about investigative 
reporting and coverage of corruption in the newspapers, including about how 
stories of corruption are sourced or reported, relationships between journalists 
and sources in investigating and reporting corruption, the workings of regulatory 
environment, including the freedom of information, etc.  
At the two newspapers in which I gained access for newsroom observation (Daily 
Trust and The Guardian), selecting the respondents was quite straightforward, 
as over the weeks, I came to know the journalists by their roles and job 
descriptions, mostly through informal conversations with their colleagues or 
other staff in the organizations. Having already been given right of access to the 
newsrooms, I simply walk up to their desks, introduced myself and my research 
and sought their consent to hold formal or informal discussions with them. 
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However, sampling interviewees also involved a snowballing process in which 
recommended that I talk to other reporters they know, within the same 
newspaper organizations or elsewhere29. At other times, snowballing arose out 
of ongoing discussions, for example, when a political reporter at Daily Trust told 
me that a colleague of his does a lot of investigative reporting even though he is 
not part of the paper’s ‘investigative desk’. This was also how I got to talk to the 
editor of the online newspaper, Premium Times in Abuja. Similarly, during 
discussion with some respondents, I learned about non-governmental 
organizations that work to investigative journalism in the media, like the Wole 
Soyinka Centre of Investigative Journalism, where I later held an interview with 
a senior staff member of the centre30. Thus, all but four of the respondents are 
journalists or work within the media. Among the four who are not journalists are 
a former head of Nigeria’s foremost anti-corruption agency, EFCC and the head 
of Wole Soyinka Centre for Investigative Journalism, a non-profit in Lagos. 
Invariably, the majority of the respondents are from Daily Trust and The 
Guardian (in that order), the two newspapers where I had access. All but three 
are men31.  
Furthermore, in general I held two types of interviews with the respondents. I 
regarded my conversations and dialogue with reporters and other during 
newsroom observation as informal interviews, since these were mostly 
recorded, with the consent of the respondents, though mostly unscheduled. 
These informal conversations ranged from a few minutes to about 45 minutes 
in length and I have generally considered them as part of data obtained from 
                                                          
29 In most cases, the reporters also kindly afforded me with contacts, mostly mobile phone numbers and emails.   
30 During my initial conversations with her, she told me that their annual awards for investigative reporting in 
Nigeria was coming up around the same time in Lagos (December 2015), so I attended the event where I met 
with and later interviewed two award winners for investigative reporting from Premium Times and Nation 
newspapers, although both newspapers were not originally selected for the study.  
31 I observed that political reporting is overwhelmingly dominated by men and had informal interviews on two 
female reporters on this and other issues and I believe this to be an interesting area for future research also.  
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the newsroom observation. The questions I asked during these informal 
engagements mostly arose from my observations in the newsrooms, which 
themselves are based on the original research questions. Some 22 of the 
interviews were formal, scheduled and ranged over 45 minutes to about two 
hours in length. I consider these as in-depth semi-structured interviews, which 
complete a tripod of the triangulation methodology used for the study: content 
analysis, newsroom observation and in-depth interviews. Almost all the formal 
interviews and informal conversations were held in a face-to-face context with 
the respondents, mostly in their offices, work-stations or somewhere on the 
premises of the newspaper organizations such as cafeteria or motor-park (for 
informal conversations only). Three in-depth interviews were however held on 
the phone because this was the most convenient means of talking with these 
respondents at the time. For five of the formal interviews, the interview process 
held in two or more sessions either complete an interview previously started or 
to follow up with additional questions. Also, questions for the in-depth 
interviews are generally of two types. Most issue from the data obtained from 
the content analysis aspect of the research and deal with issues such as why 
there appears to be much less independent reporting of corruption in the 
sample than stories of corruption generated by sources such as the national 
parliament and anti-corruption agencies, or why coverage of corruption tends 
to spike in some years but is significantly low in other years, or the effectiveness 
of the freedom of information act in the estimation of journalists in terms 
investigative reporting and coverage of corruption in the country32, etc. Other 
questions I asked during the interviews, however, deal directly some of the 
research questions, particularly those pertaining how journalists understand 
                                                          
32 I attach the interview schedule which was the general guide for the formal interviews; the informal ones were 
mostly spontaneous, sometimes triggered by an observation, though still within the general areas/questions of 
the research.  
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and approach investigative reporting, how it is organized within Nigerian 
newspapers, their relationships with various sources in coverage of corruption, 
and what factors, if any, influence corruption coverage in the country.  
Finally, the respondents have had journalistic experience that range from 3 to 
30 years, including editors, Saturday or Sunday editors, line editors, investigative 
reporters, regional correspondents, political reporters/editors, business 
reporters and one staff of the advert department at Daily Trust. All the 
interviews were recorded with a digital audio recorder after which they were 
transcribed and stored in a secure external drive and an encrypted google drive 
account.  
3.6 Reliability, Validity and Pilot Study:  
As the data for this research were collected through different techniques and at 
different locations, it is useful to outline some of the procedures taken to ensure 
validity and reliability for the study. For quantitative content analysis research, 
establishing reliability of the data involves three considerations: the extent of 
stability of measurements overtime, the degree to which the data measured is 
replicable by other independent observers, and the accuracy or the extent to 
which measurements conform to known standards or which a research designs 
yields what it is designed to yield (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 270-
271). For stability, reliability tests typically involve a test-retest procedure 
whereby the researcher measures the same subset of the sample at different 
periods and compare the measurements to check whether they have remained 
stable across the time lag. According to Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999: 
271), accuracy tests, while being the most desirable, are untenable since there 
are no gold standards agreed to by experts to which all other measures can be 
set against. Thus, reproducibility is the ‘strongest realistic method by default’ for 
testing the reliability of content analysis data. Reproducibility entails inter-coder 
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reliability tests which can be carried out in different ways. The most typical of 
these is to a pair of coders code the same subset of the sample independently 
under similar conditions, and then to compare and report the percentage of 
agreement between the coders (Krippendorff, 2004: 414; Lombard et al, 2002: 
589-590; Potter and Levine Donnerstein, 1999: 271-273). In this sense, the 
reliability of the data is a useful step towards ensuring its validity, not necessarily 
a sufficient one (Lombard et al, 2002: 589). However, an explicit and replicable 
coding scheme itself helps to systematize the coding process and thus improves 
the validity of the data collected by it (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 
273). Also, in a similar study by Fink and Schudson cited severally above, only of 
the authors did the all coding, since, according to them, “the vast majority of the 
stories were easy calls” (ibid: 18). In other words, some studies use just a single 
coder, particularly in my case where I cannot afford a research assistant. 
Moreover, pilot studies further help to strengthen the validity of content 
analysis data, first by helping to sort out problems with coding at the initial 
stages of data collection and for testing inter-coder reliability (Lombard et al, 
2002: 590). Therefore, inter-coder reliability, coding scheme and pilot studies 
together are sufficient for establishing validity of content analysis data (Potter 
and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 273). With some exceptions and modifications, I 
have followed these general principles.  
First, as I collected all the data by myself, without the help of any research 
assistants, I did not calculate inter-coder reliability. However, I did several test 
and retest measurements in order to ensure the coding scheme and the coding 
itself were stable over time. This is by way of two pilot studies (in 2014) and one 
main analysis (in 2015-216). In the first pilot study, I selected samples for the 
first two months in the sampling frame for the first year of the research period 
(January and February 2001) for each of the four publications. This gives a total 
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of 40 sampled editions (10 each). With this small sample, I tested the coding in 
seven pre-identified content categories (IMI, ACA, NA, COI, FM, DOM, and 
Other)33. These categories were based on my personal observation and 
familiarity with news coverage of corruption in Nigerian newspapers34. The 
results of the pilot study held good for the two months of the sample taken only 
from 2001. That is, the seven categories appeared sufficient for coding 
corruption stories identified in the first two months of 2001. I then proceeded 
with coding the whole sample. After completing the full coding up to 2012 
however, it turned out that over 60% of the stories were coded in the Other 
category alone, indicating that problems with categorization or unit of analysis 
or both35. There are two explanations for the anomaly. The pilot study sample 
was not only too small, it was also ‘horizontal’, that is, taken in the same year, 
for a research that covers twelve years. But more significantly, by the starting 
year of the research (January 2001), the democratic government had just taken 
off only a few months earlier (May 1999). As such several of the factors that 
influence output of corruption news such activism of anti-corruption agencies 
and parliaments, elections, change officials in important offices, turn-over of 
political parties and so on were either minimal or non-existent in 2001. As a 
result, several types of corruption stories as well as the volume of it would have 
been manifest in 2001. Thus, I regarded that first full coding also as a pilot study, 
after which I refined and adjusted the coding scheme and the content categories 
to keep up with observations from the two pilot studies and recoded the data in 
2015-2016 as described above by creating the FS and NC categories and taking 
                                                          
33 See Section 3.4 (pages 88-89) above for detailed explanation of these terms 
34 Indeed, initial ideas for this research started from some personal observations and little familiarity with of 
coverage of corruption in Nigerian press, way back in 2011 and 2012.    
35 I had noticed the problem by midway through the coding process, but I decided to go through to the end of 
the same and redesign the research all over again. Thus, I regarded the full coding also as a pilot study, which 
helped me to finetune both the categories and the unit analysis for the second coding in 2015-2016.  
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accounting for  type of corruption story (scandal, follow-up story and corruption 
talk) in the coding procedure.  
Furthermore, the replicability of a coding scheme depends to some extent on 
whether the coding is for manifest or latent content, which in turn determines 
the extent to which a coder would use their own subjective schema in making 
coding decisions (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999: 267-268). For manifest 
content, where units are easily identifiable, coding is likely to be a 
straightforward ‘clerical and computational’ process and hence improves the 
validity of the data collected. This is precisely what Fink and Schudson mean by 
‘easy calls’ above. It is also the case with my research where unit of analysis is 
the complete corruption story on the front page of the sample and coding done 
by source attribution or type of story, all of which are not difficult to spot for 
most of the stories. Thus, coding only requires following the scheme to allocate 
corruption stories to respective categories using simple nominal numbers, the 
easiest level of quantifying text. This leads to how reliability and validity for the 
overall data is established. According to Creswell and Miller (2000), procedures 
for demonstrating validity in qualitative research are different from those used 
in quantitative researches, but no less credible. Triangulation at varying levels 
(data sources, methods, investigators etc), for example, is a way of ensuring 
validity of the data because ‘’researchers go through this process and rely on 
multiple forms of evidence rather than a single incident or data point in the 
study’’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127). In other words, the iterative process 
inherent in triangulation research is itself a procedure for establishing the 
validity of data, since researchers typically cross check findings from particular 
methods and data sources to those of others, as is the case in this research. 
Furthermore, Bryman et al (2008) have identified several procedures for 
ensuring quality, and hence, reliability and validity in a mixed methods research. 
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These include integrating findings from both quantitative and qualitative 
components of the research or using different criteria for each of the 
components (ibid: 268-272). The above suggestions have been useful for me as 
well. First, the ethnography component of the research was informed both by 
some research questions that are best answered through qualitative data, as 
described above, as well as findings from the content analysis data. In all the 
formal and some of the informal interviews, I asked the respondents questions 
that issue directly from the content analysis data. There are many examples of 
this, as can be seen in the general interview guide. Broadly speaking, the 
responses served two uses. They helped to affirm, and therefore validate, 
aspects of the content analysis data to which I referred. Also, the responses 
illuminate aspects of the research that the content analysis data could not 
answer fully, which again justifies the triangulation technique. Indeed, 
respondents agreed with many of the observations that derive directly from the 
coding.  Therefore, the use of triangulation of content analysis, observation and 
formal and informal interviews for this research is useful both for obtaining a 
fuller picture of the research questions, as well as for validating the data 
obtained from the various sources, as discussed under ‘reflexivity’ below.  
3.7 Reflexivity and ethical considerations: 
Reflexivity is not only a full disclosure about the researcher’s personal and social 
location to the research itself, but also a means of improving the validity of the 
data collected, particularly for mixed methods researches involving qualitative 
techniques (Bryman et al, 2008: 272; Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127). The 
present effort is a product of many influences: personal observation of the 
subject matter and engagement with the literature above all. But it is also a 
product of my own general interests, inclinations and previous experiences, 
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both personal and professional. First, I have worked as a journalist in one of the 
newspapers studied here (Daily Trust), and although I took much care to ensure 
that does not influence me unduly, my relationship with them turned out to be 
crucial during the ethnographic component of the research. This relationship 
gained me access to that paper’s management and subsequently newsroom and 
journalists. By contrast, the newspapers in Lagos were much less friendly, even 
though all the journalists I talked to were in general supportive and appreciative 
of the research effort. Consequently, Daily Trust journalists represent a 
disproportionate number of the respondents from which the ethnographic data 
was collected, though not in a way that imperils the data. In addition, the 
systematic nature of the content analysis coding procedure means that my 
relationship with Daily Trust has no impact whatsoever on the data collected, 
since any other independent coders will obtain more or less the same data by 
following the same coding procedures outlined in the coding scheme. Finally, 
my previous experience as a journalist, including bits of investigative and 
political reporting as well as personal observations as a member of Nigerian 
society, may have shaped some of my thinking and understanding of politics, 
corruption, journalism and press freedom, some of which may invariably leave 
traces upon this research. 
3.8 Data Analysis and Missing Samples:  
(a) Analysing media content: In this section, I briefly outline the procedures for 
data analysis adopted for this study, with a comment on the missing samples. 
Since the coding is based on simple frequency counts of occurrence or number 
of corruption stories coded, data here is presented mostly in frequency tables 
and graphs, in addition to detailed explanations of the findings. The sections that 
follow focus on specific aspects of the analysis such as overall coverage and 
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prominence as lead stories, annual trends and variation by publication and 
categories. In the next chapter, I discuss and interpret some key findings.  
Croucher and Cronn-Mills (2015: 211) have argued that quantitative content 
analysis research that deals with media coverage of a given subject generally 
measures attributes such as frequency of occurrence of the subject in the 
selected sample, the amount of space or time devoted to it, the favourability or 
otherwise of the coverage, etc. As Deacon et al (2007: 11) put it, content analysis 
commonly involves establishing “the frequency with which certain kinds of 
stories occur in the press, or the degree to which they are slanted towards a 
particular perspective within a high frequency of occurrence”. Similarly, for 
Bryman (2016: 287), doing content analysis research entails finding out the 
“representation of X in Y”, where X is the variable being measured, in our case, 
corruption stories, and Y being any media content in which X is represented, that 
is, front pages of the selected Nigerian newspapers. For this research, this means 
that the analysis measures the number of times corruption stories appear on 
the front page of a selected sample, that is frequency of corruption stories on 
the front page of a sampled edition and consequently in each of the categories. 
During coding, I first count and code the total number of news stories on the 
front page of a sample, and then read the stories to identify which are corruption 
stories and finally code them into respective content categories according to 
details of the procedure described in several sections of this chapter above. It is 
important to note that front pages of newspapers contain other contents such 
as editorials, opinion articles, pictures, graphics, etc. But these fall outside of the 
unit of analysis and were not counted or coded. 
Furthermore, Andrew (2007: 28) suggests that newspaper headlines “introduce, 
advertise, and communicate the importance of a story to a viewer, reader, or 
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listener”. This implies the bolder the headline, the more importance it is 
assumed to have by editors. Also, in her study of news reading, Graber (1988) 
finds that “prominence criteria” or “story importance cues” used by editors in 
newspaper stories such as headline font size and location of the story, are 
among the major factors that determine whether readers will read a news story 
at all (in Althaus and Tewksbury, 2002: 184). For the media therefore, to report 
any story at all is to give it some emphasis, to consider it as important for the 
audience, higher and above all other issues and events that could potentially 
make the news for that day, but which are not reported. And to report a story 
on the front page is to consider it more important than those in the inside pages, 
and yet even more emphasis where the story is reported as the lead story of the 
day, that is, the story with the boldest headline on the front page. In other 
words, taken together, the frequency of corruption stories and the prominence 
given to them in terms of positioning on the front page or ranking as lead stories, 
are all various dimensions of emphasis the newspapers in our sample give to the 
issue of corruption in the country. In this sense, these various dimensions of 
emphasis in media coverage can be highlighted through a systematic analysis of 
coverage of corruption in the sample. In the following analysis therefore, I 
consider measurable attributes of emphasis to corruption news in the sample 
such as the frequency or number of corruption stories per sample or in relation 
to overall news coverage, their prominence as frontpage leads, the amount of 
coverage coded for each of the nine categories, annual trends over the 12-year 
period, and how the frequencies compare or vary for each publication. In all 
cases, the data is presented through simple frequency tables and charts/graphs 
depicting the absolute number of corruption stories and relative frequencies, 
where the relative frequencies show the percentage of absolute frequency in a 
category to a given total. However, complex statistical analysis of the data was 
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considered unnecessary, since the research questions do not involve questions 
of causality, such as where x is assumed to cause y. In other words, only one 
variable, corruption story, is being measured by a simple frequency counts of its 
occurrence in respective categories, that is, the variable is measured at the 
nominal level of simple frequency counts as 0, 1, 2, 3 corruption stories, etc. 
Even for the case of whether the FOI Act in 2011 resulted in increase in 
investigative stories of corruption, I did a simple analytical comparison of 
coverage before and after 2011, rather than a statistical comparison.      
For the ethnographic data, I follow a three-stage process of sorting, coding and 
thematic categorization. Interviews and conversations were first transcribed 
and combined as a single data set, since I considered transcripts of informal 
conversations as part the field notes. The initial process generated tens of codes 
or headings, which were then regrouped together under broader categories to 
which the headings were related. For example, among the codes in stage two 
are ‘freedom of information law’, ‘proprietor influence’, ‘advertiser influence’, 
etc. But these three subcategories were then further grouped under ‘journalistic 
autonomy’. Responses by each journalist or editor which refers directly or 
indirectly to any of these subcategories were then copied and pasted under the 
relevant subcategory. Some of the codes and categories were pre-identified 
based on the research questions and the interview guidelines36. Others emerged 
from the data itself and further review of literature during draft chapters. 
Indeed, this coding process continued throughout the writing phase of the 
research, as in most cases I needed to refine the codes once writing and 
discussion began. 
(b) Combining quantitative and qualitative data: 
                                                          
36 The interview guideline is attached in the appendix. However, some of the interviews differ slightly from the 
others, depending on the context of my meeting with a respondent.  
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A mixed method research invariably returns mixed data, often comprising 
varying degrees of both quantitative and qualitative data. But as Bryman (2016: 
638-642) notes, doing a mixed methods research also entails decisions about 
priorities and sequence of the various components of the research, both during 
data collection and its analysis. The key questions, Bryman shows, are which 
components of the data to prioritize in the research, and which should precede 
which? In this sense, he observes, a researcher has two broad choices: to regard 
both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research as equal in weight, 
or to prioritize either the quantitative or qualitative component (ibid). For this 
research, the content analysis (quantitative component) is prioritized over the 
qualitative component involving media ethnography, and as the sections above 
demonstrate, was carried out first. Therefore, in the analysis and discussion that 
follow in chapters 4 through 7, I regard the content analysis data as the primary 
data and use data from the interviews and field notes to further explain and 
elaborate the findings of the content analysis component. There are three 
justifications for this approach. First, the interview and observation data were 
themselves largely informed by the results of the content analysis research. As 
stated earlier above, while the content analysis revealed several findings about 
the way the extent of coverage of corruption in the sample, it also threw up 
certain important questions that required talking to involved actors to 
understand further. For example, why was new reports of corruption 
concentrated in a handful of years rather than evenly distributed across the 12-
year period of the research? Why was extent of coverage considerably similar 
across at least three of the four publications selected for analysis? Why was 
there no significant increase in the coverage of corruption following the 
adoption of the freedom of Information Act in 2011? Why is high coverage of 
corruption in the sample analysed also associated with a high extent of 
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information subsidy by state level actors investigating corruption such as anti-
corruption agencies and the national parliament? And how do journalists 
understand and do investigative reporting of corruption in Nigeria? Such 
questions became necessary to understand and explain findings of the content 
analysis, and hence the need to engage involved actors such as investigative 
reporters and editors through interviews and newsroom observation in the first 
place. Indeed, it is also for these reasons that the qualitative component of the 
research sequentially followed the quantitative component as mentioned 
above. Secondly, and following from the foregoing, most of the questions in the 
interview schedule were derived from findings of the content analysis aspect of 
the data collection process. Accordingly, in the analysis that follow, particularly 
in chapters 5 and 6 that combine data from both components of the study, the 
interview and observation data are used to further explain and provide 
additional details for the findings of the content analysis data. Finally, some 
original research questions such as how Nigerian journalists understand 
investigative reporting and what specific factors influence its practice in the 
country’s media are better answered by qualitative techniques like interviews 
and newsroom observation, as previously argued above. Nevertheless, such 
questions, and the data they generate, still help to support the general objective 
of the study for which the content analysis was designed, namely how and to 
what extent Nigerian newspapers report corruption and what roles, if any, 
investigative reporting particularly plays in reporting corruption in the press. 
Thus, in this broad sense, the qualitative data from the interviews and 
observation generally function to elaborate the findings of the content analysis 
on which our discussion and analysis is significantly based. In practice therefore, 
this means that only those aspects of the ethnographic data that relates to 
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findings of the content analysis, or some of the research questions are used in 
the analysis and discussion in the empirical chapters below.  
(c) Missing Samples:  
In this regard, it is useful to note that 174 selected samples were missing in the 
archives, for all the four publications combined. This represents 5.96% of total 
2920 sampled editions initially selected for analysis.  Table 3.1 below shows the 
missing editions for each publication, relative to its total sample. A total of 32 
sampled editions were missing for Daily Trust, 49 for The Punch, and 54 and 39 
for The Guardian and Thisday respectively, giving a combined total of 174 
missing samples. In other words, missing editions vary slightly between the four 
publications, from 4.38% in Daily Trust to 7.40 in The Punch.   
Table 3.1: Missing Samples from the selected newspapers 
 
 
Some existing studies have dealt with cases of missing editions or samples in a 
variety of ways. Several content analysis studies simply report the missing issues 
as ‘missing data’ or ‘missing issues’ (Cohen et al, 2008: 430; Dimitrova, 2006: 83; 
Faber et al, 1993: 72; Brown et al, 1987: 49). However, in a sample of 1,820 
issues or editions selected over five years designed to measure four variables 
(number of photographs, number of graphics, number of stories, number of 
staff stories), Lacey et al (2001: 839) report that 5 of the selected samples were 
Publications Number of Samples Selected Number of Missing Samples Number of Samples Coded % of Missing Samples
Daily Trust 730 32 698 4.38%
The Guardian 730 49 681 6.71%
The Punch 730 54 676 7.40%
Thisday 730 39 691 5.34%
Total 2920 174 2746 5.96%
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missing. However, they argue that “with 1,820 issues, it is highly improbable that 
these missing data would have changed the conclusions of this study”. This 
suggests that if the sample is large and the missing editions are few, then there 
is good chance that the missing editions will not affect the outcomes of the 
research significantly. Also, Deacon (2007) conducts several reliability tests on 
the Lexis-Nexis digital archive to determine the extent to which digital archives 
are reliable over time. In one of these tests, he compares news contents of three 
random dates “distributed five months apart and checked each item published 
in the hard copies” of each of 8 UK national dailies “to see whether it was 
present in the Lexis-Nexis archive”. He finds that “overall 5% of the items were 
found to be missing” (Deacon, 2007: 18-19), although there was some variation 
of the missing items between the newspapers coded and the three dates, with 
missing samples in some papers rising to 7%. He concludes, however, that (ibid: 
19):   
a reassuring aspect of these findings is that no systematic pattern was 
evident in the omitted material. Therefore, it could be argued that low 
level omissions represent a type of random rather than constant 
sampling error; i.e. they have implications for the degrees of 
confidence we can have in any media sample we derive through these 
means, but they do not completely compromise its credibility 
This research suggests two issues that are useful for me here. First, omissions of 
around 5%-7% can be considered “low level” omissions which do not 
compromise the credibility of the research. Secondly, if missing samples do not 
indicate any clear patterns, they can be considered part of random sampling 
error, that is, error inherent in a sample relative to the population. Therefore, 
given that the samples were selected randomly, and that the overall final sample 
of 2746 editions is considerably large for 12-year period, I believe that the 
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missing editions will not significantly affect the findings presented here. But 
there are two additional reasons for my confidence. As observed previously, 
corruption stories, particularly scandals, tend to stay longer in the media agenda 
over several days, sometimes even weeks and months. Thus, because the 
interval between one sampled edition and the next is only 6 days, there is a high 
chance that corruption stories missed in any edition could well be captured in 
the follow-up story category. Secondly, as we shall see, just 37.51% of the total 
sample contained one or more corruption stories. This means that nearly two-
thirds of the sample contained no corruption story at all. If this statistic were 
extrapolated for the missing sample, the margin of error in the research caused 
by the missing sample is reduced further, and thus corresponds to Deacon’s 
observation above that for low level omissions, the error in the sample is no 














Chapter Four: Data I: Corruption in the Nigerian press (1999-2012) 
 
4.1 Introduction:  
This chapter, and the subsequent chapters (5, 6, and 7) build on the foundational 
chapters above to present findings of the research intended to answer the 
research questions on how and the extent to which Nigerian newspapers report 
corruption, how much of that coverage is investigative reporting, and so on. In 
brief, we find that corruption is extensively reported in Nigerian newspapers. 
This is evident in several respects. First, coverage of corruption accounts for over 
8% of all frontpage news coverage in the newspapers sampled. This implies at 
least two corruption stories on the frontpage of these newspapers every week. 
Furthermore, just about one third of the total corruption stories coded were 
reported as lead stories in the days in which they appear in the news. This 
indicates that corruption stories figure prominently in the media’s agenda 
setting in the country. Moreover, about 10% of the sampled editions carry 
multiple stories of corruption, sometimes up to three or more different 
corruption stories on the same frontpage. This further indicates extensiveness 
of coverage of corruption by the newspapers. Also, this coverage varies 
significantly from one year to another, but only slightly between the four 
publications. Indeed, stories of corruption in the sample are clustered around 
five ‘golden’ years of coverage, from 2005-2009, although a steady increase in 
the amount of corruption reported in the sample is observed throughout the 12-
year period covered by the research. Viewed in terms of variation by individual 
publications, The Guardian tends to report corruption significantly less than the 
other three publications selected. Also, we find three types of corruption stories 
in the newspapers in general. Scandals, or stories of alleged or real acts of 
corruption make up 45.72% of the total. Follow-up stories, or additional stories 
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about previously reported scandals constitute 28.48% of total corruption 
coverage in the sample, while narratives of corruption or stories about the 
general state of corruption in Nigeria, rather than actual practices by any 
persons or groups of persons, make up the remainder (25.80%). Details of these 
findings are presented and discussed in this chapter. Most of the coverage of 
corruption in the sample results, however, from press reporting of the activities 
and investigations of corruption by state level actors such as anti-corruption 
agencies, national assembly, commissions of inquiry, etc, rather than from 
independent investigations of corruption by the newspapers. Less than 5% of 
total coverage of corruption in the sample is due to independent investigative 
journalism, although this rises to about 10% for corruption scandals specifically. 
Furthermore, we find that corruption scandals in the sample are generated by a 
variety of sources and actors: independent media investigations by the 
newspapers or their reporters (10.41%), anticorruption agencies (29.76%), 
national and state assemblies (21.79%), commissions of inquiry (16.10%), 
foreign media (2.44%), diaspora/online media (0.81%). Sources such as the 
courts, the police, whistle-blowers and so on supply 18.70% of the scandal 
stories coded. In other words, stories of real or alleged wrongdoing involving 
specific persons and sums (scandals) are subsidized for the press by almost 90%. 
Details of these findings are discussed in chapter five, including our argument 
that in the specific context of corruption stories in a developing democracy like 
Nigeria, information subsidy may not always be a bad thing for the news. In 
chapter six, I examine the organizational and operational context of 
investigative reporting in the newspapers sampled, by drawing on ethnographic 
data from the interviews and observation. I find that investigative journalism is 
scarcely institutionalized in the newspapers and is no more than adhoc practice 
by the few journalists who practice it. Full-time investigative reporters are rare 
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in all the newspapers as most journalists who do investigative reporting 
generally combine it with other daily beats. Also, only one of the four 
publications has a separate investigative journalism unit or desk in the 
newsroom. But even at this paper, investigative reporting remains largely 
subsumed under general editorial direction in terms of budget, deadlines, 
rewards and so on. Still, internally within the organizations, journalists claim 
they have and demonstrate a reasonable level of journalistic autonomy and 
initiative, in the way they source stories of corruption, and in their relationships 
with news sources and targets of corruption in the news they report. Several 
respondents claim that their editors and publishers encourage them to do 
investigative stories, and even reward them personally for demonstrating 
journalistic enterprise in investigative reporting; that they enjoy considerable 
independence and initiative, with little or no interference from their bosses 
within the organizations. At the same time however, the external and wider 
regulatory environment for investigative journalism is not entirely conducive for 
investigating stories of corruption. Investigative reporters face subtle, and not 
so subtle verbal, legal and occasionally physical threats from public officials 
being investigated by reporters for corrupt practices. Furthermore, because 
government plays an outsized role not only in politics and public policy, but also 
in business and the market, public officials also have considerable influence in 
the advertising market and use this power to ‘punish’ media organizations that 
are inclined towards investigative reporting. Thus, government controls not only 
the political and regulatory environment of the press, but also significant aspects 
of the media market since government is at once the largest advertiser in the 
country. Indeed, a crucial finding of this research is that government institutions 
and officials in Nigeria generally refrain from direct political censorship of the 
press, but do not hesitate to deny advertising to ‘erring’ newspapers. This 
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possibly explains the near consensus in the literature, as we have seen in 
preceding chapters above, that press freedom in Nigeria is relatively higher than 
in other African countries.   
The constitution guarantees freedom of the press and a freedom of information 
legislation came into force in 2011. However, neither is operationally effective 
in enhancing journalistic investigations and reporting of corruption. Journalists 
report that officials use delay tactics or other forms of subterfuge to refuse 
freedom of information requests. The culture of bureaucratic secrecy, 
supported by colonial laws such as the Official Secret Act, remains deeply 
entrenched, despite the constitutional guarantees for press freedom and 
freedom of information legislation. Indeed, in the sample of newspapers 
analysed, there is no appreciable increase in the amount of independent 
investigative reporting of corruption between the period before and after 
freedom of information legislation. In addition, most public institutions lack 
robust databases which makes information retrieval difficult and sometimes 
impossible altogether. Moreover, several respondents claim that Nigerian 
journalists themselves are not sufficiently trained for investigative reporting, do 
not stay on the job long enough to acquire useful experiences and worse, 
corruption within journalism itself is rife. The result of the foregoing is that there 
is limited investigative stories of corruption in the press, less than 5% of overall 
coverage of corruption, and conversely, an over-reliance on information subsidy 
for news of corruption from the corruption investigating authorities (CIA) in the 
country. Details of these findings are discussed in chapter six, including the 
various ways in which information subsidy for news of corruption actually 
promotes more watchdog journalism in the press, and an interpretation of what 
this may mean for the watchdog functions of the press in Nigeria and other 
developing democracies in Africa and elsewhere. But again, by comparing 
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corruption stories independently investigated by the newspapers to those 
reported from the CIAs, I show, in chapter seven, that investigative reporting is 
not only low in terms of quantity of reporting, but also in terms of the scale of 
corruption independently reported in comparison to the corruption cases 
exposed by the CIAs. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 8), I review some of the 
core arguments and findings of the research and its contributions to the 
literature, as well as point some ways towards further research.  
4.2 Coverage of corruption: Frequency, Prominence, Trends, Publications  
Our first finding is the total news coverage itself, that is, the total number of 
stories on the front pages against which corruption news is measured37. We find 
that a total of 16613 news stories were reported on the front pages of the 2746 
sampled editions in the four titles. This is represented by the Total News 
Coverage (TNC) column in Table 4.1 below. The Total News Coverage (TNC) 
category is the category into which all news stories were coded by a simple 
frequency count, including but not limited to corruption news. This is to give a 
measure of the frequency of corruption stories relative to total frontpage news 
coverage. In the table above, we can see that 16613 total news stories were 
coded from the front pages of the total 2476 editions in the sample, of which 
1345 (8.10%) were corruption stories.  This total news coverage gives an average 
of 6.05 news stories per sample (16613/2746 = 6.05). This means that for every 
edition coded, there are an average of 6 news stories reported on the front page. 
                                                          
37 Some researchers doing content analysis of press coverage of corruption, for example Dincer and Johnstone 
(2016), code only politics related stories, such as election news, party news, policy news, news about political 
actors and institutions and so on, rather than all news stories. This is to determine the percentage of corruption 
stories in relation to all political reporting in a sample. The process is the same, but details defer according to 
research questions. In fact, I considered doing this too, since it is useful to be able to say that corruption news 
is X% of total political reporting. However, I thought that for my research, it is more useful to be able to say that 
corruption news is X% of total news coverage, than just X% of political news coverage. Also, coding against only 
political news will entail additional categories for all political news and therefore complicate the coding for me. 
I explain this point in detail in the conclusion.  
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The Punch reported the most number of stories per sample (7.33), followed by 
The Guardian (7.01), slightly higher than the overall average of stories per 
sample. These two newspapers account for 58.55% of total news stories coded 
in the sample. Daily Trust and Thisday carried fewer news stories per front page 
at 5.35 and 4.57 news stories respectively. Thus, The Punch and The Guardian 
generally report more news stories on the front page than Daily Trust and 
Thisday. One possible explanation for this variation is the differences in house 
styles for each paper. Some newspapers stack their front pages with lots of 
headlines, others prefer fewer. Another explanation is the recent but growing 
tendency by Nigerian newspapers to place classifieds on their front pages. These 
ads take up news space that could otherwise have been used for more front-
page news stories. Thisday and Daily Trust tended to place more classified ads 
on the front page than The Punch and The Guardian. This helps to explain why 
Thisday and Daily Trust have fewer front page stories. But as we shall see in the 
case of The Guardian, more front-page news coverage does not mean more 
news of corruption.  
Table 4.1 Corruption stories in the samples newspapers (Daily Trust, The 
Guardian, The Punch & Thisday) 
 
Publications Total News Coverage Total Frequency of Corruption Stories % of Corruption Stories
Daily Trust 3731 330 8.84%
The Guardian 4775 249 5.21%
The Punch 4952 459 9.27%
Thisday 3155 307 9.73%
Overall 16613 1345 8.10%
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Furthermore, corruption stories make up 8.10% of total frontpage news 
coverage in the sampled newspapers over the 12-year research period38. 
Interpreted differently, 8.10% of total news coverage means that on average, 
slightly over two corruption stories (2.16) are reported in these newspapers 
every single week for the entire 12 years running39. This is very significant 
considering that corruption is just one out countless other issues that could 
potentially make front page news during the same period. One reason why 
coverage of corruption in the newspapers is this high is that many samples carry 
two or more different corruption stories on the front page of the same edition. 
Figure 4. 2 below shows the frequency of corruption stories per sample, from 0 
in which no corruption story is reported in a sampled edition to 5 in which the 
same sampled edition carries five different corruption stories. In total, at least 
one corruption story was reported in 37. 51% of the total 2476 samples coded. 
Of these, 28.44% of the sample carries one corruption story. 7.06% of the 
sample carries two corruption stories, while 1.64% of the sample carries three 
different corruption stories on the same front page. In sum, the above figures 
imply that well over one-third of editions in these newspapers report at least 
one story about corruption on the front page, indicating that corruption is a 
major issue in Nigerian newspapers’ agenda. Indeed, the observation that nearly 
10% of the sample reports contains two or more corruption stories on the same 
front page is by itself a further indication of the importance of prominence of 
corruption to overall news coverage in Nigerian newspapers. In one edition of 
The Punch (19 November 2005), 5 out a total of 7 stories on the front page were 
corruption stories. In one story, then President Obasanjo was reported to have 
                                                          
38 This figure is obtained by dividing total corruption stories (1345) through total news stories (16613) and then 
multiply 100. That is (1345/16613) x 100 = 8.10%.  
39 Since we take a year as 365 days, there will be 52 weeks per year or 624 weeks in 12 years. Therefore, we 
have and average of (1345/624) = 2,16 corruption stories each week throughout the 12 years.   
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said that all heads of the parastatals and agencies under the Aviation Ministry 
were corrupt, but without specifying the officials in question, or the specific acts, 
or the amounts possibly involved (an NC story). This was presented as the lead 
story of the day. Another story reported that former Governor of Bayelsa State 
had been suspended from then ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) over 
charges of money laundering he was then facing in court (a follow-up story). The 
third was an investigative story of fraudulent allocation of land worth N50m 
involving the officials of Lagos State Government (an IMI story). The fourth story 
reported that the anti-corruption agency, ICPC, had charged then PDP Deputy 
National Chairman, Abubakar Magaji to court over corruption (an ACA story). 
The final corruption story reported that officials of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation who connived with Nigerian con men to defraud a 
Brazilian businessman of over $200m over purchase of an oil field had been sent 
to jail (another follow up-story).  
Table 4.2: Frequency of corruption stories per sample edition 
 
Notes: The table shows frequency of corruption stories per sample since some samples have 
more than one corruption story, while others have none at al. This is indicated by the coloured 
column in the table, from 0 to 5 which occurs only once in the sample.  
125 
 
(a) Variations by publications:  
In the previous sections, we have seen that corruption is extensively reported in 
these newspapers. Corruption stories alone constitute 8.10% of total frontpage 
news coverage. In fact, 9.07% of the total sampled newspapers on the same 
front page. Additionally, we find that about one-third of all corruption stories in 
the sample were front page lead stories, further indicating a high significance of 
corruption in these newspapers’ agenda. There is some variation across 
individual publications however. For example, the number of corruption stories 
reported by The Punch is almost double that of The Guardian, even though both 
carry much the same number of total news stories per sample as mentioned 
above. As Table 4.2 above shows, in absolute terms, that is, in terms of total 
number of corruption stories reported by each publication, The Punch leads the 
pack with (459) corruption stories, followed by Daily Trust (330), Thisday (307), 
and The Guardian (249) making up the total 1345 corruption stories reported by 
the newspapers combined over the research duration. However, in relative 
terms, that is, in terms of percentage of corruption coverage relative to total 
news coverage, Thisday leads the rest with 9.73% of its total frontpage news 
coverage devoted to corruption alone. This is followed by The Punch (9.27%), 
and Daily Trust (8.84%), and finally The Guardian (5.21%). Thus, while three of 
the publications are above average coverage of 8.10%, The Guardian is below 
the, as Figure 4.1 shows below. But even The Guardian’s coverage of corruption 
at 5.21% of its overall frontpage news output is still reasonably high considering 
that corruption is only one issue out of numerous others. 
Furthermore, coverage also differs between the publications in terms of 
multiple corruption stories per sample. For example, 14.50% of the samples in 
The Punch carry two or more corruption stories, well above the 9.07% of 
samples in the combined data that carry two or more stories. Indeed, as shown 
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above, in one sample of The Punch, 5 out of 7 news stories were on corruption. 
In other words, while front page coverage of corruption is generally high in the 
sample, three out of four publications under consideration still give it even more 
coverage. This indicates two things. First, it shows that in both absolute and 
relative terms, there is only a slight variation in the coverage of corruption by 
three of the four publications under study. Secondly, coverage of corruption in 
The Guardian tends to be significantly lower than the other three publications, 
again, in both absolute and relative terms. These two observations raise an 
important question which I consider in the next chapter: why is reporting of 
corruption significantly similar in three of the publications but much different in 
the fourth? 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of corruption stories to total news coverage  
 
 
(b) Lead Corruption stories:  
Additionally, we noted above that lead stories, identified as the stories with the 
boldest headline on the front page, are considered the most important stories 
of the day in newspapers. Table 4.4 below shows that 31.08% of the total 
corruption stories coded were reported as lead story for the days they were 
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published. In other words, about one-third of all stories of corruption covered 
in the sample were considered most important for the respective days of their 
publication. This further indicates the extent to which corruption reported in 
these newspapers, and by implication other media in Nigeria, namely as an issue 
of considerable importance. Thisday reported the most lead stories, with 
37.13% of its total corruption stories as lead. Daily Trust and The Guardian are 
almost at par in this regard, reporting 33.33% and 32.13% of their respective 
totals as lead. The Punch, which has both the highest number of corruption 
stories and highest instances of multiple coverage of corruption per sample, 
comes tends to lead the news less with a corruption story, at 24.84% of its 
stories on corruption leading the news. In other words, while The Punch is more 
likely to report issues of corruption than the other newspapers, it is least likely 
to lead news with a corruption story than the other publications in the sample. 
In general, then, we see that there are only slight variations in the prominence 
given to the subject of these newspapers.  
Table 4.3 Corruption stories as lead stories 
  
Notes: A = Frequency of lead corruption stories. B = frequency of non- lead corruption stories. 
TCS = Total corruption stories for each publication, i.e. (A + B). % A and % B are percentage of 
totals, obtained by dividing A or B through TCS. E.g. for Daily Trust, % of lead corruption stories 
%A = (110/330) x 100 = 33.33%. % of non-lead corruption stories %B = (220/330) x 100 = 
66.67%. Same procedure for each publication and for combined totals.  
Publications A B TCS % A % B
Daily Trust 110 220 330 33.33 66.67
The Guardian 80 169 249 32.13 67.87
The Punch 114 345 459 24.84 75.16
Thisday 114 193 307 37.13 62.87
TOTAL 418 927 1345 31.08 68.92
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(c) Annual trends of coverage:  
Furthermore, annual trends of coverage of a given issue is also a useful way of 
understanding how and the extent of media performance on the issue, in this 
case corruption in the sampled newspapers. Figure 4.2 below shows the 
patterns of coverage over the research period. First, the trend (dotted) line in 
the centre of the chart shows a steady increase in output of corruption news, 
from less than 5% in the starting year (2001) to over 8%, which in fact is the 
overall coverage, in the final year of the research (2012). This means that 
coverage increases overtime in the sampled period taken as a whole. At the 
same time however, as the various peaks and troughs (high and low points) in 
the chart show, corruption coverage still rises or falls sharply in some years. 
These are important findings. For example, it implies that as Nigeria moves 
further away from the founding or transition election in 1999, coverage of 
corruption increases. This in turn indicates some correlation between 
democratic political processes and coverage of corruption, including perhaps 
increasing press freedom, or other factors in the wider political system. These 
two trends (steady increase and rise and fall) raise two important questions 
which we pursue in the next chapter: why does coverage of corruption increase 









Figure 4.2: Annual trends of coverage of corruption in the sample 
Notes: x-axis represents the years from 2001 to 2012 while y axis shows the percentage of 
corruption stories to total frontpage news coverage for each year.  
In addition, the rise and fall of coverage indicates two patterns. First, it shows a 
wide variation between the years. For example, the amount of coverage in 2008 
(17.25% of total frontpage news) is more than four times higher than in 2001 
(3.64%). Similarly, coverage in 2005 (13.23%) is almost four times higher than in 
2011 (3.87%), the year freedom of information act was adopted. Moreover, the 
rise and fall of corruption stories is often quite sharp between any two years, for 
example from 6.10% in 2004 to more than double that figure in 2005 (13.23%). 
It falls from a high of 17.25% (2008) to almost half of that in the next year in 
2009 (10.56%). Significantly, it rises from a low of 3.87% in 2011 to 7.29% in 2012 
a year after adoption of FOI law. Indeed, the amount of corruption stories in 
2005 alone is about two-thirds of the previous four years combined, indicating 
disproportionate coverage between the years.  
Thirdly, Figure 4.2 above reveals that the years 2005 through 2009 can be 
described as the ‘golden years’ of reporting corruption in these newspapers. 
These five years alone account for almost two thirds or 62.30% of the total 
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corruption stories reported in the 12 years studied. In fact, the five years (2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) have an average coverage of 12.46%, well above the 
overall average of 8.10%. Still, even among these five years, 2005 and 2008 
stand out. These two years alone account for 30.48% or nearly one third of the 
total for the 12-year period. In other words, while overall coverage of corruption 
tends to be high in the sample, it is significantly skewed towards some years 
than others. I discuss the implications of these findings, both to the research 
questions and existing literature in the next chapter.  
4.3: Sources of corruption stories in the Nigerian press:  
Figure 4.3: Sources of corruption stories in the Nigerian press  
Notes: The figures for amount of corruption stories generated by Foreign Media (Blue bar) and 
Diaspora/Online Media (Green bar) categories appear unclear. The figures are 1.12% and 
0.37% respectively. IMI: Independent Media Investigations. ACA: Anti-Corruption Agencies. 
NA: National (and State) Assemblies. COI: Commissions of Inquiry. FM: Foreign Media. DOM: 
Diaspora/Online Media. FS: Follow-up corruption stories. NC: Narratives of Corruption stories  
Data above illustrates three dimensions in press coverage of corruption in 
Nigeria that we analyse and discuss in the next chapter. First, overall coverage 
of corruption news is ‘bloated’ by two categories: follow-up stories and 
narratives of corruption, which together constitute more than half of total 
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corruption news in the sample (54.28%). This can be seen by the tallest bars to 
the right of Figure 4.3 above and explains why the distribution skews to the right 
of the chart. In other words, more than half of corruption stories in the sample 
are either about corruption cases already reported (follow up stories) or are 
stories which do not refer to any specific instances of corruption at all (narratives 
of corruption stories). This has implications for some of the standard methods 
of measuring corruption such as those used by Transparency International and 
the World Bank. Secondly, official sources or state level actors and institutions 
involved in investigating corruption dominate news reports of corruption in the 
sample. For convenience, I refer to these as ‘corruption investigating authorities’ 
to distinguish them from independent media sources through investigative 
reporting. These corruption-investigating-authorities (CIAs) include anti-
corruption agencies (ACA category: 13.61%), parliamentary investigations (NA 
category: 9.96%), administrative panels and commissions of inquiry (COI 
category: 7.36%), and other official sources like the courts, the police and 
whistle blowers (Other category: 8.55%). Combined, corruption stories 
attributed to these sources make up about 40% (exactly 39.48%) of total news 
of corruption coded in the sample40. Indeed, a good majority of the follow-up 
stories (FS category) concern corruption stories generated by these agencies 
through their investigations of corruption. This indicates that some sources or 
categories are more important in generating news of corruption in the press 
than others. Third, stories of corruption generated by independent media 
investigations (IMI category) amount to 4.76% of total corruption coverage, a 
key finding for this research. Also, foreign media (FM category) and Diaspora 
online media sources (DOM category) account for 1.12% and 0.37% of total 
                                                          
40 The four categories (ACA, NA, COI and Other) add up to 531 corruption stories or 39.48% of the total 1345 
corruption stories in the sample.  
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respectively. Therefore, corruption stories generated independently by the four 
newspapers fall well below those of established sources, namely, corruption 
investigating authorities, foreign media and diaspora online media. The key 
element here is that corruption stories attributed to these established sources 
are reported through routine journalistic practices, rather than by independent 
investigative reporting. This has several implications for the watchdog and 
political accountability functions of the press, as I argue throughout subsequent 
chapters.  
(a) Corruption investigating authorities as sources of corruption news:  
As noted earlier, 45.72% of total corruption news are stories of real or alleged 
corruption. Four categories or sources (ACA, NA, COI, Other) dominate these 
news reports of corruption, accounting for 39.48% of total coverage. In contrast, 
independent media investigations of corruption generate just 4.76%. This 
indicates the significance of corruption investigating authorities as established 
sources of corruption news. For example, this finding implies that without these 
CIAs, there will be very little coverage of actual corrupt practices, real or alleged 
in the press. But the point of this thesis is that investigations and reports of these 
CIAs, which generates the bulk of news about wrongdoing in government, is 
itself influenced by the prevailing culture of anti-corruption in Nigerian politics, 
which creates the general climate for reporting corruption and influences the 
form and substance of investigative reporting in the country. This significance is 
further marked by a higher than average lead stories from these sources: 38.80% 
leads for ACA, 35.07% for NA and 41.41% for COI categories respectively, against 
the average of 31.08% lead stories for all the categories combined. Therefore, 
CIA stories tend to be given the most prominence. Indeed, the COI category has 
the highest lead stories of any in the sample, with about half of its stories 
reported as frontpage leads (41.41%) against an overall average of 30.08%. But 
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the COI category comprises investigative panels set up by presidents, governors, 
ministers and so on, thus consistent with previous research which suggests that 
political news gravitates towards the most powerful or ‘authoritative’ sources 
(Broersma et al, 2013: 389; Dimitrova and Strӧmbӓck, 2009: 77). Only the Other 
category, comprised of sources such as police, courts and ‘political whistle-
blowers’41, has a lower than average leads at just 20% of its category total, a 
possible indication that sources in this category are lower down in the hierarchy 
of authoritative sources of corruption news. However, much like the overall 
distribution of corruption stories in the sample, stories from these actors and 
sources are concentrated in the same ‘golden’ years between 2005 and 2009. 
For example, 65.85% of corruption stories attributed to anti-corruption agencies 
were reported during these five years.  
(b) Anti-corruption Agencies (ACA) Category:  
Also, of these four categories, anti-corruption agencies make up the largest 
sources generators of corruption scandals, representing 13.61% of total 
distribution42. As Figure 4.4 below shows, EFCC alone initiated 75.96% of the 
category total, while the remainder were attributed to the ICPC and CCBT. This 
is not surprising, since EFCC is generally regarded as the foremost anti-
corruption agency in the country. A report by the Human Rights Watch describes 
EFCC as “the most promising avenue to make tangible progress in the fight 
                                                          
41 I use ‘political whistle blowers’ because majority of corruption stories from whistle blowers had come from 
politicians who, as more than half of the interview respondents say are either aggrieved or have ulterior motives, 
in this sense, whistle-blowing is for political purposes, rather than strictly public interest.  
42 The three most prominent anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria are the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC); the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission (ICPC); and the Code 
of Conduct Bureau, with its special court or Tribunal (CCBT). These are permanent state institutions with the 
sole function of fighting corruption. In addition to these, however, there are sector specific watchdogs such as 
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NIETI), for the oil industry; Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal 
Commission (RMFC) which monitors how government revenue is generated and distributed. These two were a 
are also sources of corruption stories coded. I have classed these under the COI category as they have other 
mandates besides fighting corruption.    
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against corruption” in Nigeria (Albin-Lackey, C., & Guttschuss, 2011: 1). EFCC is 
well-known for its high-profile investigations of corruption. Such investigations 
have included that of former Inspector General of Police mentioned above, as 
well as Governors of virtually all the 36 states, ministers, senators and many 
others. It claims to have recovered some $11 billion through its investigations 
(ibid). These investigations generated breaking stories and tons of follow-up 
stories in the press. Unsurprisingly then, the same Human Rights Watch report 
describes EFCC’s first chair, Mr Nuhu Ribadu as “dynamic and media savvy” who 
cultivated the friendship and support of the media and civil society activists in 
the country early in the life of the commission. Moreover, both the ICPC and the 
CCBT are similarly centres of news of corruption through their own 
investigations into corrupt practices of various public officials in the country. But 
as the distribution above shows, it is either they have not been as ‘active’ or as 
‘media savvy’ as the EFCC.  
Figure 4.4: Corruption stories in the sample by Anti-Corruption Agencies  
    
Notes: EFCC: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. ICPC: Independent Corrupt Practices 









Typically, corruption news from the CCBT has involved false declaration of assets 
by respective public office holders. For example, during 2011, Daily Trust 
reported that the CCBT was investigating a former Governor of Lagos State, Mr 
Bola Tinubu for operating 15 illegal foreign accounts.  
(c) National (and State) Assembly (NA) Category:  
In addition to anti-corruption agencies, national and state parliaments also 
generated substantial corruption stories coded into the NA category, comprising 
the Senate and House of Representatives, the two chambers of the federal 
parliament, as well various state assemblies in the country. These add up to just 
about ten percent (9.96%) of overall sample. Within the NA category itself 
however, corruption stories generated by the Senate and the House are evenly 
distributed as Table 5.4 below shows. This implies that corruption stories are as 
much likely to be sourced from Senate investigations as from investigations in 
the House. By contrast however, only 6.72% of the category total were 
attributed to respective Houses of Assembly in the states. This is surprising, 
considering that there are 36 states and only one federal government in the 
country. Yet, only a handful of the states were represented in the distribution, 
implying either that there is less corruption in the states than in the federal 
government, or that state assemblies are as not as active in investigating 
corruption as the federal parliament. But it could well be an indication of 
centralization in the country’s political and media systems. Among the earliest 
stories of corruption coded in 2001 was a N2bn contract scandal at the Ministry 
of Power, involving then Minister, Bola Ige (now late) and the Permanent 
Secretary. The case got into the news through investigations by the Senate 
arising from petitions submitted to it. This set the pattern for many subsequent 
investigations of corruption by either chamber over the study period, including 
investigation of corruption within the National Assembly itself.  
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Figure 4.5: Corruption stories in the National (and State) Assembly (NA) category 
 
(d) Commissions of Inquiry (COI) Category:  
In Nigeria during the sample period, many cases of corruption were initiated by 
open or closed investigations of ad-hoc commissions of inquiry, administrative 
or probe panels, which then generate news of corruption in the press. Such 
panels were mostly established by the federal and state governments, or 
ministries, agencies and departments (MDAs). Often the investigations are by 
regulatory agencies or watchdog bodies of public or private institutions, and 
even political parties probing party officials over party finances. Combined, 
these sources make up 7.36% of the total corruption coverage. Thus, such panels 
were also significant sources of news of corruption in the newspapers. 
Moreover, within the COI category itself, exactly one-third of its total (33.33%) 
were from various presidential panels and commissions of inquiry, the largest 
subcategory. For example, in 2001, Thisday reported news of a $1.24m contract 
fraud discovered by a presidential panel on National Airspace Management 
Authority (NAMA). Similar panels in several states generated additional 
corruption stories, which reinforces the assumption that state institutions of 
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of corruption stories sourced from Commissions of 
Inquiry (COI) category  
 
Notes: FG Panels: Panels of Inquiry on corruption set up by the Federal Government. SG Panels: 
Commissions of Inquiry on corruption set up by respective state governments. MDAs: Panels 
of Inquiry on Corruption set up by various Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the Federal 
or State governments directly. Report: Reports of various government agencies about 
corruption quoted or cited in the newspapers. Watchdogs: Watchdog organizations revealing 
cases of corruption in Nigerian newspapers, e.g NIETI. Private/Party: Commissions of Inquiry 
on corruption set up by private organizations or political parties.      
(e) Other Category:  
As noted in chapter three, stories coded under Other category are an amalgam 
of corruption scandals which do not readily fit into any of the initial categories 
(IMI, ACA, NA, COI, FM, DOM). Yet, they are reports of specific instances of 
corruption involving specific persons and reported for the first time in the press, 
unlike the NC and FS stories. As such, the sources from which corruption news 
in this category were attributed vary widely, from police, courts, and whistle 
blowers to civil society organizations and even foreign governments or 
organizations, as different from foreign media. In all, a total of 115 corruption 
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Within this category, whistle blowers generated the highest number of 
corruption stories with 41.74% of total stories in the OTHER category. However, 
the operational understanding of whistle blowers in this specific sense is broad 
ranging, encompassing individuals and groups through whom news of 
corruption gets to the press either through press conferences, leaks or other 
means. They range from sitting political office holders blowing the whistle on 
various corrupt practices of their predecessors or colleagues in other agencies, 
other politicians, businessmen with connections to politicians, opposition 
figures and parties, aggrieved collaborators, activist civil society organizations 
and individuals. For example, on 24 September 2003, The Guardian reported 
that newly appointed Minister, Nasir El-Rufai had alleged that two senators had 
demanded N50m bribe from him to enable his ‘swift’ confirmation by the 
senate. Thus, most of these stories cannot be said to be whistle blowing in the 
proper sense of the term, since it involves individuals who mostly have their own 
specific political motivations, rather than public good. In all the 48 stories coded 
under the whistle blower subcategory, only two were instances of whistle 
blowing by private citizens, one of them a prominent lawyer for the EFCC; 
although a few more were by activist civil society NGOs.  
Also, other Nigerian newspapers and broadcast media were quoted to have 
reported one or other corruption stories in the sample, amounting to 6.96% of 
the total 115 stories in this category. News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), a state-
owned agency, Newswatch, a leading news magazine in Lagos, Leadership, an 
Abuja-based daily, and Channels TV etc were among the local media quoted. 
This implies remediation of corruption stories investigated or exclusively 
reported by media other than those in the sample. Sometimes, cases of 
corruption go straight to the courts from where they are then reported by the 
newspapers or are revealed by the police directly. For example, on 24 April 2005, 
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The Punch reported that a court in Lagos heard that a ministerial nominee and 
two others were standing trial in N21m bribery scam. Similarly, on 6 June 2001, 
The Guardian reported that the police have ‘arraigned’ four officials of the 
Nigerian Airways over N3.5m bribe. Other stories of corruption coded here 
involve Nigerian officials reportedly under investigation abroad. Such stories are 
attributed to courts, police, governments or government officials of other 
countries. One example is investigation and trial of three governors for money 
laundering by the Metropolitan Police, one of whom Mr James Ibori, former 
Governor of oil-rich Delta State served term in a London prison. Also, Daily Trust 
(28 September 2007) attributed a front-page story to the UK High Commissioner 
as saying that the UK government had recovered £34.6 million from three 
former Governors. Moreover, 7 stories of corruption in other countries, not 
involving Nigerians, also made front page news. For example, news of corruption 
against South African President Jacob Zuma, a former Israeli Prime Minister and 
the UN food for oil corruption scandals in Iraq were among those reported under 
the ‘foreign corruption’ stories subcategory as shown in Table 4.4 below.     
Table 4.4: OTHER sources of corruption stories in the sample 
 
Notes: Foreign sources refers to corruption stories attributed to non-media sources in other 
countries for corruption stories involving Nigerian officials, e.g. Metropolitan Police, U.S 
Government officials, various courts in UK and U.S especially, etc. Foreign corruption refers to 
Other Category Sources Frequency of corruption stories % of corruption stories
Whistle Blowers 48 41.74%
Other Media 8 6.96%
Police 8 6.96%
Courts 6 5.22%
Foreign Sources 19 16.52%





corruption stories reported on the front page but on corruption in countries other than 
Nigerians and not involving Nigerians at all, e.g. case of Jacob Zuma above.    
(f) Foreign Media and Diaspora/Online Media Categories:  
In addition to the corruption investigating authorities, a small number of 
corruption stories was attributed to foreign media and diaspora/online media, 
accounting for 1.12% and 0.37% of total respectively. All 5 DOM stories were 
reported by The Punch and Daily Trust only, and from Nigerian diaspora online 
media like Sahara Reporters (New York), Elombah.com (London), Empowered 
News Wire (London), and Economic Confidential (London).  For example, in 2002, 
Daily Trust cited Elombah.com to have reported controversial deals worth over 
a million dollars in New York involving a son of then President Obasanjo.  Thus, 
the newspapers in the sample do not appear to carry much corruption stories 
from diaspora online media in their front pages. This is surprising, since online 
media are very active in uncovering and reporting instances of corruption in 
Nigeria, the most prominent ones being Sahara Reporters and Premium Times. 
These two regularly report breaking stories of corruption in both public and 
private sectors, and most times with documentary evidence (Dare, 2011: 38). 
Furthermore, corruption news in the foreign media category (FM) were 
attributed to a variety of foreign media organizations, including New York Times, 
Haaretz, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Clarin (Argentina), The Age (Australia), Die 
Spiegel (Germany), Guardian, Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Also 
included here are diplomatic cable disclosures by WikiLeaks. Three items each 
were attributed to New York Times and Reuters, while 9 corruption stories in 
this category were attributed to each of the remaining media in the list above. 
Also, many of the foreign media stories are those in which Nigerian officials were 
involved in bribery scandals. For example, in one of the stories, Bloomberg was 
quoted to have reported that U.S firm, Wilbros had offered bribes to Nigerian 
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officials to be favoured for contract awards. Similarly, a report attributed to Die 
Spiegel is of bribery to Nigerian officials by Julius Berger (a German construction 
firm operating in Nigeria). Similar stories of bribery to Nigerian officials were 
attributed to The Age (currency printing), Haaretz (arms purchase), and 
Guardian (oil and gas contracts). In other words, foreign media serve much the 
same purpose of information subsidy on news of corruption to the newspapers 
in the sample, as do state institutions in the fight against corruption within 
Nigeria. 
(g) Independent Media Investigations (IMI) Category:  
This is the category into which media investigations of corruption by the 
newspapers were coded in order to measure how much of total corruption 
coverage results from investigative reporting, as indicated by our research 
questions. Thus, as Figure 4.3 above shows, 4.76% of total corruption coverage 
are investigative reports by the newspapers studied, well below all other 
categories, except for foreign media and diaspora/online media. I analyse and 
discuss details of this category in chapters six and seven, where I situate this 
data in the analysis of investigative reporting in Nigeria as a whole.     
4.4 Following and talking corruption in the press:  
(a) Follow-up stories: 
As mentioned earlier, news reports coded in the FS category are of corruption 
cases and scandals that have already appeared in the news at least once before, 
but which are still current in the news, mostly through additional dimensions of 
the same scandal, such arrests, trials and convictions of officials involved in the 
scandals or their denials and refutations in the press concerning allegations of 
corruption. It is remarkable that corruption stories in this category are the 
largest in the overall distribution making up 28.48% of the total. This implies that 
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one in four front page news reports of corruption in the newspapers is likely a 
story of an ongoing corruption scandal, rather than breaking news of corruption. 
Furthermore, all follow-up stories derive from routine coverage of corruption 
scandals initiated by other categories or sources such as the anti-corruption 
agencies, the national and state assemblies, commissions of inquiry, etc, 
through which news of corruption by various persons got to the press over the 
selected period. Table 4.5 below shows second layer coding of the stories in the 
FS category. The table shows that, out of the 383 total corruption stories in this 
category, 46.21% were on corruption scandals initiated by the three anti-
corruption agencies in the ACA category. Of these, the overwhelming majority 
were on corruption scandals that broke to the news through the EFCC alone. 
Table 4.5 Follow-up corruption stories in the sample  
 
Also, 24.80% follow-up stories were on corruption scandals that reached the 
news through investigations or oversight functions of various national and state 
assemblies in the country over the same period. A further 12.79%, 9.66% and 
6.53% of total stories in this category were on corruption cases generated by 
COI, OTHER and FM categories respectively. In other words, almost all the 
follow-up stories (93.47%) were about corruption cases generated by the more 
established institutions in the fight against corruption in the country, that is, the 
CIAs. However, follow up stories generated by foreign media sources account 
Follow-up Corruption Stories Frequency of Corruption Stories % of Corruption Stories
Anti-corruption Angencies (ACA) 177 46.21%
National Assembly (NA) 95 24.80%
Commission of Inquiry (COI) 49 12.79%
Foreign Media (FM) 25 6.53%




for 6.53% of the stories in this category. The IMI category which is the category 
into which independent media investigations of corruption were coded has no 
follow-up story. In other words, investigative reporting of corruption elicits little 
or no follow up stories in the news. Furthermore, about one-third of the follow-
up stories (29.24%) were reported as lead stories, close to 31.08% lead stories 
in the overall distribution43. This implies that the newspapers consider follow-
up corruption stories important enough to lead the news of the day. It also 
implies that the newspapers in the sample tend to keep corruption scandals at 
the top of their media agenda, since all or most of these follow-up stories could 
well have been buried in the inside pages or not reported at all. For example, 
the case of $4bn corruption against former military Head of State, General Sani 
Abacha (now late) and his family generated a total 22 follow-up stories by the 
four newspapers combined over several years. But like many of the corruption 
stories in the sample, this too was not the product of investigative reporting by 
the media. News of Abacha’s corrupt practices came from a presidential 
committee set up in 2000 (two years after he died) to investigate and report 
back to government. Nonetheless, the newspapers prominently reported the 
findings of the committee. Much the same applies to the case of Halliburton 
bribery to Nigerian officials for contract which was first reported by Reuters and 
then taken up by the media in Nigeria. In this sample, the Halliburton scandal 
alone generated 21 FS stories over many months. Many other corruption cases 
against Governors, Ministers and bank executives were similarly reported over 
long periods of time. Indeed, the biggest corruption scandals tend to generate 
the more number of follow-up stories, but most of these scandals were those 
broken by the corruption-investigating authorities (CIAs). In fact, although there 
were 64 (4.76% of total) stories of corruption independently investigated by the 
                                                          
43 See Table 4.2 in the preceding chapter.  
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combined four publications in the sample, not a single follow up story issued 
from any of these media investigative reports. This is itself a significant point 
about the extent of investigative reporting in the country. In other words, while 
the newspapers give front-page prominence to corruption scandals generated 
by established institutions fighting corruption, independent media 
investigations of corruption tend to be given one-off reporting. Finally, the FS 
category also significantly accounts for the annual trend of coverage earlier 
observed in the preceding section. For example, the two individual years with 
the highest number of reports on corruption in the sample are 2005 and 2008. 
But these two years also have the highest number of FS stories. Therefore, FS 
stories account for 34.83% and 23.71% of total corruption stories in each of the 
year 2005 and 2008 respectively. Much the same applies to the other years in 
the ‘golden’ period of corruption coverage (2006, 2007, 2009). In other words, 
in the years in which corruption stories rise sharply or remain high, it is 
significantly influenced by the higher number of follow-up stories of ongoing 
cases of corruption, which in turn, is influenced by the activities of state 
institutions mandated to fight corruption.   
(d) Narratives of corruption:  
Like FS category, narratives of corruption stories also help to shore up the overall 
coverage of corruption news, even though such stories do not refer to any 
specific instances of corrupt acts by any public officials, such as the reported 
statement of David Cameron saying that Nigeria is one of two most “fantastically 
corrupt” countries in the world mentioned previously above. Such stories are 
also very frequent in this sample, accounting for 25% of the total corruption 
news coded. This means that one in four front page stories of corruption in 
Nigerian newspapers is likely to be a general statement about corruption, 
indicating that Nigerians talk a great deal about corruption in their country, even 
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without any specific instances of it. This is additional indication of the 
significance of corruption within the country’s political culture and helps to 
explain the prevalence of corruption in the press.  
 A further implication of this corruption talk is that it complicates measures of 
corruption in Nigeria, particularly measures of corruption based on perception 
surveys of citizens and business people, such as the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) annually collated by Transparency International (TI). As Holmes (2015: 36-
37) notes, the CPI is an aggregation of perceptual and attitudinal surveys by 
‘independent institutions specializing in governance and business climate’, 
many of which conduct polls of citizens and business people. Yet, citizens’ or 
business people’s perception of corruption could be influenced by media 
coverage of it and hence may exaggerate or bias data on which such measures 
of corruption are based. Indeed, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016: 20) suggest 
that where the press has a degree of freedom and is active in reporting 
corruption, measures of corruption based on perception surveys may in fact 
reflect freedom of the press rather than higher levels of corruption44. 
Conversely, Zhu et al (2012) argue that government-controlled media reduces 
people’s perception of corruption in mainland China, and also significantly 
reduces the negative impact of face to face grapevine news about corruption 
may have on peoples’ perceptions of it. In other words, perceptions of 
corruption may have as much to do with media coverage of it as its incidence. 
In this sense, since over half of corruption stories in the media are either 
repetitions of existing scandals rather than new ones, or not about actual 
corruption at all, general perceptions of corruption in Nigeria, by Nigerians or 
others may in fact be inflated and thus skewing its rank on such indices.  
                                                          
44 Still, corruption scandals in Nigeria can be mind-boggling, considering the sums involved.  
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Again, such corruption talk tends to reflect public imaginings of the state itself 
or the nation at large, by Nigerians as well as others, since the press is both a 
medium for conveying information as well as a mechanism for identity 
construction (Gupta, 1995). In his study of corruption and the state in India, for 
example, the engineer turned anthropologist, Akhil Gupta, advises 
ethnographers to pay attention to newspapers and other media. His thinking is 
that these media are as much a source of ‘field data’ as personal observations 
and interactions, since, in his words, “representations of the state are 
constituted, contested, and transformed in public culture” (Gupta, 1995: 385). 
By ‘public culture’, he means a site of political and cultural debate conducted 
through “the mass media, other modes of mechanical production, and the 
visible practices of institutions such as the state” (ibid). His own observations of 
bureaucratic corruption in a rural Indian village therefore included close 
observation of media coverage of it. He finds that “local discourses and practices 
concerning corruption were intimately linked with the reportage found in 
vernacular and national English language newspapers” (ibid: 386). Yet this 
linkage occurs in such a way that corruption itself and the discourses around it, 
Gupta maintains, enable “people to construct the state symbolically and to 
define themselves as citizens” in relation to it. Perhaps nowhere is such 
corruption-talk more apparent and acute than in Nigerian public culture and 
explains why it takes up 25% of total corruption news in our sample. But a close 




Chapter Five: Discussion I: Strong watchdogs, weak investigators? 
 
5.1 Introduction:  
In the previous chapter, we observed that corruption stories account for over 
8% of total front-page news and one-third of total lead stories, implying an 
average of two stories every week. We also find that about 10% of the sampled 
newspapers carry multiple corruption stories, that is, two or more corruption on 
the same front page. Findings for Daily Trust, The Punch, and Thisday are 
comparatively similar in terms of frequency and prominence at 8.84%, 9.27% 
and 9.37% of total news coverage respectively for the three papers. The 
Guardian, we find, covers corruption less than the other titles at 5.21%, which 
is still considerably high, since it implies reporting of corruption on an average 
once every three weeks throughout the 12-year period45, but also given that 
there are literally hundreds of issues that could make front page news over the 
period. Over time, we find steady increases and significant variations between 
one year and the next, to the extent that 62.30% of all corruption stories were 
reported during 2005-2009. Corruption stories also vary significantly between 
the categories. Follow up and narrative of corruption stories account for more 
than half the total corruption coverage (54.28%), while stories of actual 
corruption or scandals make up 45.72% of the total. In addition, most of the 
scandals were generated by the investigations and reports of corruption-
investigating-authorities, such as anti-corruption agencies, national and state 
assemblies, adhoc commissions of inquiries etc. These sources, we observed, 
account for 39.48% of all corruption coverage, and for most of the scandal 
stories. Investigative reporting of corruption by the four newspapers contribute 
                                                          
45 The Guardian alone has a total of 249 corruption stories. This gives average of (249/624) x 3 = 1.19.   
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just 4.76% of all corruption news, indicating a low investigative output. Finally, 
investigative reports of corruption tend to have little or no follow-up stories, 
unlike corruption stories generated by established sources. In this chapter, I 
examine these key findings in light of existing research and offer an 
interpretation of what they mean for watchdog journalism in the context of 
Nigeria’s democracy.  
5.2 Situating press coverage of corruption in Nigeria:  
Two broad strands are discernible in the emerging literature on press coverage 
of corruption in Nigerian newspapers. One set of researchers consider the press 
as active in reporting corruption as part of its watchdog function as 
demonstrated by “front page headlines” on corruption (Sowunmi et al, 2010: 
13-16) or media investigations of “high profile cases of corruption” (Alikor et al, 
2013: 47-49; Olaiya et al, 2013: 53). These studies appear consistent with some 
of the findings here, although the distinction between coverage of corruption in 
general and investigative reporting is important. However, Iwokwagh and Batta 
(2011: 337-338) find ‘’only a negligible percentage” of corruption stories in a 
sample of four Nigerian newspapers “receiving high prominence on the front 
page’’ (ibid). This is not consistent with our findings as described above. 
Iwokwagh and Batta may have overgeneralized findings of a small sample taken 
from a single year (2010)46, rather than a trend as Figure 4.2 (chapter 4) shows. 
A second trend of research finds some influence of ethnic and regional politics 
or “regional parallelism” (Yusha’u, 2010a) on press coverage of corruption in 
ways that favours politicians from the south, or south west against those from 
other regions (Alozieuwa, 2012: 384-386; Jibo and Okoosi-Simbene, 2003: 181-
                                                          
46 They analysed a total of 196 editions of The Guardian, The Punch, Thisday and Vanguard selected by an interval 
of 4 days apart, over the period 1 May to 31 December 2010. They conclude that all four newspapers “gave low 
or weak prominence to issues of corruption since majority of the stories were buried in the inside pages, rather 
than in the front or back pages” (Iwokwagh and Batta, 2011: 337).    
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184; Ojo, 2003: 835-836). So that “reporting of corruption takes on an ethnic 
and regional dimension, with each section of the country and its media trying 
hard to reveal the atrocities of the other” (Yusha’u, 2010a: 359). However, our 
long-term trend analysis suggests two considerations for caution in reaching 
such conclusions. First, most of the evidence cited by these studies tend to be 
the same few or select cases, which can hardly justify a trend. Secondly, there is 
little evidence of ethnic or regional bias for or against officials involved in the 
scandals, at least to the extent that quantitative analysis can measure such 
things. For example, one of the most widely reported scandals in the press was 
the case involving former IGP Balogun, a southerner. This case alone accounts 
for 22 follow-up stories, mostly by the three ‘southern’ newspapers in the 
sample. Much the same applies for corruption cases involving two southern 
governors. Furthermore, the majority of the scandals involved a collection or 
group of politicians and businessmen drawn from different parts of the country, 
rather than individual officials from any single region.  
Coverage of corruption is often understood as scandal reporting, that is, 
corruption news as mediated scandals. Theodore Lowi (1988) defines scandals 
simply as “corruption revealed” in the media (in Tumber and Waisbord, 2004a: 
1032). Some researchers suggest that corruption scandals tend to be more 
emphasized in the press than others like sexual scandals or celebrity scandals 
(Kantola and Vesa, 2013; Schudson, 2004) because such scandals are 
fundamentally about uses and abuses of power (Thompson, 2000: 241). But 
studying corruption scandals is about understanding the conditions for exposing 
corruption in the press, rather than analysis of corruption itself (Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004a: 1034), because scandals are inconceivable without media 
publicity (Jacobsson and Lofmarck, 2008: 209; Waisbord; 2004a: 1077). In 
addition to publicising scandals however, Clemente and Gabbioneta (2017: 1) 
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hold that the media also frames them in ways that shape public perceptions of 
both the wrongdoing exposed and the officials or institutions involved. The 
watchdog function, then, is the inherent assumption of these studies: exposure 
of corruption in turn instigates resignations or policy reforms (Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004b: 1144). Some researchers hold that corruption scandals are 
symptoms of a ‘crisis of democracy’ manifested in the rise of ‘scandal politics’, 
or as consequence of structural and technological changes in the media itself, 
particularly media competition (Jacobsson and Lofmarck, 2008; Adut, 2004; 
Tumber, 2004; Tumber and Waisbord, 2004a; 2004b; Thompson, 2000). 
Suphachalasai (2005), for example, regards media competition as a more 
important factor in reducing corruption than press freedom. Furthermore, 
Chalaby (2004) argues that investigative reporting and revelations of corruption 
in the French press arose in the 1990s due to fierce competition between 
newspapers following withdrawal of government subsidy and decline of literary 
journalism. Indeed, Hamilton (2016) thinks of investigative reporting as 
“product-differentiation” for beating or staying above the competition in media 
markets. Similarly, Waisbord (1994) argues that, the increase in journalistic 
exposes of corruption in Argentina in the 1990s is part of the rise of scandal 
politics and media sensationalism for attracting audiences, and by implication 
advertising revenue. How then, does media competition explain coverage of 
corruption in Nigerian newspapers? Hardly, I suggest. Media competition 
implies exclusivity of reporting, as Hamilton (2016) contends above. In short, 
media competition as a driver of corruption coverage implies investigative 
reporting or some measure of exclusiveness in sourcing the stories, to 
distinguish one paper’s reporting from that of others. But for scandals in the 
Nigerian press, our data shows a convergence in all these criteria.  
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One explanation is the routine process of reporting corruption in the 
newspapers. We have seen that 39.48% of corruption stories and indeed, most 
of the scandals as well as their follow up stories were initiated by corruption-
investigating agencies such as anti-corruption agencies, congressional 
investigations of corruption, commissions of inquiry on corruption, etc. These 
stories reach the media through normal or routine reporting practices and 
processes, rather than through investigative reporting of corruption 
independently initiated by the press. In a conversation with me, INTVWEE 28, 
for example, said that investigations of corruption are disclosed to the media 
through the Commission’s regular press releases, monthly and sometimes 
weekly media briefings, as well as what she calls “operatives’ leakages” in which 
field agents investigating corruption cases often informally leak stories to the 
press, that is, outside of official communications channels of the commission. 
This is confirmed by several reporters who mentioned ‘press release’, 
‘spokesmen’ etc when referring to the EFCC. Also, speaking of the investigations 
of corruption by houses of the national assembly, INTVWEE 12 says that:  
There has been a lot of investigative resolutions, we call them 
resolutions or motions, brought by members, and most of the times, 
you hardly see such kinds of motions dropped. You hardly see a 
member objecting to such kinds of investigative motions… And each 
time there are such kinds of stories, no newspaper house will drop 
such stories, no newspaper will overlook such kinds of stories… All 
media houses, both newspapers and even electronic media give such 
type of stories prominence 
The indication is that major sources of corruption news such as anti-corruption 
agencies, the national assembly etc are also beats to which reporters are 
assigned and who then report news of corruption generated by these sources 
through official channels like press releases, briefings and so on. But The 
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Guardian differs from the other three publications in its amount coverage 
because, as INTVWEE 5 explains:  
The Guardian is a business-oriented newspaper. They mostly carry the 
stories that they think the corporate world wants to hear. Analysis of 
government, in-depth reports of complicated government policies, 
and policies in particular that have relevance for the business world 
and things like that. So, to that extent they under report small cases 
of sleaze and corruption and things like that.  
Similarly, INTVWEE 7 claims that: “For The Guardian, they do not have 
reputation for reports like this [corruption stories]. This is not their sphere 
traditionally”. Still, that 5.21% of its total front-page news coverage is devoted 
to corruption stories alone suggests that The Guardian is not much of an outlier 
from the rest. Thus, media competition might not fully explain press coverage 
of corruption in Nigerian newspapers at least.  
However, corruption itself and press coverage of it are said to be linked to 
democratization and democratic development. That is, processes of democratic 
transition can trigger an increase in corruption in the period immediately 
following authoritarian rule, while at the same time enhancing disclosures of it. 
Sindzingre (2002: 446) argues that authoritarian political cultures such as 
impunity or disregard for rule of law remain entrenched in a new democracy 
despite formal democratic structures and institutions that come with transition. 
In this sense, as Weyland, 1998: 112 contends, democratic transition increases 
the number of political actors who may demand pay-offs and bribes, or act with 
impunity with public resources. Paradoxically however, transition also creates 
conditions for detecting and publicizing corruption in the media due to impact 
of democratic processes and institutions such as political competition, pressure 
to maintain legitimacy, proliferation of media outlets and increased press 
freedom, however weak these may be in a new democracy (Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004a: 1035). For example, Kramer (2013: 60) finds a marked 
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increase in Indonesian press coverage of corruption caused by freedom of 
information legislation and proliferation of new media outlets after the fall of 
Suharto regime. Nigerian democratization has similarly enhanced both 
detection of corruption and disclosure by the press. For example, in his inaugural 
speech marking the return to democracy in 1999, then newly elected President 
Olusegun Obasanjo described corruption as “the greatest single bane of our 
society today”. He criticised the military for not doing enough to check 
corruption and regarded the fight against it in the new dispensation as a 
“dividend of democracy”.47 This informed the establishment of the two anti-
corruption agencies (ICPC in 2000; EFCC in 2004) which have investigated 
literally hundreds of corruption cases and reports, which in turn helped in 
generating a substantial amount of corruption news48. Moreover, political 
competition between parties and individuals, a consequence of the new 
democratic politics, also influenced coverage of corruption in the press, for 
example during elections, as we discuss below. Add to these, the proliferation 
of new media outlets in the country, following transition to democracy (Ciboh, 
2007), particularly as this coincides with the rise of diaspora online media such 
as Sahara Reporters which regularly investigates and publishes corruption 
stories in the country (Dare, 2011). In other words, the general atmosphere of 
democratization in terms of free competition, legitimacy and free expression for 
both the media and other actors help to explain coverage of corruption in 
Nigerian media too. However, I argue that to the extent that processes and 
institutions of democratization influence coverage of corruption in the Nigerian 
press, these need to be understood within the framework of an older and more 
                                                          
47 Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), Inaugural Speech at Eagle Square, Abuja, May, 29, 1999. Available at  
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/inaugural.html  
48 Even the Code of Conduct Bureau, the third anti-corruption agency in Nigeria established in 1979, was a 
consequence of the short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983) democratic transition, following a period of 13 
years of military rule in the country (1966-1979). 
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entrenched political culture of ‘war against corruption’ which explains both the 
political behaviour of the media and of the CIAs in reporting corruption.  
5.3 Anti-corruption as political culture in Nigeria:  
According to Adebanwi and Obadare (2011b: 191), “corruption and its discourse 
in Nigerian public life are central to the country's political history”. Indeed, 
Nigeria has been ‘fighting corruption’ throughout its hundred-year history.  For 
example, Lord Lugard, the colonial administrator who formed Nigeria in 1914 
insisted to the leaders of his new territory that prevailing practices such as 
“abuses, extortionate demands from the peasantry, corruption and bribery in 
the courts, arbitrary imprisonment and forced labour” (in Tignor, 1993:177-178) 
would henceforth be “forbidden” in colonial government. In short, Tignor (1993: 
177) reasons that explorers, missionaries, merchants and colonial 
administrators in Africa all believed, to varying degrees, that African traditional 
political systems were ‘oppressive’, ‘disorderly’, and ‘corrupt’. In this discursive 
representation of Africa, ‘corruption’ implies the wider Aristotelian sense of a 
deviation from an ideal in both politics and ethics (Mulgan, 2012: 29-30), the 
ideal in this case being the norms of governance in the European motherland. 
But Ekeh (1975: 95-97) calls such representations of Africa at the onset of 
colonialism as ‘colonial ideologies of legitimation’, in which colonialism itself 
was extolled and justified as a revival against degeneration of the old ways, and 
as a reform of the corrupt order that the African past represented. 
 But if at inception colonialism aimed to reform Nigeria of its ‘corruption’, 
colonial administration proper soon tolerated it. As some researchers have 
noted, corruption, in its narrower sense of the use of public office for private 
gain, was rife in colonial administration itself (Ogunyemi, 2016; Ogbeidi, 2012; 
Pierce, 2006; Osoba, 1996; Tignor, 1993; Ekpo, 1979, etc). Tignor (1993: 176) for 
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example believes that a substantial amount of various forms of corruption, 
including bribery, nepotism and self-enrichment through public office, did exist 
under colonial rule and were documented by colonial officials. Also, in his 
analysis of archival documents, Ogunyemi (2016: 68) finds 26 different instances 
of “embezzlement and misappropriation” by various officials totalling over 
£25,000 between 1950 and 1960 alone. While the top echelons of colonial 
administration were generally exempt from such corrupt practices, they looked 
the other way when officials in the lower cadres of the administration engaged 
in them (Ogunyemi, 2016: 73; Tignor, 1993: 178). Indirect Rule, devised to 
accentuate shortage of colonial manpower depended on local chiefs who ruled 
through provincial ‘Native Authorities’. Challenging these local chiefs for their 
corruption risked upturning the colonial cart altogether.  
Moreover, if ideas about corruption and anti-corruption were formative aspects 
of the Nigerian state during colonialism, decolonization was the real political 
moment of the emerging anti-corruption culture in Nigerian politics during 
which its three key features took hold in Nigerian politics to this day and by 
which we explain press coverage of corruption as observed above. First, 
corruption suddenly moved to the top of the political agenda in Nigeria and has 
remained there ever since. Second, decolonization marked the beginning of 
official probes and investigations into corruption, a tendency that has been a 
central feature of virtually all Nigerian governments since then. Third, and the 
consequence of the first two, corruption became a central feature of media 
agenda from this period onwards. It is a combination of these interconnected 
factors that I refer to here as political culture of anti-corruption in Nigeria. First, 
Tignor (1993: 175) notes that as decolonization began in earnest after World 
War II, official concerns about corruption emerged from the shadows of secret 
memos to mainstream colonial policy to, in his words, “slow down” the transfer 
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of power to then growing strata of educated Nigerians, or nationalists as they 
are known, who were agitating for independence. To demonstrate this concern 
about corruption, the colonial government set up the first commission of 
inquiry, headed by Bernard Storey, then Town Clerk of Norwich, to ‘investigate’ 
and ‘probe’ corruption in the Lagos City Council in 195349. Storey’s report was 
damning and widely publicised in the newspapers of the time. But for Tignor, 
the “50-page document established a precedent by becoming the first of a series 
of public airings of Nigerian corruption - the opening salvo in a campaign to 
publicise bribery, nepotism, and venality as Nigeria’s most pressing political 
ailment” (ibid: 186). At the same time however, the nationalists turned 
colonialist’ discourse of corruption on its head. In their public speeches, rallies, 
pamphlets and newspaper and magazine writings, they presented colonialism 
as the ultimate corruption, the root of all evils itself. Moreover, these 
nationalists targeted specific instances of corruption in the native authorities 
and exposed them as illustration of the corruption that was the colonial 
government in its entirety. Pearce (2006: 893) contend that by the early 1950s, 
speeches and proceedings in the three regional legislative assemblies, and the 
national one in Lagos were devoted to railing against corruption in the native 
authorities. Anti-corruption, in this sense, then, was a central mobilizing force 
against the incumbent colonial power by their nationalist challengers, and as we 
shall see, not for the last time in Nigeria. Gupta (1995) makes a similar 
observation in the earlier case of India, that the “discourse of accountability” 
played a significant role there. But the nationalists made even more charges of 
corruption against political opponents in the scramble to replace colonial 
officials. Indeed, the Storey report was instigated by local politicians who were 
defeated in the Council elections of that year (Tignor, 1993: 186-87). Ekeh (1975: 
                                                          
49 By 1953, the Lagos City Council was largely run by Nigerian elected officials.  
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96) calls these discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-corruption ‘invented’ by 
the emergent African elites to replace50 the colonizers ‘African bourgeoise 
ideologies of legitimation’. Official investigations and public enquiries soon 
became a norm, practiced throughout the country well before independence in 
1960. Findings of these enquiries were then eagerly reported in the local press 
(Olukotun, 2004; Osoba, 1996) and presented corruption as the single most 
important issue in a post-independent Nigeria (Tignor, 1993: 187). 
Yet, corruption flourished extensively during the first independent government 
(1960-1966) and spelled its collapse (Ogunyemi, 2016; Ogbeidi, 2012; Osoba, 
1996; Ekpo, 1979). The soldiers who staged the first military coup proclaimed 
corruption, defined liberally to include bribery, nepotism, favouritism, ethnicity 
and sundry vices, as a major reason why they intervened. As their leader Major 
Nzeogwu stated on the night of the coup (15 January 1966): 
Our enemies are the political profiteers; the swindlers; the men in 
high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10%; those that seek 
to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in 
office as Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, or VIPs at least; the 
tribalists; the nepotists; those that have made the country look big for 
nothing before international circles; those that have corrupted our 
society and put the Nigerian calendar back by their words and deeds 
(in Ekpo, 1975: 163)   
In other words, corruption is here presented as a major factor in military’s 
intervention in Nigerian politics, much the same way as colonial administrators 
and nationalist politicians had done previously. Successive military regimes then 
ruled the country from 1966-1979, and again from 1983-1999, each predicated 
on the same discourse of corruption. The 1983 coup, which marked the collapse 
of the Second Republic civilian government (1979-1983) was singularly 
                                                          
50 Italics in the original. Ekeh sees ideologies as false representations invented to acquire power, first by the 
colonizers and later by the African elite who sought to replace them. For him, both groups lack sufficient 
legitimacy and hence recourse to these ideologies (See Ekeh, 1975: 93-94).  
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explained as an attempt to rid the country of the corruption of the civilians. This 
government immediately launched a slate of anti-corruption decrees and 
military tribunals which in turn summarily tried and convicted top politicians for 
corruption and sentenced many of them to long stretches of prison terms, in 
some cases up to 120 years. In addition to these, it set up a military agency then 
known as War Against Indiscipline (WAI) to fight corruption in the wider society 
(Ogbeidi, 2012: 8). But even before this, previous military governments had 
established anti-corruption agencies and commissions of various hue, notably 
the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 1975 which conducted 
extensive investigations into the civil service and sacked literally hundreds of 
senior bureaucrats for corruption (Ciboh, 2014: 59). Yet, by all accounts, military 
governments were no less corrupt than their civilian counterparts, if not more 
so (Agbiboa, 2013; 2012; Ogbeidi, 2012; Ikpe, 2000). Olukotun (2002a; 2000a) 
notes that popular discontent against corruption in military governments was a 
major factor in civil society mobilization and struggle for democracy, and by 
implication, regime change in 1999. Throughout Nigeria’s political history then, 
various governments have initiated different legislations, institutions, decrees, 
policies, and programmes, including media policy and legislation, for fighting 
corruption (Agbiboa, 2012: Omotola, 2006)51.  
Elkins and Simeon (1979: 127) say of political culture that “it consists of 
assumptions about the political world”. These assumptions, Elkins and Simeon 
continue, are in in general, collectively held among members of a country, for 
                                                          
51 Between 1999 to date alone, Nigeria has had more than a dozen legislations, rules, executive orders and anti-
corruption agencies, not to mention, literally hundreds of official commissions of inquiries- all against 
corruption. Some of these agencies include EFCC, ICPC, CCBT, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Debt Management Office (DMO), Budget Management and Planning 
Unit (BMPU) or Due Process Office as it is called, Treasury Single Account (TSA), and of course regulatory 
agencies of various industries in the public and sectors. Some are public campaign programmes like National 
Orientation Agency (NOA), Service Compact (Servicom), etc. These are all government initiatives at eradicating 
corruption in Nigeria since 1999. Many more have been launched in the past.   
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example, and function, among other things, to focus attention on “identifying 
the problems deemed pertinent” (ibid). In this sense, for them, political culture 
closely approximates a “mind set” through which leaders and citizens alike 
approach politics by “limiting attention to particular problems and solutions” to 
the neglect or exclusion of others. Therefore, my argument here is that ‘anti-
corruption’ has long been entrenched in Nigerian political culture, but with the 
onset of democratization over the longest stretch ever in Nigeria, this tendency 
has renewed vigour and free expression. This is manifested in the hundreds of 
official investigations and reports of corruption which then generate the bulk of 
corruption stories in the press. Following Elkins and Simeon (1979) above, I refer 
to this persistent attention to corruption in Nigeria as an aspect of its political 
culture, not only in politics, but also in the wider society, which I illustrate briefly 
below.  
Ekpo (1979: 161) observes that “there are few issues in contemporary Nigeria 
that have received as much attention in the comments of public officials, in 
newspaper and magazine articles, and in speeches of prominent citizens, as that 
of corruption in public life”. Similarly, Tignor (1993: 175) observes 
straightforwardly that “no country in Africa has devoted more attention and 
energy to continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria”. Both authors wrote 
decades ago, but even today, such ‘attention’ to the issue of corruption in public 
life by public officials and prominent citizens dominates Nigerian politics and 
media. In fact, that 25% of total coverage of corruption comprises what Nigerian 
leaders and others say about corruption or its reform, rather than actual 
instances of corruption, is, by itself, a significant indication of how strongly 
issues of corruption are viewed in Nigerian political culture. Indeed, few issues 
hold media and popular imagination in Nigeria than corruption. For example, 
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Chinua Achebe’s A Man of the People (1966)52 is said to be a model of ‘national 
literature’ in Nigeria because it has inspired others of its kind even in many 
Nigerian local languages (Sullivan, 2001: 79). But A Man of the People is a novel 
about corruption in Nigerian social and political life. In fact, major Nigerian 
works of literary and cultural production like poems (Bamikunle, 1995), 
Nollywood movies (Abah, 2009; Haynes, 2006) are about the theme of 
corruption, including the acclaimed novel Welcome to Lagos by Chibundu 
Onuzu, published earlier this year53. Even non-fiction books written by 
foreigners about Nigeria, especially by diplomats, scholars and foreign 
correspondents who have worked or served in the country tend to be wholly or 
partly about corruption54. Thus, the various examples above illustrate the 
centrality of corruption in general political, social and cultural life in Nigeria. 
Hence, it is not entirely surprising that Nigerian newspapers will give corruption 
such prominence on their front pages, to the extent that nearly 10% of editions 
carry two or more corruption stories.   
Moreover, corruption is also a major topic of discussion among Nigerians in 
various social contexts: at work, school, queues, journeys, and virtually social 
gatherings of any kind. Anthropologists, journalists and other observers have 
been repeatedly struck by the extent to which Nigerians talk about corruption 
and imagine every social and economic condition in the country through it, even 
if they find themselves implicated in it in their everyday life (Agbiboa, 201655; 
                                                          
52 Chinua Achebe (1966) A man of the people, Oxford: Heinemann African Writers Series  
53 Chibundu Onuzu (2017), Welcome to Lagos, Faber and Faber 
54 Recent examples include Karl Maier (2002) This house has fallen: Nigeria in Crisis, Oxford: Westview Press; 
John Campbell (2012) Nigeria: Dancing on the brink, Council on Foreign Relations Books; Richard Bourne (2015) 
Nigeria: A new history of a turbulent century, London: Zed Books; Stephen Ellis (2016) This present darkness: A 
history of Nigerian organized crime, London: Hurst & Company 
55 Agbiboa was in fact reviewing a recent children’s novel Gbabga by a Nigerian author which explores the theme 
of corruption through the eyes and experiences of a Nigerian child. Agbiboa (2016) ‘A child’s eye view of 
corruption’, Africa at LSE blog, available at  http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/05/27/a-childs-eye-view-of-




Smith, 2010; 2007; Tignor, 1993; Wraith and Simpkins, 1963).  Our argument 
therefore is that in such a political and social setting, where corruption is 
perceived as dominating the system (Gupta, 1995), newspapers are likely to give 
emphasis to corruption stories. But journalists, too, are not exempt. For 
example, the weeks of my newsroom observation at Daily Trust in Abuja 
coincided with a major corruption scandal in in the news at the time, involving 
then newly elected President of the Senate, Dr Bukola Saraki, who according to 
the Code of Conduct Bureau, had falsified his assets declaration forms when he 
became Governor of Kwara State back in 200356. I observed that the reporters 
took a keen interest in news of the scandal, followed it on TV and in other 
newspapers, and talked about it almost everywhere on the premises of the 
paper. As INTVWEE 18 observes: 
One, corruption stories sell in Nigeria. The media has come to know 
that Nigerians want to know that their leaders are stealing, even when 
they are not stealing. It’s a story that people want to read and it’s a 
survival way of making money by the media itself. So that is one way 
of looking at that.  
This statement points to much of the foregoing discussion about how important 
corruption issues are to the reading public in Nigeria. Newspapers give 
prominence to corruption stories because it matters to Nigerians, and it matters 
to Nigerians because corruption has always mattered in Nigerian political 
culture, as we have seen above. 
                                                          
56 See Festus Owete and Richard Akinwumi (2015), ‘Inside the N10bn Saraki Declared as Governor’, Premium 




5.4 Political culture and information subsidy in coverage of corruption:  
Classical research on the relationships between journalists and their sources as 
either ‘consensual’, or ‘adversarial (Ciboh, 2017: 186; Jackson and Moloney, 
2016: 763-764; Tiffen et al, 2014: 375-376; Davis, 2009: 205-206; Örebro, 2002: 
21). An influential version of this classical account is Gandy’s (1982) idea of 
“information subsidies” in which sources, particularly public relations sources 
subsidize the costs of news production for journalists through press releases, 
lobby, briefings etc and thus enhance the profitability of the news media (Lewis 
et al, 2008a: 2). More recent research on information subsidy is concerned with 
the increasing over-reliance of journalists on public relations and other elite 
sources for the much of the news the public consumes, and the potential of this 
to undermine both independent journalism and the democratic promise of the 
press. This concern is often expressed by a variety of labels like ‘information 
subsidy’, ‘passive journalist’ ‘churnalism’, ‘public relations democracy’, ‘crisis’, 
etc (Jackson and Moloney, 2016; Franklin, 2011; Reich, 2010; Davies, 2009; 
Lewis et al, 2008a; 2008b; O’Neill and O’Connor, 2008; Bro, 2008; Davis, 2000).  
For example, Lewis et al (2008a; 2008b) hold that as staff strengths and other 
resources shrink while demand for news rises, journalists are increasingly relying 
on “pre-packaged” news material mostly from public relations and agency 
copies. Their analysis of 2207 news stories from five British national dailies finds 
evidence of “independent journalism” in just 12% of the sample (ibid, 2008: 15). 
Also, based on similar data and insider-perspective, Guardian Journalist Nick 
Davies suggests the rise of “churnalism” in the global media. Moreover, Jackson 
and Moloney (2016) find that information subsidy has since transformed into 
editorial subsidy: page-ready material specifically targeted at the media. 
Similarly, in an innovative engagement with PR practitioners, journalists and the 
news they produce, an approach designed to reconstruct the news production 
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process, Reich (2010) finds that the influence of public relations and information 
subsidy is “richer” and more varied than previous research recognizes. Public 
relations people successfully build their agenda in 50% of the stories analysed 
and are involved in one way or another in a further 75% of the news items, 
through “supplying information, story leads, and even dubiously ‘technical 
services’” (Reich, 2010: 799). Also, Kiousis et al (2015: 365-366) observe that 
studies on information subsidy focus predominantly on the news release, 
particularly election campaign news release and its agenda-building potentials, 
and occasionally on political advertising, and corporate takeovers (see also 
Kiousis et al 2006: 267-268).  Ciboh (2017) finds that information subsidy is also 
rife in Nigerian newspapers, but more than that politicians use a combination of 
“positive (monetary awards) and negative (intimidation and violence)” to elicit 
or discourage news coverage (ibid: 186). In sum then, these studies conceive 
information subsidy as not only unhelpful for journalism, but also for 
democracy, or as Franklin (2011: 90-91) put it, information subsidy sources 
represent a “continuing crisis” for democratic media performance. Our 
argument here is to the contrary. First, while information subsidy is a useful 
framework for understanding press coverage of corruption in Nigeria, it does 
not recognise the nuances of news types subsidized for the press. Lewis et al 
(2008a: 4-5) based their analysis on all types of “home news”, from politics to 
the arts and conclude that information subsidy compromises fourth estate role 
of the press. However, for corruption stories specifically, information subsidy 
supplied by corruption investigating-agencies may in fact be a necessary 
condition for more watchdog journalism, especially in a political culture steeped 
in anti-corruption as Nigeria, as we illustrate below. 
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(a) Corruption investigating authorities and press coverage of corruption:   
In the preceding chapter, we find three types of corruption stories in Nigerian 
newspapers: corruption scandals, follow up stories and narrative of corruption 
stories. Scandals are distributed in seven categories according to their sources 
(IMI, ACA, NA, COI, FM, DOM, OTHER) and together account for 45.72% of total 
coverage of corruption. Follow stories from these scandals and narrative of 
corruption stories make up 28.48% and 25.80% respectively.  This is represented 
by Figure 5.1 below which shows the distribution by types of corruption stories 
in the sample. But for the sake of analysis here, we focus specifically on the 
scandals to illustrate the extent of information subsidy provided by the CIAs. 
Figure 5.1: Types of corruption stories in the Nigerian press: 
  
Notes: Corruption scandals (45.72%) is total frequency of corruption stories in the seven 








Types of corruption stories
Corruption Scandals Follow-up Stories Narrative of Corruption
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Table 5.1: Frequency of corruption scandals in Nigerian newspapers (n=615) 
 
The second column in Table 5.1 above shows the frequency or number of 
corruption scandals in each of the seven categories and their combined total, 
while the last column shows their percentages relative to the total scandals in 
the sample. This means that the four categories that make up the CIAs (ACA, NA 
COI and Other) generate a total of 86.34% of breaking stories of real or alleged 
corruption (scandals), while the remaining 13.66% are generated from foreign 
media, diaspora/online media and independent media investigations. In other 
words, CIAs information subsidy for revelations of corruption in the four 
newspapers is almost 90%. These findings conform to Waisbord’s (1997a: 121) 
observation that powerful sources, individuals or institutions, play a strong role 
in ‘originating’ news stories about wrongdoing through a variety of means. 
Indeed, tips from government sources account for 34.9% of prize-winning 
investigative stories in U.S journalism (Lanosga and Martin, 2017: 10), and even 
more significantly, investigative reports triggered by such sources are more 
likely to result in policy reforms than those resulting from independent 
journalistic enterprise (ibid: 11). This further indicates that for certain types of 
stories, for example, corruption stories or investigative reports, information 
Categories (sources of corruption stories) Frequency of Corruption scandals % of corruption scandals Corruption Investigating Authorities
Anti Corruption Agencies (ACA) 183 29.76%
National (and State) Assemblies (NA) 134 21.79%
Commissions of Inquiry 99 16.10%
Other (OT) 115 18.70% 86.34%
Indpendent Media Investigations (IMI) 64 10.41%
Foreign Media (FM) 15 2.44%
Diaspora/Online Media (DOM) 5 0.81% 13.66%
Total Corruption Scandals 615 100.00% 100.00%
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subsidy may well enhance democratic governance, rather than undermine it, all 
other things being equal.  
(b) CIAs and mandate power:  
One reason for this high extent of information subsidy, according to more than 
two-thirds of the 16 interviewees, is the mandate power of the CIAs in 
comparison to the effective capacity of the press to discover and report 
corruption in high places. In contrast to the press, the agencies or probe 
committees are state-level institutions set up by law with the specific mandate 
of revealing and prosecuting corruption. Therefore, public officials tend to 
respond to requests for information from the CIAs than they do to journalists. 
For example, INTVWEE 22 says that “if for example, a government institution is 
probing another one, it has a mandate to compel anybody to appear or to 
appear with certain documents which even with the freedom of information 
law, it is difficult for the media to get”. Similarly, INTVWEE 9, an editor-in-chief 
at one of the publications in this study explains that: 
So sometimes that is why it is better to rely on the national assembly. 
If they are investigating a particular issue, you see the newspapers 
giving it blanket coverage. Why, because that is where the officials 
cannot easily wriggle out and they are under public scrutiny. And then 
they are being asked questions by members of the national assembly 
who have been constitutionally given that power. So, they cannot 
dodge like if it is a media organization.  
These statements exemplify a common theme among the respondents who 
think that the media’s capacity to investigate corruption does not compare to 
the CIAs since politicians have more regard for these agencies than the media. 
But it also reflects the relative lack of institutionalization of freedom of 
information law, which in principle, should be sufficient to compel public 
officials to release any information to journalists. But even journalists 
themselves often find stories from CIAs more reliable than independent sources, 
167 
 
most of whom are described by the respondents as “aggrieved” persons who 
might mislead reporters into fighting turf battles rather than watchdog 
journalism. But so too do citizens who supply petitions to anti-corruption 
agencies or parliament. In fact, INTVWEE 4 notes that citizens submit more 
petitions to anti-corruption agencies than the media because they believe these 
agencies have more effective power. As INTVWEE 4 put it, “but now if EFCC gets 
information, they go for the person and arrest the person, it makes impact”.  
Also, INTVWEE 5 observes that:  
But usually what you have here is that somebody is aggrieved and he 
leaks it to a reporter. But on the other hand, if it is police or EFCC or 
ICPC or NEITI or any of the anti-corruption agencies that discovered it 
as part of their duties, a corrupt deed, and they reveal to the nation, 
nothing wrong with that. Or for that matter the parliamentary 
committees... the parliamentary committee doesn’t have to know 
anybody, they will sit down, they will issue a circular: Perm. Sec come, 
Director come, you, come. Bring the file. Can I do that as journalist?... 
And if the media were still there, they will just grab and go to town. 
Very legitimate. There is nothing wrong with those sources spilling. 
Actually, we prefer it that way because it is more reliable than a source  
This implies that for corruption stories the credibility of the source is perhaps 
more significant than in other types of news stories, perhaps due to nature of 
corruption itself and the possible consequences of its exposure, both for the 
persons alleged to have engaged in corruption, and to the media. Corruption, 
particularly as understood here in the sense of financial misconduct by persons 
occupying positions of power and trust, is generally a clandestine activity (Dincer 
and Johnstone, 2016: 134) and often involves persons with power to fight back 
(Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011b) through intimidation against journalists (Ciboh, 
2017). Furthermore, because press disclosures of corruption can ruin 
reputations and by implication legal troubles for the press where unfounded. All 
this increase reliance on information subsidy by the CIAs, which in the context 
of Nigeria’s political culture comes in steady supply. As Adut (2008: 145) 
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observes in his analysis of investigating magistrates in generating corruption 
scandals in France in the 1990s that “Elites’ accusations are both more salient 
and credible, with less of a chance of being met with a crushing retribution”. 
Finally, CIAs make it ‘easier’ for newspapers to report corruption and still 
maintain their business relationships with corporate advertisers. For example, 
INTVWEE 23 says that “recently, EFCC arrested three senior officers of a bank. I 
am the news editor; the story came to me. But I couldn’t use the name of the 
bank in the headline”57. Similarly, INTVWEE 27 explains that: 
The newspaper, when they are protecting advertisers would say let it 
not come from us. But if, from the other hand, the EFCC is taking on 
the bank, and all the papers know about it, they will now decide what 
to do. At that point, protecting the bank beyond that stage will mean 
that the paper is reporting what others are not reporting. So, they will 
be forced to report it 
In other words, because the story emanates from an established government 
source with a mandate to investigate corruption, newspapers are compelled to 
report malfeasance even in organizations they would otherwise wish to ‘protect’ 
for commercial reasons. In effect, then, the above findings indicate that in the 
context of Nigeria, where the effective capacity of the press is curtailed by 
several factors, watchdog role of the press with regards to exposing corruption 
is positively served, rather than harmed, by information subsidy resulting from 
horizontal accountability functions of state agencies. 
(c) Anti-corruption, politics, and news:  
We noted earlier that Chalaby (2004) attributed the rise of corruption scandals 
and investigative reporting in France to competition for market share among 
newspapers occasioned by withdrawal of government funding. For Adut (2008: 
530-32) however, it was the “high-profile corruption investigations by the 
                                                          
57 Nigerian newspapers frequently use generic means of identifying organizations, like “a new generation bank”, 
“a leading telecoms company” and so on, particularly for negative stories such as corruption, bank robbery etc.  
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French investigating magistrates”, who strove to enforce previously existing but 
under-enforced anti-corruption laws, by strategically revealing details of their 
investigations to the press through leaks and other backhanded channels. But 
the investigating magistrates were “enabled” by certain “structural factors”, 
notably decentralization of the political system and liberalization of the 
economy in the late 1980s (ibid). Marchetti (2009) makes a similar argument 
that these magistrates were driven a mission to promote the independence of 
the judiciary from the executive which had subordinated the judicial arm for 
much of the 20th century. Thus, the press then “became a strategic arena for the 
revelations of this investigations sandwiched in the tensions the political and 
judicial fields” (ibid: 371). Similarly, Waisbord (1996: 344) argues that because 
political corruption necessarily involves powerful institutions and individuals in 
the political system, media scandals are inherently an expression of the conflicts 
between these actors, “rather than simply the by-product of solitary 
investigative reporters” as normative theory assumes. Moreover, Dincer and 
Johnston (2016) suggest that political culture is a determinant of the number 
and types of corruption issues reflected in the media. In fact, their research is 
central to my argument about political culture in generating news about 
corruption that it is worth recounting at length. Dincer and Johnston aim, first, 
to provide a “new measure” of corruption based not on surveys of how citizens 
and businesses perceive corruption, or through analysis of conviction rates 
dominant in U.S studies of corruption (ibid: 135-136). Instead, they measure 
corruption through a new technique based on quantitative analysis of press 
coverage of corruption, which they call “Corruption Reflection Index” (CRI)58.  
Secondly, Dincer and Johnston investigate the extent to which varying political 
                                                          
58 Barring the statistical analysis and difference of research questions, this technique is strikingly similar to that 
I used in this research, as I indicated in an earlier note above.  
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culture in U.S states determine news of corruption, as reflection of both 
corruption itself and of the amount of space media devote to it, which, they 
argue, in turn reflects its significance within the political culture of the respective 
states (ibid: 134). Thus, they follow Daniel Elazar’s classification of political 
culture in U.S states into individualistic, moralistic and traditionalist. They then 
analyse Associated Press news coverage of corruption in those states over 1980-
2010. They find that corruption news is higher in traditionalist and individualistic 
states than in moralistic dominant ones, but higher still in traditionalistic states 
than in individualistic ones (Dincer and Johnston, 2016: 138). This shows that 
certain aspects of a country’s political culture could well influence how and the 
amount of corruption reported in that country’s press. And while I could not find 
comparable research on political culture in Nigeria, our argument here is that 
the tendency, or the general “mind-set” (Elkins and Simeon, 1979) for fighting 
corruption within Nigerian politics, government and society as an aspect of its 
political culture that influences press coverage of corruption in the country, as 
our data shows below. Therefore, taken together, these studies imply that 
structural factors in the wider political system could in turn influence revelations 
of scandals through strategic use of the press by certain actors. My point is that 
similar processes were at play in Nigeria after return to democracy and explains 
much of the information subsidy for corruption reporting in the newspapers. 
Democratic transition gave renewed impetus to the anti-corruption political 
culture in Nigerian governments to make the fight against corruption the centre 
of policy and governance.  
Early on, President Obasanjo (2000) acknowledged all previous governments’ 
attempts at anti-corruption but noted that in most cases, “the cure often turned 
to be worse than the disease” (in Ciboh, 2014: 59). In response, he promised a 
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new “crusade” and “total war” on against graft59. He severally called for “moral 
rebirth on corruption”60 and insisted that the war against corruption was 
“necessary for national development”61. Political activism against corruption by 
his government, demonstrated first by the establishment of ICPC and EFCC, and 
subsequently by the high-profile investigations of these agencies during 2003-
2005 (and beyond) explain much of the long-term pattern of corruption 
coverage observed in our sample. It explains the steady increases over time and 
why there is concentration of corruption stories in a handful of years.  As we 
have seen in Figure 4.2, reports of corruption were at 3.65% of total in 2001, but 
spiked to 13.23% in 2005, more than four times the rate of 2001. The upsurge is 
explained by several high-profile investigations by the EFCC and ICPC. For 
example, during 2003-2004, the ICPC investigated two sitting ministers and 
several top civil servants over $240m National Identity Card project bribery 
scandal involving the French company SAGEM (The Guardian 5 December 2003). 
Adebanwi (2012) observes that by 2005, the anti-corruption war had turned to 
a media war as corrupt officials “fight back”. INTVWEE 7 suggests how this war 
may have played out in the media, that:  
When we started with fraudsters like the 419, the media were very 
excited because they (fraudsters) didn’t own anything (media) and we 
were celebrated.  Then we moved to next level and we started 
attacking government agencies like the customs, Inland Revenue, etc. 
It was still okay. Then over next level was to start attacking the 
politicians. Then the whole shift in momentum began. Why? Because 
these politicians own the newspapers. That was where the change 
began. Issues of witch-hunting; that Obasanjo was using it to go after 
opponents…  
Whatever the validity of these claims, the events set the stage for what was to 
come. As the EFCC continues to investigate corruption and publicize them in the 
                                                          
59 The Guardian, 23 April 2005 
60 The Punch, 12 February 2001 
61 Daily Trust, 24 December 2003.  
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press, its public profile rose and created a multiplier effect on the other 
investigating authorities: ICPC, national and state assemblies, and numerous 
many panels or adhoc commissions of inquiry into corruption by both federal 
and state governments and their agencies or departments. Moreover, elections, 
impeachment proceedings against political office holders of all sorts, and 
changes in leaders or heads of major government establishments became the 
primary arena for playing out this politics of anti-corruption during this period, 
which peaked between 2005 and 2009. At least five state governors and several 
more deputy governors were impeached on corruption charges spearheaded by 
the EFCC between 2003 and 2007 (National Democratic Institute, 2008: 25). 
These generated tons of front page corruption stories in the press. Election 
periods were particularly significant in these processes of exposing corruption. 
For example, in all three general election years (2003, 2007 and 2011) coverage 
of corruption increased either in the election year itself or in the year following 
it, relative to the year before the elections. Campaigns and other political 
activities generated accusations of malfeasance among incumbents and their 
challengers and CIAs caught in on the game. Indeed, then Chairman of EFCC 
announced to a joint session of the National Assembly in late 2006 that the 
agency had cases of corruption against 31 of the 36 state governors62 and urged 
the legislators to enact a law barring them from holding any political office in 
the future (National Democratic Institute, 2008: 25), which itself generated 
more corruption stories in newspapers. As INTVWEE 22 claims, “it is not as if 
these cases are not there before”, but the elections bring such issues to fore as 
politicians try to “outwit themselves”. This continues even after elections as 
successors probed the affairs of their predecessors, especially in an electoral 
                                                          
62 Under Nigerian constitution, executive heads (president and governors) cannot be charged for corruption 
while still in office through a provision called constitutional immunity.    
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system with consistently high turnover rates of elected officials (Hamalai et al, 
2017: 246; NDI, 2008: 43). In February 2008, for example, then new president 
Umaru Musa Yar’adua and Speaker of the House of Representatives Dimeji 
Bankole separately alleged $10 billion and $16 billion corruption, respectively, 
in the Independent Power Project of the Obasanjo government63. Many such 
official accusations resulted in a flurry of public hearings and investigations by 
various CIAs throughout 2008 and beyond.  
5.5 The press as strong watchdogs, but weak investigators:  
What then is role of the newspapers in these processes and events? If 
information subsidy accounts for much revelations of corruption in the press, 
rather than investigative reporting, how should we understand the role of the 
press in such a context? I argue that newspapers were strong watchdogs but 
weak investigators, and that the two roles are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Table 5.1 above shows that just 10.41% of breaking news of alleged 
cases of corruption results from independent journalism by the four newspapers 
combined. About 90% are generated through information subsidy supplied by 
CIAs, foreign media, diaspora/online media etc. this implies that independent 
journalism about corruption in Nigeria is considerably weak, at least in 
comparison to investigations and disclosures of corruption through other 
sources. However, as I discuss in detail in the next two chapters, as compared to 
other types of news reporting, investigative reporting is considerably low in 
many media systems. Secondly, in the specific context of corruption stories in 
Nigeria, low investigative reporting does not necessarily suggest weak Fourth 
Estate journalism. Or conversely, high information subsidy from established, or 
to borrow the language of Nigerian journalists themselves as cited above, 
                                                          
63 The Punch 1 February 2008; Daily Trust 7 February 2008. 
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‘constitutionally mandated’ sources, does not necessarily compromise fourth 
estate watchdog journalism. Lewis et al (2008a) conclude their analysis of 
information subsidy in the British press by suggesting that it compromises the 
fourth estate role of the media. My argument is that for reporting about 
corruption, information subsidy may in fact enhance media watchdog role, at 
least in the specific context of Nigeria’s new democracy where both the political 
and media systems are only just emerging from long decades of undemocratic 
rule. The question then is how does the Nigerian media demonstrate a strong or 
high watchdog journalism even in the face of low investigative reporting of 
corruption? Findings from the content analysis and interviews suggest that 
watchdog role of the press is enacted in three ways, which I examine below.  
The first point is to establish the key distinction between investigative reporting 
and watchdog journalism of which the former is a part. Eriksson and Ӧstman 
(2013: 304) have suggested that watchdog function of the media is ‘enacted’ at 
two key moments in the production of political news. Journalists demonstrate 
‘cooperation’ with politicians at the first ‘interactional’ phase of direct or 
indirect contacts with politicians during press conferences but tend to be more 
critical and questioning of the politicians at the second phase of ‘news 
construction’, that is, in their news reports. Cooperation conforms to the 
‘exchange’ model, while criticism and questioning conforms to adversarialism in 
the relationships between journalists and political sources. In a similar research, 
Gnisi et al (2014: 112) contend that watchdog journalism and its adversarialism 
are enacted by Italian journalists in interviews with politicians, particularly 
during elections. They find that journalists exhibit more ‘toughness’ against 
candidates leading in the polls when questioning when questioning them during 
interviews. Furthermore, Coronel (2010: 112) argues that watchdog journalism 
covers a wide range of different types of ‘exposure journalism’, regardless of the 
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medium, quality, target or ‘initiator’ of the investigation. In this sense, reporting 
corruption through information subsidy is still watchdog journalism.  Similarly, 
Mellado (2015: 602) suggests that while investigative reporting is the highest 
form of watchdog journalism, all news types that involve ‘questioning,’ 
‘critique’, ‘denouncing’, ‘conflict’, coverage of ‘trials and processes’, ‘external 
research’ are also varying degrees of performing the watchdog role. That is 
investigative reporting is but one aspect of watchdog journalism. Fink and 
Schudson (2014) and Ekstrom et al (2006) find much the same in the respective 
cases of American and Swedish journalism. The point of these studies, then, is 
to illustrate that in practice, watchdog journalism encompasses a wide range of 
different journalistic activities practices broadly lumped together under the 
same label of watchdog journalism and which can be performed at several 
moments of the reporting process. This finer distinction between varying 
degrees of watchdog journalism is important because as I illustrate below, 
findings of this study indicate that Nigerian newspapers are relatively strong at 
doing watchdog journalism even if their independent reporting of corruption is 
comparably low.  
First, as overall coverage of corruption shows above, the newspapers give 
considerable front page space and prominence to corruption stories. Over 8% of 
total front-page news coverage is devoted to corruption stories alone, about 
one third of which are presented as lead stories. Nearly 10% of editions sampled 
carry two or more corruption stories. Also, all kinds of issues relating to 
corruption are covered in the newspapers, including actual cases of corruption 
or general talk about it. In addition, Scandals remain matters of front page 
importance for long periods, to the extent that follow up stories on scandals 
constitute the single largest category of corruption news in the sample. But even 
the narrative of corruption stories, which are general statements about 
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corruption, rather than particular instances of it, were also widely reported by 
the press, making up 25.80% of total corruption coverage. A good number of 
these stories highlight the economic, social and political consequences of 
corruption in Nigeria, as expressed by Nigerian leaders, leaders of other 
countries and so on. Also, we find that corruption stories are sourced from a 
wide range of established sources from independent media investigations to 
investigations by foreign governments, officials or media. In addition, 
observations by respondents interviewed broadly confirm these quantitative 
findings about the extent of press coverage of corruption in the four 
newspapers. For example, INVTWEE 5 offers a view that conforms to that of 
several others interviewed, that:  
And if EFCC arrest somebody or is investigating somebody, we know 
that our readers will be interested to know about it. So we follow EFCC 
or ICPC, or if NEITI discovered that Shell or NNPC or Chevron are not 
paying the right amount of money into the federation account. Our 
readers will be interested. So we follow it. Okay. But those 
institutions, they also know that they need media support for what 
they are doing because whatever work you are doing in service of the 
public you want the public to hear… Even the judiciary, they want 
public to hear about what they are doing because every public 
institution needs legitimacy from the public  
Indeed, INTVWEE 7, who has considerable experience of working at one of the 
anti-corruption agencies, suggested that newspapers generally “supported” 
their investigations of corruption, even against the will of their proprietors, 
some of whom are politicians or have close friends among them: 
In spite of the attempt to derail our effort as not genuine, as a witch 
hunt, it still went on successfully and the media especially the 
reporters understood and supported us, and the ownership on its part 
fought it seriously… We attacked the interest of Ibrahim Babangida, 
Atiku Abubakar, Tinubu64 and lots more. Luckily for us we succeeded 
                                                          
64 Babangida (Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida is a former military head of state (1985-1993) who is widely reputed 
to have liberalized corruption in Nigeria. Atiku Abubakar was Obasanjo’s Vice President (1999-2007) who is also 
widely reputed to have corruptly enriched himself. Bola Ahmed Tinubu is a former Governor of Lagos (1999-
2007) and a major politician and businessman in Nigeria.  
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and survived – because it was the media that supported us 
nonetheless. We observed that there are differences of opinion 
between the owners and the reporters. The reporters like what was 
happening. They agreed with it despite all the machinations.  Hence 
there is wall of difference between media proprietors in Nigeria and 
the reporters 
All these, in our view, indicate a high extent of watchdog journalism in 
highlighting issues of corruption in the press, even if most of the stories are by-
product of information subsidy. That reports of corruption gets to the press with 
such frequency and prominence reflects watchdog function on the part of the 
press. However, these newspapers’ reporters (at least those interviewed) 
appear to be keenly aware of the wider politics and power play in relation to 
anti-corruption, and of their place in it. Indeed, the suggestion by several of 
them, as noted above, that independent sources of corruption are mostly 
aggrieved persons who may have hidden motives is itself an indication of this 
awareness. Secondly, they appear equally aware of the politics of the CIAs from 
whom they source majority of their corruption stories. They appear mindful of 
the publicity needs of agencies or committees investigating cases of corruption 
and the possibility that some of the motives of these agencies may go beyond 
anti-corruption per se. INTVWEE 10, who claims several years’ experience of 
reporting an anti-corruption agency beat, says that:     
Of course. Every agency or parastatal of government would want to 
give the impression that they are working… And these are agencies 
that are funded by the budget… So sometimes they would want to use 
the media to justify either the budgets that were allocated to them or 
in order for them to get more funding. That is why in most interviews, 
they always talk of poor funding as their major challenge… They also 
try to do their own public relations to launder their image where 
things are not going well 
But INTVWEE 22 says simply that “they have their own spokespersons and then 
for most of them it is what they want you to know. Even when they are 
compromised, they will not want to tell you that”. Moreover, reporters appear 
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to approach these agencies with suspicion, given that corruption is widespread 
everywhere in the country. In response to these, reporters appear to exercise 
discretion and monitoring in their coverage of stories from the CIAs at varying 
moments of the reporting process. For example, a senior investigative reporter, 
INTVWEE 2, observes that EFCC for example, gives press releases to them about 
who the agency is investigating, arresting or prosecuting, but that “they don’t 
give you details, except when you meet some of their lawyers, some of who can 
give you insights sometimes”. INTVWEE 23 cited earlier above suggests that he 
did not use the name of the bank in the headline as provided by in the EFCC 
release copy not only to protect the bank, but also because, some of the press 
releases are short on details and that:  
don’t forget that some of these anti-corruption agencies are also 
corrupt. There is corruption even in the anti-corruption agencies. So 
at times when they make noise about an issue it is because they are 
trying to gain cheap media whatever. So at times you the media guy 
you have to be careful that you are not being used 
The above view is supported by several respondents. But in addition to 
exercising journalistic discretion on what stories are covered from the CIAs or 
how, newspapers also tend to play a monitoring role on these agencies, on the 
understanding that they too, like the media and government, may not be free 
from corruption. For example, a senior editor, INTVWEE 9, notes that “so the 
moment the EFCC begins investigating a person, it gets into the media and gets 
wide coverage. And it is the same thing with the national assembly. Even 
sometimes when the national assembly is trying to play funny, the glare of the 
media makes them act otherwise”. Four other reporters make similar 
observations. One of them, INTVWEE 10, with experience of reporting anti-
corruption agency beat earlier above, observes that reporters sometimes obtain 
the same petitions submitted to the agency and conduct their own independent 
investigations, because “sometimes their investigations die but because you are 
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also on the case, you now begin to hammer on the issue and it now becomes a 
matter in the public domain so that they are also put on their toes”. This view 
was supported by four other respondents some of whom, like INTVWEE 22, 
above claims that some corruption scandals in fact originate from the 
newspapers, which are then followed up by the anti-corruption agencies.  As he 
claims:  
But sometimes, you also find out that some issues are raised by the 
media and then taken up by these other agencies… For example, if 
there is a collapse of bridge, the media can say this bridge collapsed, 
we find out it was because it was a shoddy job that was done, why it 
was a shoddy job, how much was budgeted, the media might not be 
able to get that. These other government establishments would be 
able to get such facts. That’s why it is as if the media could start some 
of these things and these agencies could take over, and then the 
media will help them to project it to the public light.  
In conclusion, overall reporting of corruption to the extent our quantitative 
analysis reveals, together with journalistic discretion and monitoring of the 
agencies mandated to investigate corruption are indications of what we refer 




Chapter Six: Data II: Investigative Journalism in the Nigeria press 
 
6.1 Introduction:  
Research questions 2, 3 and 4 (RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4) aim to determine how 
Nigerian journalists understand investigative reporting and to what extent they 
have the autonomy to do it; how much of it is reflected in investigative reporting 
of corruption as published in the sampled newspapers; and to what extent has 
the freedom of information impacted its practice in the country. In this sense, 
the questions assume a link between conception, practice and institutional 
framework of investigative reporting. Furthermore, the questions are part of the 
central research objective of understanding how and to what extent corruption 
is reported in the Nigerian press, and what specific role, if any, independent 
investigative journalism plays in that reportage. In this chapter, I present 
findings from both content analysis and ethnographic data to address these 
questions. Briefly, I find that in contrast to South American journalists, for 
example, Nigerian journalists understand investigative reporting in precisely the 
same ways as their Anglo-American counterparts. But the operational structure 
and organization of investigative reporting in Nigerian newspapers is almost 
non-existent, or informal at best. In addition, journalists believe they have 
significant latitude from their editorial superiors and proprietors. However, 
independent journalistic investigation of corruption as expressed in published 
news reports is quite small, at barely 5% of overall coverage of corruption in the 
sampled newspapers. I discuss these findings and their implications in the next 
chapter.    
In a survey of journalists in 33 countries, Weaver and Willnat (2012: 2) identify 
a typology of six role perceptions that journalists in different countries are 
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assumed to exhibit to varying degrees. These include ‘reporting the news 
quickly’, ‘reporting objectively’, ‘providing analysis of events’, ‘watchdog role’, 
‘providing access for the public’ and ‘providing entertainment’ (Weaver and 
Willnat, 2012: 536). In other words, journalists in different countries understand 
themselves to be performing one or more of these roles in their everyday 
journalistic activities and practices, but some more than others. Hanitzsch et al 
(2011) find four journalistic role perceptions in 18 countries, namely ‘populist 
disseminators’, ‘detached watchdogs’, ‘critical change agent’, and ‘opportunist 
facilitator’ (see also, Hanitzsch, 2011; 2007a; 2006; Hanitzsch and Mellado, 
2011). These models of journalism culture across the world have in turn inspired 
several national case studies (Hanusch, 2008; Herscovitz, 2004; (Mellado, 2012; 
Ireri, 2016) as well as for non-western countries (Hanitzsch and Vos, 2016) and 
transnational journalism (Hellmueller, 2017). Other researchers investigate 
connections between role conceptions and news content (Mellado et al, 2016; 
Lee et al, 2016; Mellado, 2015; Pihl-Thingvad, 2015; Mellado and van Dalen, 
2014; Tandoc et al, 2013; Willnat et al, 2013; Strӧmbӓck et al, 2012; van Dalen 
et al, 2012; Josephi, 2005; Donsbach, 2004; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). For 
example, Shoemaker and Reese (1996: 103) hold that the assumptions 
journalists have about what they do influence editorial decisions and therefore 
news content. Also, Mellado and van Dalen (2014: 863) observe that role 
conception implies a corresponding role performance or enactment, expressed 
in newsroom decisions or news contents, particularly in countries where, in their 
words, “the Western model of professional journalism” proves difficult. Van 
Dalen et al (2012) combine a survey of 425 journalists in 4 European countries 
and the U.S with a content analysis of 1,035 newspaper articles of political 
coverage in these countries. They find that journalistic role conceptions are 
reflected in the reporting styles of political news in these countries, and that 
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these varies more between countries than within them (ibid: 903). Mellado 
(2015) constructs a typology of reporting styles that fit certain role perceptions 
based on some indicators such as the extent of journalistic voice in the story, 
power relations, and appeal to audience. In this typology, investigative reporting 
as one of six story forms that enact the watchdog function (others are 
questioning, critiques, denouncing, conflict, coverage of trials and external 
research) (ibid: 602). Yet, not much research has been done about the role 
conceptions of investigative reporters as a specific group (Lanosga et al, 2017: 
266), although they are known to emphasise roles like helping people, 
influencing politics and adversarialism towards politics and business (ibid: 283). 
Collectively however, these studies illustrate the significance of professional 
norms to understanding journalistic processes and practices, as well as how 
country specific social and political contexts may influence both these norms 
and the practices they supposedly engender.  
Similar research on Nigerian journalists does not yet exist in the literature. 
However, in Kenya and Uganda, journalists rate ‘the watchdog role’ lower than 
roles as ‘disseminator’ and ‘advocate for social change’ (Ireri, 2016; Mwesige, 
2004). Nevertheless, as noted in chapter one, the watchdog role is said to rank 
highly in the Nigerian newspaper press, although not so highly in the broadcast 
sector (Oso, 2013). Secondly, how journalists understand and define 
investigative reporting can be influenced by perception of their roles in relation 
to society and government (Waisbord, 2000: xvi-xvii). Against the background of 
this literature, I examine how the journalists and editors interviewed in this 
research understand and define investigative journalism and its connections to 




6.2: Conception of investigative reporting in the Nigerian press:  
In general, Nigerian journalists interviewed for this research understand and 
describe investigative reporting in terms of independent journalistic initiative, 
research led procedures for reporting, as well as its impact on corruption and 
good governance in Nigeria. Furthermore, they suggest that investigative 
reporting requires a ‘higher’ moral and ethical commitment of the reporter and 
distinguish it from other forms of reporting practices. For example, while 
speaking on the kinds of journalism he favours for his paper, a senior editor, 
INTVWEE 9, says that he detests “press release journalism” and laments that 
journalists no longer care about “pounding the street investigating, establishing 
the facts”. This tendency to contrast investigative reporting to other journalistic 
practices is evident in the views of four other respondents, another of whom, a 
business reporter (INTVWEE 14), provides a detailed definition that:  
First of all, it is very in-depth. Then an investigative story is never PR, 
you are going to see hard facts. One thing that is a major difference is 
the fact that investigative journalism is all about saying something 
that somebody doesn’t want the public to know while a routine story 
is saying something that person is expecting you to say, that is just the 
difference  
This description explicitly contrasts investigative reporting to public relations, by 
stressing that the information sought and published is one that others would 
like to hide, a view taken by nearly all the respondents. For example, a third 
reporter (INTVWEE 12) expresses the same idea that: “investigation is part of 
journalism and they say whatever I don’t want to give you; that is what you ask 
for”. A fourth respondent, a senior editor (INTVWEE 17) shares this view by 
observing that “you have to look for something that somebody has hidden. You 
are looking for something that public officers or business barons and scammers 
would not like you to see… It’s like research, normal research”. These examples 
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point to the independent initiative of the reporter in initiating the investigative 
story, a key dimension of how investigative reporting is conceived in the 
literature. Terms like ‘research’, ‘digging’, and ‘uncovering’ of information were 
used to describe this independent initiative of the journalist, or the reporting 
methods associated with investigative stories. For example, one respondent 
(INTVWEE 27), says that “if you are an investigative reporter, the number one 
thing is that, you have to have that nose for information, to see what other 
people may see and will gloss over it, you start reading meaning to it”. Yet 
another, referring to government officials says that ‘’people try to cover things 
up. And it is our job as investigative journalists to uncover what they try to cover 
up”. Moreover, as the quote above shows, the respondents also understand 
investigative reporting in terms of the impact it is assumed to have on society, 
or more specifically on corruption in Nigeria. As a political reporter at one of the 
publications explains, “what is required is to dig in to a corruption case that can 
nail someone”. Finally, respondents also approach investigative reporting in 
terms of the resources it requires. As INTVWEE 17 puts it: “you know, 
investigative journalism requires training. To develop the capacity to investigate 
stories and follow-up… So thorough investigation requires money, requires skills 
and requires character of the journalists”. This was a view shared by several 
respondents who emphasise time, money, expertise and moral commitment of 
the reporter.  
But the description and understanding of investigative reporting by Nigerian 
journalists above reflects definitions of it in the literature. That is, a form of 
reporting that is different from or superior to other kinds of journalism in terms 
of journalistic initiative, objective method of fact finding, a higher moral, ethical 
and resource commitment of the reporter or media organization, and impact on 
power and society (Lanosga, 2015a: 370; Starkman, 2014: 7-10; Coronel, 2010: 
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113; Stetka and Ӧrnebring, 2013: 415; Feldstein, 2007: 500-501; Waisbord, 
2000: xv; Blevens, 1997: 258; Aucoin, 1995b: 430). For example, Coronel (2013: 
112) holds that investigative reporting is the “pinnacle” of journalism, requiring 
“highest order skills and noblest principles” whose function is to hold 
institutions of power to account for effecting desired changes in society. Ettema 
and Glasser (2007: 491) reason that investigative reporting is journalism’s most 
“politically vigorous and methodologically rigorous’’ form of practice. Similarly, 
Stetka and Ӧrnebring (2013: 415) suggest four ‘key elements’, namely, 
‘systematic, often long-term nature of investigative work’, that reporting 
uncovers ‘wrongdoings of some type, legal or otherwise’ made by ‘persons in 
positions of power’, and thus, a reporting which requires more time and 
resource commitment. Moreover, Blevens (1997: 257-258) contends that a 
combination of three criteria is the basis for distinguishing investigative 
reporting from other kinds of journalism. These, he claims, include independent 
journalistic initiative, secrecy of the information sought and impact to the public. 
Thus, he notes that these criteria were the basis for which U.S investigative 
reporters considered Watergate (Washington Post) as a piece of investigative 
reporting, but the Pentagon Papers (New York Times) as not, since the former 
involved independent discovery by journalists in a way the latter did not. More 
than half of the respondents in this research make a similar distinction that 
stories of corruption that reach the press through activities of anti-corruption 
agencies or parliamentary investigations cannot be considered investigative 
reporting65. In this sense, Nigerian journalists’ understanding of investigative 
                                                          
65 For example, a managing editor at Daily Trust says: “That is not investigative. The element of exclusivity has 
to be there. EFCC has done all its investigation and is ready to arraign somebody over certain criminal offences. 
It will tell several newspapers or media organization. So the story is not related to you alone and so that is not 
an investigative story. The story is a routine story because the investigation has already been done by the 
authority and not by the media. Unless if the information divulged one person alone and then it is not an 
investigative story but an exclusive story. An investigative story must be done by the journalist”. However, 
another Daily Trust investigative reporter and former EFCC correspondent clarifies further that: Now you as a 
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reporting, as described above, reflect those of their US counterparts. But Stetka 
and Ӧrnebring (2013: :415) and Waisbord (2000: xix) observe that definitions of 
investigative reporting in the political communication literature are not 
universal because they have been influenced by assumptions of U.S investigative 
reporters. Indeed, Waisbord (2000: xv-xix) finds that Latin American journalists 
see ‘investigation’ in all reporting, not just that which requires specific methods 
or procedures. Furthermore, he suggests that the ‘independent initiative’ of the 
reporter will be limited in social and political systems where robust official data 
are lacking; as would be ‘impact’ in contexts where political apathy is 
entrenched precisely because news of official corruption is commonplace. 
Consequently, he concludes that although “the U.S model of investigative 
journalism is extremely influential, it is not the only possible paradigm” (ibid: 
xix). Waisbord is here suggesting that investigative journalism, and indeed 
journalism generally, can be context specific in both ideals and practice. For 
example, investigative reporters in the U.S are “much more likely to justify’’ 
controversial reporting practices in investigative journalism like using official or 
personal documents without permission, impersonation, hidden recording 
technology and so on (Lanosga et al, 2017: 281). But investigative reporters in 
Latin America and Caribbean countries overwhelmingly reject such practices 
(Joyce et al, 2017: 470). Moreover, Tong (2012: 14-17) has observed that unlike 
in Western societies where investigative journalism is rooted in liberal 
democratic philosophy, in China, it has been forged by the historical traditions 
of Confucian ideology, liberalism in late Qing dynasty and the more recent 
                                                          
journalist, if for instance somebody comes to submit a petition to the EFCC and they collect, that one is not 
investigative journalism. But if you go beyond to now get a copy of the petition and now go and do your own 
investigation independent of what the EFCC is doing; then you are now doing your investigation while they are 
doing their own. Sometimes their investigations die but because you are also on the case, you now begin to 
hammer on the issue and it now becomes a matter in the public domain so that they are also put on their toes. 
There is also the tendency for them too to be also corrupt”. These further indicate the extent of correlation 
between how journalists in Nigeria and definitions of it in political communication literature.   
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statism of Marxist-Communist era. The point then is that investigative 
journalism is understood from different perspectives and practiced differently 
across regions and countries, depending on the specificities of history, culture 
and social and political systems.  
But it is not an entirely surprising finding that Nigerian journalists understand 
investigative reporting in similar ways as their Anglo-American counterparts. As 
we noted in chapter one, liberal journalism values have been a part of the 
Nigerian press since its inception (Oso, 2013: 17). First, Nigeria’s media, like the 
political system itself, is a part of the general heritage of British colonialism, in 
which, as Hatchen (1971: 148-149) argues, the ideals of press freedom and 
watchdog were carried over from the Empire to its colonies (in Shaw, 2009: 495). 
Furthermore, Nigeria is said to have a political and agitational press, in both tone 
and reportage (Olukotun, 2000: 33; Agbaje, 1993: 459). Omu (1978) notes that 
by the 1880s, there were already 12 newspapers in Lagos alone, some three 
decades before the Nigerian state itself was formed in 1914. Furthermore, Omu 
documents the long march to press freedom in Nigeria from this period to the 
1940s by which time Nigerian newspapers had evolved into a foremost political 
organ for a variety of objectives, from anti-colonialism and political education to 
the formation of African identity. Throughout this period, newspaper owners 
and editors, mostly the same persons, had recursively drawn on the principles 
and legal statutes concerning press freedom in Britain itself to argue against 
colonial legal and administrative measures to curtail press freedom in the 
colony. Moreover, researchers have also noted that this liberal watchdog norm 
in Nigerian journalism is, in practice, directed at exposing corruption and 
promoting democracy and good governance in the country.  As one observer put 
it, “the Nigerian press claims that it is a watchdog whose fundamental 
responsibilities include safeguarding public rights against governmental 
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encroachment as well as exposing corruption, maladministration, graft, 
embezzlement, and other vices endemic within the Nigerian ruling class” 
(Ogbondah, 1991: 110).  Thus, occupational socialization, identified as a means 
through which journalistic role conceptions are passed on through generations 
of journalists within and across countries (van Dalen et al, 2012: 903), may here 
account for how most of the respondents in this research understand 
investigative reporting similarly to their Anglo-American counterparts. Secondly, 
education and on the job training may have also played a part. For example, 
research by Maikaba (2011) shows that journalism education and research in 
Nigeria has been influenced by U.S ‘Mass Communication’ and the British 
‘Cultural Studies’ models, with emphasis on liberal watchdog theory, journalism 
writing skills and quantitative research techniques. At least 8 of the respondents 
had studied ‘mass communication’ at university or HND levels in Nigeria, with 
two proceeding to postgraduate degrees in the U.S (Wisconsin) and South Africa 
(Rhodes) respectively. Additionally, nearly all the respondents reported that 
they have undergone some training or journalism related programmes or events 
in the U.S, Europe or elsewhere66. Therefore, such networking opportunities 
could also explain the respondents’ views of investigative reporting as described 
above. In other words, the findings under discussion here are consistent with a 
history and occupational socialization in liberal values of investigative journalism 
in Nigerian press. But this raises the question as to what extent they practice it, 
and of individual and organization dynamics for its practice.  
 
 
                                                          
66 For example, a senior investigative reporter at Daily Trust said he had just returned from an international 
conference on investigative journalism in Lillehammer, Norway. Another said he was at such a conference in 
Kenya earlier in the year. Similarly, a business reporter at The Punch said “if you are a good reporter, the 
company will sponsor you to at least one international conference in a year”.  
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6.3 Operational framework for investigative reporting in the Nigerian press:  
News organizations require committing substantial resources, in manpower, 
money and time for investigative reporting (Tong and Sparks, 2009: 340). Also, 
investigative stories do not easily fit into the bureaucratic organization of 
everyday news work. For example, Hansen (1991: 474) finds that only about four 
in ten of Pulitzer winning investigative stories rely on official sources, as 
compared to eight in ten for regular news stories. This implies the ‘research’ or 
‘digging’ element of investigative stories, which in turn make such stories more 
expensive in time and money. Similarly, the system of evaluation in which 
journalistic performance is measured by the number of stories published per 
week is not suitable for investigative reporting, since it is based on quantity, 
rather than ‘quality’ (Mellado; 2015: 598; Tong and Sparks, 2009: 340). Lanosga 
and Houston (2016: 11) find that nearly half of 861 investigative reporters they 
surveyed reported having a dedicated investigative unit at their organizations, 
even if some investigative reporters are not necessarily assigned to it. Thus, 
these researchers suggest that the operational organization of investigative 
reporting tends to be specific in media organizations in terms of staffing, 
budgeting, remuneration, reporting tasks, performance evaluation and so on.   
Only one of the four publications in this study (Daily Trust) appears to have a 
dedicated investigative unit in their newsroom. Two respondents, one each at 
The Punch and Thisday are unequivocal that they do not have such a unit in their 
newsrooms. Two respondents at The Guardian claim they do have a “new” 
investigative desk. My own observation does not bear this out however. But a 
third reporter in the same paper explains:  
The Guardian does not have a specific investigating desk. What we 
have is a special reporting desk. And because of that, some of us have 
actually approached the editor that let’s have an investigative desk, 
so that anybody who is coming there has an understanding of what 
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they are going to do: investigation. And for me, that is the kind of desk 
that will actually drive a newspaper in our kind of society, where 
people are not transparent 
In the three publications however, some respondents suggest that the lack of a 
permanent desk, specific to investigative reporting does not preclude practice. 
In their view, variously, any reporter can engage in investigative reporting, 
regardless of their beat. For example, INTVWEE 23 at The Punch observes that:  
No. We don’t have an investigative desk yet. But what we do is that 
we have a module in-house that requires that every desk does good 
investigative reports, and there are people in the newsroom that have 
been identified as being good at doing investigative reports. They 
have distinguished themselves in that area, but we don’t have an 
investigative desk and I am not sure we’ll have it in the nearest future. 
Similarly, responding to this question, INTVWEE 27 at Thisday noted that: 
Well, no. Thisday divides places into beats and you are supposed to 
be on top of your beat. So, if there are things to investigate in your 
beat, you can. But it doesn’t stop another person who has sources or 
wherewithal to get in and do investigation from doing that. But I don’t 
think we have an investigative desk specifically. 
These respondents are suggesting that while Nigerian newspapers generally do 
not have a specific unit for investigative reporting, they do not think that this by 
itself is a hindrance for doing investigative stories, a claim suggested by several 
others. The investigative unit at Daily Trust comprises four reporters, one of 
them designated as ‘head of investigations’. These reporters do mainly 
investigative stories and are not attached to any other beats or pages in the 
newspaper, but their stories are given prominence on the front pages. While 
speaking about this desk and the investigative stories they do, a senior editor at 
the paper noted that “sometimes depending on the strength of the story, what 
we do is we either lead or make it second just to give it more prominence or 
more air to breath”. However, reporters in other beats within the same paper 
also claim to be doing investigative stories. Indeed, one business reporter claims 
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that he was employed as an ‘investigative reporter’ from day-one, a claim 
confirmed by several others. For example, a respondent at the paper clarified 
that, “we have a desk that we call the investigative desk and we have four staff 
who do it… When you talk about investigative story, it is not limited to these 
four members”. Thus, although Daily Trust differs in having a specific 
investigative desk, it is yet like the other publications in the general operation of 
investigative reporting. Reporters are required to combine investigative 
reporting with other reporting tasks they have, regardless of the dedicated staff. 
Even then, the investigative desk at Daily Trust itself may not be functional. I 
observed that there does not seem to be any significant coordination or 
collaboration between the four investigative reporters. I did not witness any 
meetings specifically by the unit. All answer directly to the news editor, editor-
in-chief or his deputy rather than to the designated head of the desk. Indeed, 
one interviewee at the paper remarks that: 
I know for example, here in Daily Trust we set up what we call an 
investigative journalism desk. Just for that. But even that arrangement 
has its weaknesses. One of the weaknesses is that we assume that 
people on the investigation desk can go wherever we get a sniff of 
scandal and investigate that. In practice things don’t work like that. If 
as a reporter you are not accredited to a particular institution you may 
not be able to have much access to it. For example, if I sent you to 
Ministry of Defense, you may not be able to enter, or to Army 
Headquarters, or to police 
This indicates some difficulties inherent in such arrangements. In sum, the 
foregoing suggests a ‘roving’ mode of operation: an investigative reporter who 
may or may not be assigned to a specific investigative desk, and who sometimes 
combines investigative reporting with regular news reporting.  
In addition, I find that in general newsroom support for investigative reporting 
is ambiguous. First, the newspapers do not appear to invest much resources, 
particularly in manpower and money, at least, not specifically to investigative 
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reporting. INTVWEE 18 at The Guardian presents a general outlook of the media 
system on this, that: “the issue of resource allocation is a very key area. It’s not 
always there. And that is why our journalism practice is the way it is. The main 
media in Nigeria, they make money. But the amount they invest in stories, in 
content generation, is another issue. They don’t invest in it so much”. This 
general position may not fully reflect the specific circumstances of individual 
newspapers, given the political economic conditions of the country. However, it 
is supported by the observation that none of the four publications studied 
maintains a specific budget for investigative reporting other than the general 
budget for editorial activities. Furthermore, investigative reporters earn just the 
same salaries as other reporters, although they (and other journalists too) can 
benefit from other kinds of incentives that exist in the newspapers such as 
weekly or monthly awards for stories published. The same applies for medical 
or other insurance cover. Another reporter at the same paper says that 
“resources needed to do a job at a particular time will be made available. It is 
not as if we earmark specific amounts to the desk for investigations. But within 
the budget for operations in the year, the editor can use to send for special 
investigations that we know can be of value to the newspaper”. This view is 
corroborated by yet another reporter at Daily Trust who says that “Yes. We have 
a budget, not specifically for investigative reporting, but for editorial expenses. 
There is a budget for editorial expenses. So, if I’m doing an investigative story or 
if I’m doing a feature story and I need to send people out, the money will be 
taken from that budget”. The foregoing suggests further that investigative 
reporting in these newspapers is operationally part of general news reporting, 
rather than as a distinct activity within the newspapers’ overall editorial 
operations. It is not allocated separate resources nor fully coordinated under a 
specific unit. Most investigative reporters combine regular news reporting along 
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with doing investigative stories. Consequently, they are not treated differently 
in terms of pay or assessed by different indicators of performance. One 
implication of this is that investigative reporters tend to lack sufficient time to 
conduct investigative stories, particularly because their performance is not 
evaluated separately as two investigative reporters at two of the publications 
lamented. Yet, as we shall see shortly, time and different standards of 
performance evaluation are a crucial element of investigative reporting practice 
and a significant aspect of its institutionalization in media organizations.  
The point to note here is that if the principles of watchdog journalism have long 
been entrenched in Nigerian political journalism, they have not been fully 
structured into the operational organization of newspapers in the country. In 
short, investigative journalism is not operationally separated from other 
newsroom activities, even for the fourth publication which does have an 
investigative desk. According to Tong and Sparks (2009: 340-342), when 
investigative reporting first emerged in China in the early 1990s, following 
liberalization of the media market, it was predominantly an individualized 
practice. Individual journalists took the initiative and bore the costs and the risks 
by themselves, without much input from their media organizations. As the 
practice became popular with audiences however, newsrooms took over these 
responsibilities and risks: dedicated desks and special budgets for investigative 
reporting, higher pay and legal cover for investigative reporters, and different 
standards for performance evaluation. Such newsroom support for investigative 
reporting, they argue, led to its ‘institutionalization’ and ‘professionalization’. 
Consequently, investigative reporting became the darling of Chinese journalism, 
and investigative reporters gained a higher status and prestige among their 
peers on other beats. Similarly, Doig (1992: 46) notes that at its peak in the 
1970s, Sunday Times investigative unit, Insight enjoyed “plenty of time, large 
194 
 
budgets and a strongly supportive editorial approach”. All these suggest that 
certain structural and operational changes are required within newsrooms to 
institutionalize investigative reporting everywhere. But as the data above 
shows, such structural changes have yet to take hold in Nigerian journalism, 
despite claims of a liberal watchdog. In sum, then, one way to conceptualize 
investigative reporting in Nigerian newspapers is to say that the practice is not 
yet institutionalized or professionalized, despite the underlying values of 
watchdog against corruption or adversarial relations to the state. This then leads 
us to a consideration of other aspects of the operational mechanism for 
investigative reporting, namely, journalistic autonomy.  
6.4 Journalism autonomy and investigative reporting in the Nigerian press:  
Weaver et al (2007: 70) understand professional autonomy as the “latitude that 
a practitioner has in carrying out his or her occupational duties” (cited in Reich 
and Hanitzsch, 2013: 135). Drawing from this, McDevitt (2003: 156) defines 
journalistic autonomy as the principle that ensures the press and journalists 
fulfill their “duty of informing the citizenry, free from partisan bias and other 
corrupting influences”. Moreover, McDevitt’s ‘corrupting influences’ imply a 
wide range of factors and forces which can affect the editorial decisions of 
individual journalists, editors and media organizations, and consequently their 
practices as expressed in news content. Thus, Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011) and 
Reich and Hanitzsch (2013) comb the vast literature on journalistic autonomy 
and identify six possible influences on journalistic autonomy: political, 
economic, organizational, procedural, professional and reference group 
influences. Political influences emphasize autonomy from politics and the state 
and thus deal with questions of press freedom and censorship, legal 
environment, as well as the relationships between journalists and various 
individual or institutional political actors in the production of news. Economic 
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influences emphasize the profit-making concerns of advertisers and media 
owners. Organizational influences issue from the hierarchical organization of the 
media comprising management and editorial decisions that can yet influence 
what journalists do or don’t do. Procedural influences refer to operational 
constraints arising from organizational routines, such as time and space, rather 
than straightforward decisions of senior editors and managers. Professional 
influences could come from the policies and rules of the profession itself, for 
example, journalistic codes of conduct by national unions of journalists 
everywhere. In addition, reference groups such as peers, colleagues, friends and 
family could also influence news reporting and by implication news content 
(ibid). For Sjøvaag (2013: 160) however, journalistic autonomy is an inherent 
aspect of the normative model of journalism that can be manifested at every 
level of journalistic practice, from institutional dynamics to individual decisions. 
For investigative reporting, autonomy implies first the independent initiative to 
investigate or pursue a story, and then decisions investigative reporters must 
make in dealing with sources. Story initiative is significant because as Kathleen 
Hansen (1991: 474) notes, investigative stories frequently involve independent 
sources rather than official ones. Thus, the very fact of seeking out non-official 
sources is itself a demonstration of autonomy. Yet, such sources sometimes may 
have their own motives for giving tip-offs or helping initiate investigations, and 
thus, journalists also require dealing independently with sources too. Also, 
reporters need to demonstrate independence from the public officials and 
institutions being investigated, many of whom would have more than one 
reason to kill the story if they could. Moreover, autonomy, or lack of it, can be 
manifested in the relationship between reporters and their senior editors or 
proprietors, since media are themselves bureaucratically organized, and as 
Lanosga and Houston (2016: 9) find, most investigative reporters are paid 
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employees. The foregoing therefore provides a general context for examining 
how the reporters in this research view their autonomy for investigative 
reporting in four key dimensions: individual journalist, proprietor influence, 
advertiser influence and public officials. The first two of these are examined 
here, while the others form part of the discussions about press freedom and 
political economy of the press in the next chapter.  
(a) Individual Journalistic Initiative:  
Findings here show that investigative stories are initiated by editors, tip-offs 
from whistle blowers as well as through personal observations or through 
sources cultivated over the years67. For example, INTVWEE 22 observed that: 
Sometimes it starts from complaints, either individual complaints or 
public complaints. Sometimes, somebody might walk in, somebody 
who is hurt, somebody who is aggrieved will explain to you this is what 
happened, for example, I can’t get justice, knowing fully well that if 
you come in, you could make a change. You could start from there. 
And then, some other times, you could be passing by, you get to know 
about something happening, directly or indirectly through somebody 
or through reports and you follow up and you get to find out that it is 
much deeper than on the surface. And then you dig deeper. And you 
find out a lot of things. Especially for public goods 
The editor’s comment here indicates the range of possibilities from which an 
investigative report might be initiated, from citizens’ tip-offs68 to personal 
observations. It also indicates the various stages and processes by which some 
form of professional autonomy of the journalist or editor might be exercised. 
                                                          
67 For example, The Guardian investigative reporter who investigated the conditions of internally displaced 
persons arising from the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East said that “it was the editor’s idea. The editor 
called me up and said he wanted me to go to the north east to go and check what is actually happening there. 
It was an open offer, waiting for me to take it up. So I agreed to go”. 
68 A Daily Trust investigative reporter who was investigating a case of corruption at the Abuja Geographical 
Information Systems told me the story started through tip-off he got from a staff at the agency who supplied 
him with documents of contracts, and of the companies, that were awarded to circumvent due process. He 
claimed to have investigated the tip off by among other things verifying from the Cooperate Affairs Commission 
that the some of the companies were fake or not duly registered. The story was subsequently published on 8 
October 2015 while I was still there doing my newsroom observations. 
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Furthermore, the comment also distinguishes sources of investigative reporting 
from those of beat reporting, by not including official channels such as public 
releases or press conferences. This is a significant demonstration of autonomy 
and initiative since news from official or formal sources such as government 
offices generally tend to be promotional, even where the material is in the public 
interest. Third, it indicates the research element of ‘dig deeper’ that transforms 
story initiatives into investigations and subsequently published news stories. But 
this process itself requires exerting journalistic autonomy by not taking tip-off 
at its face-value, and thus demonstrating the journalist’s independence even 
from her own sources. The comment above is suggestive of the views of several 
other respondents on how they initiate investigative stories. For example, 
INTVWEE 2 claims that he gets his story ideas by following news in other media 
or by observing events in the streets, from which he then investigates further. 
This reporter then recounted two examples of previous investigative reports he 
did both of which sprang from personal observations or following other media. 
In one example, the reporter investigated claims by the federal government that 
it was using debt relief monies to build primary healthcare centers in many 
states across the country to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets. 
But according to the reporter, his investigations gainsay the claims: the primary 
healthcare centers did not exist. This again demonstrates that journalists use 
their own initiative in generating stories and are free to do so, a crucial aspect 
of any notion of journalistic autonomy.  
(b) Organizational and Proprietor Influence: 
Beyond autonomy in initiating stories and in dealing with sources however, 
majority of the respondents claim that they do not face any interference from 
their editors or publishers from investigating any case of possible or actual 
corruption. INTVWEE 23 says that his Managing Director does not interfere with 
198 
 
reporters’ investigations, even if officials or companies being investigated had 
got in touch with him. As he put it:  
I will give you an example. There was a time a telecoms company was 
fined by the NCC. The spokesperson of the company called and said 
please, don’t use this story. I told him I don’t have the power to kill a 
story in The Punch. He called my editor, but she too doesn’t have the 
power... And they made the mistake of reaching out to the MD of the 
company. And the MD didn’t say anything until the following morning 
the story came out. We used the story. If we had not done so, the MD 
would have said so that is how we have been killing stories. And the 
company is one our biggest advertisers. But we still run the story. 
First, the statements by these two respondents provide a general illustration of 
the relationships between investigative reporters and politicians or advertisers 
which we discuss shortly. Secondly, the statements are indicative of what 
Sjøvaag (2013) denotes as the negative aspect of journalism autonomy. That is, 
in this case, the idea that investigative reporters should be free from 
interference from senior editors, owners of their media, or other powerful 
individuals or institutions. Virtually all the reporters interviewed cited instances 
in which their proprietors or editors stood by them to get a story in the press. 
But there is also a positive aspect of journalistic autonomy in which respondents 
claim that proprietors encourage, even actively promote investigative reporting 
in the newsroom. For investigative reporting, this positive aspect of autonomy, 
I suggest, can be demonstrated in several ways, for example, by way of resource 
allocation and other incentives to investigative reporters, and, as Tong (2012) 
claims of investigative journalism in China, by protecting individual journalists 
from any direct political fallout of their investigative reports. Three senior 
editors from two of the publications under study report that they positively 
encourage their reporters to do investigative reporting, to “pound the streets 
investigating”, in the words of one of them. According to him,  
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We have incentive for the journalists every week. Even today by 4 
O’clock we have a meeting where we review all the papers for the last 
one week. We give story of the week. A lot of the time you will be 
pleased to note that it is investigative stories that win the prize for 
story of the week. And then we have reporter of the month, feature 
of the month, business story of the month, picture, cartoon, all the 
different aspects of the paper, they get rewarded. They get monetary 
reward, you get a letter also, and at a point you even get a book 
related to whatever you are covering whether investigative or 
whatever. 
This senior editor is alluding to the incentives his paper supposedly gives to 
investigative reporting, but it also shows that the incentive structure for 
investigative reporting, too, is subsumed as part of the general newsroom 
organization, not separately as would be expected in a more standardized 
context for the practice of investigative reporting. For example, in their survey 
of 861 US self-declared investigative reporters, Lanosga and Houston (2016: 7) 
observed that investigative reporters have an income higher than the average 
non-investigative reporter, indicating a higher incentive for investigative 
reporting particularly. Similarly, INTVWEE 18 noted, at the time of our interview, 
that he had only recently been promoted to Features Editor, as reward for his 
investigative enterprise,69which, he claims, was meant to encourage others. 
Also, INTVWEE 2 noted that the weekend edition of the paper he edits depends 
on investigative reports. As he explains:  
For the Sunday newspaper, we are very unfortunate in the sense that 
newsmakers go to bed, they go to marriages and birthday parties etc. 
So on Saturdays you hardly find news breaking. So the only way we 
can survive is by doing investigative stories. When I say regularly, I 
                                                          
69 This was confirmed by the investigative reporter in question; the same reporter who had done reports on the 
conditions of internally displaced persons in the north east and who said that media owners do not invest much 
in “content generation”, as he put it.  
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always ensure that we do a story that is investigative at least once in 
a week 
Thus, these statements indicate that editors and senior managers tend to 
encourage investigative reporting in the newspapers under study, even if, as we 
observed above, the practice itself is not sufficiently institutionalized or 
professionalized within the organizations. Indeed, while some respondents 
were quick to point out that investigative journalism requires enormous 
resources, they were also quick to say that their organizations generally support 
and reward such reporting activities through prizes, conferences or promotions, 
etc. However, INTVWEE 27 believes that funding used to be available but is now 
‘tight’. He observes that:  
Most times, it has do with your relationship with your editor. Some 
editors will just say okay go ahead and they will assist you. Sometimes, 
you can apply for trips and build in one or two things and in that trip, 
it is for you to investigate. That was then but now it is very very rare 
to get such funding, probably because management has a lot of things 
in its hands, or probably they feel you should be able to use your own 
resources, or your contacts to get whatever you need. But I am sure, 
if you want to investigate something that is very big, maybe they will 
give you some support. 
This suggests further that funding investigative reporting may be an informal 
process, rather than institutionalized as part of the budgeting for editorial 
operations. Indeed, this ‘sporadic’ allocation of resources for investigative 
reporting itself indicates that it is not much of a full-time practice by journalists 
within the organizations, otherwise funding would rather be on a more 
permanent basis, much like salaries for example. So far, we find that Nigerian 
journalists understand investigative reporting as a research-led initiative of the 
reporter, the purpose of which is to check corruption and hold power 
accountable. Furthermore, although it is not sufficiently institutionalized within 
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media organizations, journalists have considerable individual and organizational 
latitude to practice it. These provide a background for examining how much 
investigative reporting newspapers do as expressed in investigative reports of 
corruption coded in the newspapers under study.  
6.5 Performance of investigative reporting in the Nigerian press: IMI data 
Table 6.1 below shows both the absolute and relative frequencies of corruption 
stories coded in each category according to attribution of sources and types of 
stories as previously explained. As the table shows, just 4.76% of corruption 
news coded in the sampled newspapers were independently reported by the 
four publications combined the research period. That is, while overall frontpage 
coverage of corruption is extensive in the newspapers, as we saw in chapter 
four, only a very small of fraction (4.76%) of that reportage is product of 
investigative journalism by the newspapers, as shown below. In terms of 
positioning, 39.06% were reported as lead stories, while the remaining 60.94% 
were not. Thus, the amount of lead stories in the IMI category is reasonably 
higher than the 30.08% for all corruption stories in the sample coded. Therefore, 
although these newspapers are less likely to report corruption independently, 
they are yet more likely to lead the news with their own investigative stories. 
 Table 6.1 Distribution of corruption stories by categories   
 
Categories (sources of corruption stories) Frequency of corruption stories % of corruption stories
Idependent Media Investigations (IMI) 64 4.76%
Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACA) 183 13.61%
National (and State) Assemblies (NA) 134 9.96%
Commissions Of Inquiry (COI) 99 7.36%
Foreign Media (FM) 15 1.12%
Diaspora/Online Media (DOM) 5 0.37%
OTHER 115 8.55%
Follow up Corruption Stories (FS) 383 28.48%
Narrative of Corruption Stories (NC) 347 25.80%
Total Corruption Stories (TCS) 1345 100.00%
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The finding above is supported by several journalists and editors interviewed in 
this research. For example, INTVWEE 27 observes that “investigative journalism 
in Nigeria has almost died”. Another reporter corroborated this, saying that “to 
be honest with you, I must say that we are still trying to scratch the surface of 
investigative journalism, not just in business but across all other sectors”. 
Indeed, for INTVWEE 17, investigative journalism in Nigeria is simply “a joke”. 
But another senior editor interviewed reflects that “However I am not making 
excuses. I know that we can do better than we are doing now because 
somethings can be done with patience and persistence… But really the Nigerian 
media now does little investigation and even less follow up”. This represents the 
general view of the respondents in relation to the amount of independent 
investigative reporting in the press, although INTVWEE 22 observed that 
sometimes newspapers’ investigations are often taken up by the state level 
authorities investigating corruption in the country. In other words, the amount 
of investigative reporting of corruption as observed in news content is 
consistent with the general view of the practitioners themselves. This reflects 
what, Hasty (2005b: 340) says of press and politics in Ghana, that journalists 
rhetorically trumpet their role as agents of ‘good governance’ through 
“exposure and critique of corruption”, within western models of liberal 
democracy, but their everyday practices can be very different in both intent and 
news content. For the Nigerian press, the implication here is clear: without 
corruption investigating agencies, there will be very little disclosure of 
corruption in the press. Conversely, the implication could be the other way 
around: there is little independent exposure of corruption by newspapers 
precisely because these agencies exist to do the job. In other words, the political 
culture of anti-corruption in the country, is the key element that accounts for 
exposure of corruption in the country, rather than investigative reporting.  
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(a) Annual trend of investigating reporting: 
Furthermore, coverage varies across the years. Figure 6.1 below shows a graphic 
representation of the amount and annual trends of independent coverage of 
corruption over the research period. First, unlike for overall coverage of 
corruption, there is no steady increase in investigative reports of corruption over 
the years. Instead, investigative reports of corruption stay much the same 
annually with only marginal increases or decreases from one year to the next, 
except between 2007 and 2008 which recorded 0% and 18.75% (the highest), 
respectively. Moreover, unlike in the overall distribution of corruption news 
which tends to be concentrated in a handful of ‘golden’ years of coverage, 
investigative stories of corruption are almost evenly distributed over the period. 
One implication of this is that for investigative stories, journalists depend on 
their own initiative and resources for news of corruption, rather than the supply 
of news from corruption investigating authorities. In this sense, both annual 
variation, and as we shall see, differences in coverage between the publications 
is to be expected. Indeed, this variation is itself a key indicator of investigative 
reporting: an independent report of corruption by a newspaper is unlikely to 










Figure 6.1 Investigative stories of corruption in the sampled newspapers  
 
(b) Freedom of Information and investigative reporting:  
Also, Freedom of Information Law appears to have little impact on investigative 
reporting of corruption, if any. The law was passed in May 201170 by then 
President Goodluck Jonathan, after twelve years of bickering between the 
federal legislature and the presidency on the one hand, and the media and civil 
society on the other (Ojebode, 2011: 268). Moreover, the law was specifically 
designed to further the fight against corruption with provisions that compel 
public officials to disclose information, while providing protections for whistle-
blowers “who can be allies for investigative journalists” (Ojebode, 2011: 278). 
Thus, I check the extent to which the new law may have had any impacts on 
investigative reporting of corruption by comparing annual trends of 
investigative stories before and after the law was passed. If the law impacted 
positively on journalists’ autonomy to seek and disclose information about 
corruption, we would expect a significant increase in the frequency of 
investigative reports in the months following the enactment of the law. But as 
the data here shows, in 2011, the very year the law came into force, investigative 
                                                          
70 This leaves only 18 months from when the FOI bill was passed into law to the end of the period covered by 
this research (June 2011-December 2012).  
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coverage dropped to 3.13% from 7.81% in the previous year. It rises to 12.50% 
in the following year, 2012 (see Figure 6.1 above). This would at first indicate 
that the law had a positive impact during its first year. However, when 
considered in absolute, rather than relative terms (see Table 6.2 above), there 
are only 3 additional investigative stories from 2010 (the year before law) and 
2012 (the year after the law). This marginal increase is not different from other 
increases between any three years throughout the period, for example, 
between 2001 and 2003. Indeed, the change from 2001 to 2003 is greater than 
from 2010 to 2012. Thus, the rise in investigative reports in the year following 
passage of the law is unlikely to have been cause by the law itself. Moreover, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, several respondents corroborated that the 
freedom of information law has not had much impact investigative reporting in 
the country. Indeed, the impression is that legal constraints on the press are not 
the problem.  
(c) Targets of investigative reporting:  
In addition, 59.38% of the investigative stories involved persons or institutions 
in the federal government, while 23.44% of the stories involved officials in the 
states (see Table 6.3 below). This shows that much like in the overall coverage 
of corruption, there is more news of corruption in the federal government than 
in the states or that the newspapers are more inclined to investigating 
corruption in the federal government than in the states or the private sectors. 
Also, while there are 36 states in the country, only four featured in the 
investigative stories: Lagos, Kano, Enugu, and Oyo states. This suggests either 
there is no corruption in 32 states or newspapers are investigating it 
independently, and thus further revealing the extent of independent reporting 
in coverage of corruption in the press. Similarly, just 9.38% of investigative 
stories involved wrongdoing by persons in the private sector, represented under 
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column PS (Private Sector) in Table 6.3. The remainder represents investigative 
reports involving a combination of officials in the federal and state governments 
or the private sector.  
       Table 6.2 Investigative stories of corruption by actors involved 
       
These findings are consistent with some previous research and could be further 
explained by the structural pattern of Nigeria’s media and political systems. For 
example, Ekstrom et al (2006) study seven forms of what they call “scrutiny 
journalism” in the Swedish local press and politics, including “digging or 
revealing journalism”, that is, investigative reporting, “quality tests”, “closer 
observations of service” areas and so on. They analyse 1500 articles in the local 
press over three interval years between 1961 and 2001, they find “no digging 
articles at all in 1961, only two in 1981 and very little change up to 2001”. Also, 
Dincer and Johnston (2016: 135) observe that as a national newspaper, coverage 
of corruption in the New York Times primarily concerns the national government 
and thus may exclude corruption stories at the local levels of U.S political 
organization. But Dincer and Johnston argue further that local newspapers too 
may not be suitable for analysis of press coverage of corruption since they could 
be owned or controlled commercially by the same persons or groups involved in 
the corruption cases being investigated or because they generally face more 
economic constraints and ‘topic fatigue’ (ibid). Indeed, in his survey of reporters 
in U.S local dailies, Berkowitz (2007: 557) finds that “reporters at small U.S 
dailies are less likely to undertake investigative projects”, both because of their 
Actors Investigative stories % of investigative stories
Federal Government 38 59.38%
State Government 15 23.44%





newsroom pressures and the external economic factors, although investigative 
reporting remains a strong ideal among them. In effect, then, investigative 
reporting may be less at lower levels of political and media organization, as 
recorded here in the case of Nigeria. But for Nigeria, this is worsened by the near 
absence of local newspapers, or where they exist, they tend to be owned and 
controlled by local governments particularly at the state level. Thus, the 
prospect of their autonomy to investigate and report corruption at that level is 
low, if any at all. In Nigeria, reporters in state owned media are by definition, 
civil servants under the pay of the state or local government at that level (Ciboh, 
2007). Equally significant, the ‘national’ newspapers tend to have little 
organizational and staffing reach beyond major centres like Abuja, Lagos and a 
few other cities which further hampers the possibility of investigative reporting 
of corruption at the state and local government levels. Finally, in general, 
investigative reporting tends to focus more on the politicians and the political 
system than the business elites or the economic system (Carson, 2014; 
Starkman, 2014). For example, Carson (2014) finds only 45 investigative stories, 
in his analysis of 21,000 news pages in five Australian ‘quality press’ over 1971 
to 2011. Of the 45 investigative stories, Carson adds, only 3 were “corporate 
investigations”. Thus, he concludes that investigative reporting is an exceptional 
form of reporting in the Australian media, and corporate investigations rarer still 
(ibid: 734). Thus, that less than 10% of investigative stories of corruption involve 
the private sector may reflect this general trend. But more significantly, since 
the Nigerian press is overwhelmingly political in interest, tone and reportage 
(Olukotun, 2000), it is possible that newspapers’ conception of investigative 
reporting focus more on the government and politics than the private sector. 
The figures and analyses above represent coverage of corruption in the four 
publications combined. Investigative reporting of corruption varies significantly 
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across individual publications however. For example, 48.44% of the total 
investigative stories of corruption were coded from one publication alone, that 
is, Daily Trust. This could be explained by the fact that it is this newspaper that 
has an investigative desk with four dedicated investigative reporters, in addition 
to several others on others beats who contribute investigative reports. Indeed, 
one senior editor there was quick to point out that because they have an 
investigative unit staffed with experienced investigative reporters, “we have 
been doing quite a number of investigative reports”. In addition, three of the 
permanent investigative reporters at the paper told me about the investigations 
they were doing at the time71. One of them said he was investigating the state 
of breast cancer treatment in Nigerian hospitals. Another was investigating 
corruption at the Abuja Geographic Information Systems which was published 
before I left, as previously mentioned. On the other hand, I did not observe 
similar activities at The Guardian during two weeks of fieldwork there, although 
one of their reporters had just returned from investigating the conditions of 
internally displaced persons in the areas affected by insurgency72. In other 
words, these further explain why nearly half of corruption stories investigated 
by the newspapers were coded from Daily Trust alone.  
(d) Variation of Investigative reporting by publication: 
As can be seen from Figure 6.2 below, 31.25% of the investigative stories were 
reported in The Punch, while Thisday and The Guardian make up the rest at 
14.06% and 6.25% respectively. Thus, the range of 42.19% from highest (Daily 
                                                          
71 During 6 weeks of newsroom observation at the paper, I had various conversations with the four permanent 
investigative reporters on the desk, as well as several others, besides formal interviews, about which 
investigations they were doing at the time and how they were doing it. Based on my initial research design, I 
had aimed to participate fully in this process, however, it turned out that would be of limited value since most 
of the investigative process happened outside of the newsroom. Indeed, this was one reason why the newsroom 
observation proved of limited value in the research.   
72 The reporter showed me some of the stories published from this investigation, including those he had posted 
on social media.  
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Trust) to lowest (The Guardian) of investigative output on corruption between 
the publications over the period is significantly large. This is itself an indication 
of independent initiative and exclusivity associated with investigative reporting. 
Also, the percentage of investigative reports as lead stories range from 44.44% 
in Thisday to 40.00% in The Punch, meaning that three of the publications are 
most likely to present their investigative reporting of corruption a lead stories. 
However, The Guardian’s had 0% lead stories, indicating that it is considerably 
less likely to engage in investigative reporting of corruption than the other 
publications and also less likely lead the news with an investigative story.   
Figure 6.2 Investigative reporting of corruption by publication (n=64) 



















Chapter Seven: Discussion II: Hard and soft investigative reporting in Nigeria? 
7.1 Introduction:  
In the preceding chapter, we find that journalists in Nigeria understand 
investigative reporting in ways that reflect scholarly definitions of it, but that 
operational structures for its practice are rudimentary at best. Furthermore, we 
find that journalists enjoy, and often demonstrate, considerable individual and 
organizational autonomy. Still, investigative reports of corruption are barely 5% 
of overall coverage, even though they tend to have the most prominence as lead 
stories and most concern corruption in the federal government. Additionally, we 
find no marked increase in investigative stories of corruption after the freedom 
of information law came to force. Finally, we find that 80% of the investigative 
stories were reported by two of the four publications studied. Three questions 
emerge from these findings. What does barely 5% of investigative reports mean 
for press performance in the context of democratization? Second, what factors 
explain or account for investigative output in the press as observed above? What 
do the findings of this research say about the model, if any, of investigative 
reporting in Nigeria overall? The questions for the basis for discussion in this 
chapter.  
7.2: Investigative journalism in Nigeria in perspective:  
Investigative reporting supposedly emphasises journalistic activism and 
adversarialism in which reporters uncover cases of abuse, fraud or neglect by 
the powerful on behalf of the not so powerful. In short, it is about investigating 
the operation of democracy to help actualise its normative claims (Hamilton, 
2016: 8; Olsen, 2008: 247; Aucoin, 1995: 430; Malarek, 1998:45, in Lockyer, 
2006: 767). Informed commentary and surveys of investigative journalists 
consistently report that they are a special breed motivated by a sense of justice, 
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independence, truth and courage who place great emphasis on adversarial 
relations to politics and business, in reforming society, and in fighting corruption 
and injustice through their investigative reports (Lanosga et al, 2017: 283-284; 
Abdenour and Riffe; 2016: 233-235; Starkman, 2014: 10; Davies, 2009: 2-3; 
Aucoin, 2007: 562; Ettema and Glasser, 1998: 269). Yet, investigative reporting 
is more “praised” or “discussed” than it is practiced (Feldstein, 2017: E7; 
Hamilton, 2016: 14). Furthermore, if investigative reporting is less practiced 
than it is praised, there is also a sense that it is less studied than other forms of 
political communication, even though it is repeatedly regarded as the “pinnacle” 
of journalism (Coronel, 2013: 112) or the most “politically vigorous’’ form of 
journalism practice (Ettema and Glasser, 2007: 491). Indeed, content analyses 
of investigative reporting in the literature do not compare quantitatively with, 
say, analyses of elections or campaign news. Still, much work has been done on 
the subject, even if it tends to be national case studies, as Esser and Hartung 
(2004: 1042) observed. So far however, research findings point to a limited or 
declining amount of investigative reporting across several media systems, 
regardless of status of democracy (Usher, 2017; Li and Sparks, 2016; Carson, 
2014; Fink and Schudson, 2014; Lanosga, 2014; Stetka and Ӧrnebring, 2013; 
Houston, 2010; Walton, 2010; Cordell, 2009; Marchetti, 2009; Stock, 2009; 
Merljak and Kovacic, 2007; Ekstrom et al, 2006; Hasty, 2005a; 2005b; Chalaby, 
2004; Waisbord, 2002, etc). In general, these studies find that investigative 
reports are rare to find in media content, at least in comparison to other forms 
of political news. For example, Nord (2007) contends that while Swedish 
reporters identify strongly with investigative journalism, it is yet a norm without 
“noticeable” practice because his content analysis of 1100 news stories finds 
only 9% of the stories that fit his definition of investigative reporting. Lanosga 
(2014: 497) observed that investigative reporting typically represents between 
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10% and 20% of overall Pulitzer-winning entries for most years from 1917 to 
1960. Fink and Schudson (2014) analysed 1,891 front page stories in The New 
York Times, Washington Post and Milwaukee Journal Sentinel in five selected 
years between 1955 and 2003. They find 0% investigative reports in both 1955 
and 1967, 1% in 1979 and 2003 and 3% in 1991 (ibid: 13). Similar analysis of 21, 
100 news stories in five Australian broadsheets by Carson (2014: 734) finds only 
45 investigative stories, of which only 3 are about corporate investigations. Belt 
and Just (2008: 198-200) did a similar analyses of 33, 911 stories from a sample 
of 154 U.S local TV stations and find that only 6% of the stories “demonstrate 
hallmark of effort such as investigations and interviews with newspapers”. 
Rosensteil et al (2007) analyse similar data but compare investigative reports to 
political and non-political news coverage. They find that investigative stories 
independently initiated by local stations account for 0.62% of all political stories 
and 1.14% of non-political news. Moreover, Starkman (2014; 2009) finds very 
little investigative reports in a sample taken from 9 ‘influential’ business 
newspapers that includes Financial Times, Forbes and Bloomberg News during 
the critical years leading to the 2007 global financial crisis. Just et al (2002: 102) 
find in a survey of 103 U.S local television stations that although 75% of stations 
claim to do investigative reporting, only 2% of the news they produce is 
investigative reporting. Investigative reporting, then, does not feature regularly 
in news, even in the developed democracies, despite stronger or more open 
institutional mechanisms. By implication therefore, in a developing democracy 
such as Nigeria where political protections and organizational motivation for the 
press are weaker, the amount of investigative reporting of corruption recorded 
above is more significant than 5% otherwise suggests.  
There are at least three reasons for the last point above. First, investigative 
reporting as used in this research is limited to independent media investigations 
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of financial corruption only. That is, independent press reports of explicit or 
possible financial misconduct or wrongdoing by public officials or others in 
position of power in both public and private sectors in the country. But this does 
not necessarily exhaust investigative reporting in terms of independent 
journalistic initiative, digging or research-led procedures of reporting, secrecy of 
information sought and revealed or impact of the story on society. Neither does 
financial corruption exhaust the range of activities nor abuses of power 
frequently understood as “corruption”. For example, election rigging and ballot 
stuffing. Furthermore, Nigeria’s democratic context where adherence to the 
rule of law, or to norms of political association or party politics and other 
political processes such as elections, are exceptions rather than the rule (Joseph, 
2008; Omotola, 2009a). For example, in his review of second wave of 
democratization in Africa, Diamond (2008: 144-145) contends that the 
“deadening hand of personal rule” continues to dominate across the region, 
such that much of politics comes down to a conflict between the rule of law and 
the rule of the big man. Thus, press investigations about regulatory breaches or 
campaign manoeuvres or institutional dysfunction generally, or of malfeasances 
like sex for grades or examination malpractices, could well legitimately be 
considered investigative reporting and might well have impact on the political 
and social system, even where ‘corruption’ is not involved. Much the same 
applies to what Fink and Schudson (2014: 11) call “social empathy” stories which 
generally ask, in their words, “what does it feel like to be this person?”. 
Therefore, these stories describe a person or group who might be victims of 
social and political action or policies, but who are not typically generally covered 
in news. One example of such stories was about the ‘plight’ of children orphaned 
by various communal clashes and political violence that have plagued 
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democratization in Nigeria since 199973. As we shall see in the final section of 
this chapter such stories were also observed in the newspapers sampled, even 
they were not coded because they fall outside of our unit of analysis74.  
Secondly, the finding of 4.76% of investigative stories of corruption appears 
quite small, and indeed it is, given Nigeria’s reputation for corruption and the 
relative press freedom. However, this is measured against overall coverage of 
corruption in the sampled newspapers, comprising three types of corruption 
stories: corruption scandals, follow-up stories and narratives of corruption or 
corruption talk, which were stories about corruption but without any specific 
acts of corruption or wrongdoing mentioned. Indeed, we noted that corruption 
scandals, or stories of actual or alleged acts of corruption accounted for 45.72% 
of total although coded into seven categories according to source attribution 
(IMI, ACA, NA, COI, FM, DOM, and Other categories). Thus, when measured 
specifically against corruption scandals75, the percentage of investigative stories 
of corruption improves to slightly above 10% as shown in Table 7.1 below.  
Table 7.1: Corruption scandals in the sampled newspapers (n= 615) 
 
                                                          
73 Daily Trust 06/11/2010.  
74 As mentioned in chapter three, only corruption stories are considered. In Nigerian newspapers such stories 
often contain words and phrases like ‘corruption’, ‘fraud’, ‘graft’, ‘embezzlement’, ‘bribe’, ‘loot’, and their 
variants like ‘corrupt’, ‘fraudulent’, ‘embezzled’, ‘bribery’, ‘thieves’, etc.   
75 Please see chapters four and six for details on this.   
Categories (sources of corruption stories) Frequency of Corruption scandals % of corruption scandals Corruption Investigating Authorities
Anti Corruption Agencies (ACA) 183 29.76%
National (and State) Assemblies (NA) 134 21.79%
Commissions of Inquiry 99 16.10%
Other (OT) 115 18.70% 86.34%
Indpendent Media Investigations (IMI) 64 10.41%
Foreign Media (FM) 15 2.44%
Diaspora/Online Media (DOM) 5 0.81% 13.66%
Total Corruption Scandals 615 100.00% 100.00%
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Finally, various factors such as the degree of press freedom, media ownership, 
organizational or political economic structures of the press in respective 
countries are thought to explain a general trend of ‘investigative shortfall’ as 
Walton (2010: 18) put it. As we shall see, the shortfall of investigative reporting 
in most democracies as examined above is often explained by its peculiar 
economics of high transaction costs but little benefits for the media 
organizations that sponsor it, even if investigative stories also tend to have high 
social returns. As Hamilton (2016: 11) put it, original investigative content 
generates “great benefits for society, but offer smaller returns” for media 
organizations. Thus, if investigative reporting is already difficult and resource-
intensive, it follows that 10% reports of corruption by Nigerian newspapers 
against total reports of corruption scandals can be quite significant, given that 
political and economic conditions within which the media operate might be 
more difficult than in countries in which Hamilton and others draw data. But 
what are these specific conditions for Nigeria and other developing democracies 
and to what extent does the general model of investigative reporting hold for 
investigative output in the Nigerian press and is any alternative model possible? 
I now turn to these questions by first examining how Nigerian journalists and 
editors explain the shortfall of investigative reporting in the press.  
7. 3 Political and economic frameworks of investigative reporting in Nigeria:  
As mentioned above, the amount and quality of investigative reporting is 
generally located within political and economic structures in which newspapers 
and other media operate. Nigerian journalists consider three broad such factors 
that curtail investigative output in the country: ineffectiveness of freedom of 
information legislation, corruption and other unethical practices within the 
media itself and political and advertiser influences on the press. I examine each 
of these in turn below.  
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(a) Ineffectiveness of freedom of information legislation:  
Berliner (2014) has argued that FOI laws have both costs and benefits for 
political actors by increasing the cost of corruption. This implies that effective 
FOI laws complement the operating environment for journalists. About two-
thirds of the respondents interviewed believe that the freedom of information 
act has had little or no impact on their ability to access official information. One 
respondent describes the impact of the law as “very, very abysmal”. Non-
compliance can be outright, or through delay tactics by both government 
agencies and private bodies. At other times, public institutions claim the law 
exempts them, even if it did not, or claim that it is not binding on the states 
because it is a federal law. Some respondents believe the law itself is 
cumbersome and difficult to implement, and therefore does not “qualify as good 
law”, as another interviewee claims. However, the same reporter admitted he 
had not read “the final version” of it, but the general impression I got is that 
most journalists have not fully studied the law. An investigative reporter at one 
of the newspapers related a typical example of how the ineffectiveness of the 
law affects journalistic investigations. He said that he was trying to investigate 
non-remittance of royalties to government by multi-national companies in the 
oil and gas sector who possibly colluded with officials in the national oil company 
and regulatory agencies in the sector.76 In trying to investigate further, he 
requested ten years of data from NNPC, DPR and FIRS77, all government agencies 
that should have reliable information about oil remittances. But:   
When I met each one of them, none of them was willing to come forth 
with the information. They all blanked out. So I had to invoke FOI. But 
                                                          
76 He said he read this information in the Ribadu Report, which was a formal investigation into the sector chaired 
by a former anti-corruption chief, Nuhu Ribadu, and sponsored by NEITI, the sector watchdog.  
77 These are acronyms referring to agencies of Nigerian government: NNPC is Nigeria, National Petroleum 
Corporation, that is, the national oil company; DPR is the Department of Petroleum Resources, the regulatory 
agency which monitors NNPC; while FIRS is the Federal Inland Revenue Service, a federal tax collection agency. 
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it still did not work. They kept telling me they will but they never did. 
It was just a delay tactics to get me tired and all that. So… I had to 
redirect the story to non-compliance of government agencies with the 
FOI Act. There is a record that shows that even federal government 
agencies themselves do not comply with the law. It is a lame duck law. 
So that again limits what investigative journalists can do 
Another respondent offers that government agencies are reluctant to comply 
with FOI requests because “there is always one or two corruption cases they are 
trying to cover up”. This suggests that by not releasing information to journalists 
in one case, public officials may be aiming to protect the overall system of 
corruption in government, a possibility in a context of systemic corruption. 
INTVWEE 2 however believes that it may be because public officials are wary 
that journalists might “sell” out information from FOI requests rather than for 
journalistic purposes, a practice that as we shall see appears common in 
Nigerian journalism. As he put it, “everybody is jittery when he is giving out 
information because he doesn’t know what you are going to do with it. So they 
will want to look at the law to see why they shouldn’t give those documents”. 
Moreover, ineffectiveness of the law is also due to the culture of “secrecy” in 
government inherited from colonial times. As one senior editor explains:    
Well, there are many constraints to investigative reporting in our 
country.  For example, the culture of secrecy is deeply engrained in 
the Nigerian public service, right from the colonial days. During the 
colonial days, almost every piece of paper in the bureaucracy was a 
secret. The law that they call the Official Secret Act. It has been 
consequentially repealed now by the Freedom of Information Act, but 
still civil servants all act under that constraint.  
Finally, in most cases, the problem is not so much non-compliance by officials 
but because there is just nothing to disclose because no records exist in the first 
place, a point several respondents consider a major concern. As another 
respondent concludes: “so if the data is not available, it means that initially we 
have been disenfranchised, it means that there is a limit to how far you can go 
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as an investigative journalist”. In other words, all the above illustrates the 
difficulties faced by enterprising reporters in their attempt to access information 
from public or private institutions when conducting investigative reports about 
issues of accountability.  
(b) Brown Envelope Syndrome:  
‘Brown envelope journalism’ or cash-for-news and similar practices are 
commonplace in Nigerian and African journalism, and elsewhere (Oberiri, 2016; 
Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe, 2012: 515; Kasoma, 2009:26; Lodamo and Skjerdal, 
2009: 140-141; Rønning, 2009: 167; Ndangam, 2006: 179; Hasty, 2005a; 2005b). 
In Africa, Skjerdal (2010: 367) notes that research interest on the syndrome 
looks at the extent of its occurrence in respective countries, its causes, 
particularly the impact of poor economic conditions, or social and political 
influences, and discussion of ethical and professional implications of it. In a 
survey of 155 journalists in 18 media organizations in South Western Nigeria, 
Adeyemi (2013) finds that even though 64% of the reporters agree that ‘brown 
envelope journalism’ is unethical, 75% of them admit to engaging in it. A similar 
survey of 184 Lagos-based reporters finds that 61% engage in it, although 74% 
believe it does not influence their reporting, while a further 34% claim that even 
though poor salaries is a major cause of it, better pay will not necessarily reduce 
it (Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe, 2009). This confirms Nwabueze (2010) who 
finds from 116 journalists in five Nigerian cities that orientation of journalists is 
the major cause because journalists see nothing wrong with taking money from 
sources. However, other studies report that brown envelope in Nigerian 
journalism affects ethical considerations and objectivity in news coverage, and 
thus recommend various solutions such as better pay, more stringent 
monitoring of reporters and sanctions, and more professional education or 
awareness campaigns by professional unions (Gade et al, 2017; Oberiri, 2016; 
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Okoro and Chinweobo-Onuoha, 2013; Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe, 2012; 
Yusha’u, 2009; Omenugha and Oji, 2008; Akabogu, 2005). Yusha’u (2009: 162-
163) finds from interviews with Nigerian reporters that such practices are 
manifested in clientilist relationships between journalists and sources, 
sometimes based on expectations regional and ethnic loyalties between 
journalists and political actors and thus curtailing investigative reporting.  
This research finds several ways in which such practices directly affect 
investigative reporting. First, journalists often sell information they pick up 
during reporting processes or from colleagues in the newsroom to the very 
targets of journalistic investigations. Indeed, as one reporter explains, 
journalists often double as informants under the employ of businesses and 
advertisers, such that “your informant tells you there is negative information 
coming, and the guy will start calling the editor or the publisher, calling 
everybody, and start putting pressure”. A senior investigative reporter at one of 
the newspapers explains that this practice is one reason whistle blowers and 
informants do not have confidence in reporters. As this respondent put it,  
Then a much more serious issue is when the operators in the industry 
don’t even trust the journalist. Somebody may have information. 
Details that he can give to you as a journalist but he could say if I give 
this thing to that Journalist, he will go and sell it. There are some 
journalists who are materialistic. If you give them any information 
about the CBN Governor, the next morning it is on the CBN Governor’s 
desk. If you give them these facts they will go and sell it. 
To buttress this point, another investigative reporter at a different paper cited a 
specific example of a story he wrote about a Governor’s misrepresentation of 
facts regarding public spending in his state, but which ended up not being 
published, “because individuals in the newsroom told the governor who then 
wanted to see the journalist who wrote the story so they can have a 
‘discussion’”. One implication of this practice is that investigative reporters are 
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careful not to reveal information about their investigations to colleagues in the 
same newsroom, which in turn could undermine the effectiveness of team that 
the operational idea of an investigative desk suggests. In addition, journalists 
double, not as informants, but as “media consultants”, “assisting”, business 
clients about how to get favourable news into their own paper. As the reporter 
cited above says:  
Consultancy services can mean when someone wanting the world to 
know the progress they are making in the industry they are, and they 
don’t know how to go about it. You can counsel them, that okay, in 
this type of thing, this one you can do it through press release, and 
this one you can do it through press conferences and this one can be 
through facility tour.  
Also, state correspondents and beat reporters are sometimes placed on the 
payroll of the state government or agency they report. Several respondents 
cited examples. INTVWEE 15 notes that “beat reporters are embedded” in the 
beats they report, making them inconvenient for investigative reporters to rely 
on, where travel proves expensive. INTVWEE 3, who claims experience of 
reporting from several states, said that while he was reporting from Kano, many 
reporters covering the state government were being paid ‘monthly gift’ by the 
state government, and wondered how such a journalist could balance the 
demands of watchdog “the stipend that he is getting?”. In other words, 
reporters themselves perhaps do as much to constrain press freedom as do 
regulatory or political influences on the press. Indeed, at least four senior editors 
believe that political and legal constraints on the press are minimal but achieved 
by other means. One of them observes:   
I remember mentioning it at a seminar in Paris. I said, look you busy-
body foreign NGOs who are so concerned with the arrest of 
journalists. Do you know that bribery and the brown envelope 
syndrome that we say in Nigeria does more damage than jailing? 
Because when you jail a journalist everybody will hear but if you go 
around bribing and they don’t report what they should report, or they 
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distort the story or they suppress something; that is very damaging... 
Otherwise, there is a lot of journalistic independence 
(c) Political and advertiser influences:  
Although overt or system-wide legal limitations do not exist, individual 
politicians and businesses do exert influence on the press in ways that could 
directly limit investigative reporting output. First, in addition to monetary 
inducement and bribery of reporters already discussed above, public officials 
and advertisers, especially the former, often try to intimidate field reporters 
doing investigative stories about them or their institutions. This could be verbal 
appeals, abuses or threats to discontinue an investigation or not to publish the 
story. As one of several respondents observes:  
If an investigation is ‘indictive’ (sic) they try to stop. At times, they will 
call the chairman of the company and say look, I understand your 
company is doing this story. If they don’t stop, I’m going to sue this 
company. But the chairman doesn’t bulge. He wouldn’t even call you 
to say what are you doing?  
However, if verbal intimidation fails, officials often resort to a legal one. As one 
investigative reporter put it: “They could even resort to blackmail, intimidation 
and ultimately they could even resort to litigation. They could just slam 
unnecessary libel case that sometimes the court cases don’t see the light of the 
day”. While this statement points to legal harassment of reporters, it must be 
understood within a common occurrence in Nigerian politics whereby politicians 
frequently threaten legal cases against journalists and media organizations, or 
against other politicians, but mostly without seeing the threat through to end.  
Hardly any such libel cases are litigated; sometimes paperwork for them are not 
even filed in court. Perhaps such threats are no more than publicity stunts to 
refute a story until it dies down or another scandal appears to bury it. 
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Sometimes however, intimidation takes a violent turn. While speaking on this 
point, one senior editor said that: “even as we speak, I must tell you now the 
Nasarawa State Government, we don’t have a reporter there because of 
editorial concern. Our reporter was beaten up at a public function where the 
Governor was sitting. He didn’t raise a finger”. Moreover, political and advertiser 
influences go beyond verbal or legal intimidation of reporters or their media to 
‘punishment’ of respective media organizations, by withdrawal of advertising. 
This is where distinctions between commercial and political influences on the 
press can be blurred, since government is in fact the biggest advertiser in the 
country, as respondents repeatedly point out.  
The implication, then, is that government officials can exert not only political but 
also a commercial pressure on the press at the same time, although because of 
long-standing gains for press freedom, they tend to use the latter rather than 
the former. The senior editor quoted above, for instance, cited several examples 
where his newspaper was ‘punished’ by various government ministries and 
officials, “largely because of our investigative stories”, as he put it78. In other 
words, government advertising, the largest source of revenue for the press, is at 
once an additional source of power and influence at the hands of government 
officials which they wield readily as a means of media control. These influences 
on the press are made worse by the poor capacity of the media and journalists, 
as well as the harsh economic climate for media business. The cost of news 
production is astronomical, since most inputs like newsprints, machinery and so 
on have to be imported, and in a volatile regime of exchange rates. A senior 
editor at another of the publications explains that newspapers are struggling to 
                                                          
78 Another senior editor in the same paper related that at some time, a former Governor had ordered the 
withdrawal of the state’s advertising from his paper, “and I was told it was because I wrote one column about 
him about two or three years ago and he said since that column was allowed he would not”, the editor explained. 
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“get money for operations”, because, “inflation has been very high. You import 
almost everything. So the cost of production is very high”. A third editor, 
INTVWEE 13, goes as far as suggesting that government should subsidize 
newspaper production because revenues are offset by the costs of importing 
news prints, demurrage incurred at the ports, maintaining warehouse and 
distribution of newspapers. Consequently, newspapers employ fewer staff, 
many of them poorly trained. About one quarter of the interviewees claim poor 
capacity of reporters in terms of basic writing skills, ability to spot a good story 
and follow it up, to more specialist skills of researching for stories or interpreting 
data constitute a major limitation on investigative reporting. As INTVWEE 23 
observes:  
There are not enough good journalists. If you don’t have a capacity to 
identify a good story, if you don’t have the capacity to put one or two 
together, to put issues into perspective, there is no way you will do a 
good story that will impact the lives of people. There is no way you 
will do a good story that will make public officials and decision makers 
to respond to the complaints you have made and make amendments, 
because they don’t understand what you are saying, because you are 
not even saying anything 
In addition, reporters are paid poorly, if at all. Nigerian media are notorious for 
not paying their reporters salaries. Indeed, the issue of “welfare” of reporters, 
that is salaries, was a frequently cited theme in the interviews. For example, an 
editor at an online paper (INTVWEE 16) explained that “so when the newspaper 
is struggling to pay salary, it is difficult for that same paper to say do 
investigation. That is why people don’t do it, they just do what they can to get 
by”. As to be expected, many explained corruption within the media itself from 
this perspective of poor pay. But this should be considered a dubious claim since 
several other respondents insisted brown envelope practices have more to do 
with individual orientation of journalists than poor ‘welfare’. Indeed, one senior 
investigative reporter reasons that lack of capacity of journalists does more to 
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limit investigative reporting in the press than challenges in the regulatory 
environment. In his words,  
Now, if you talk about investigative reporting in Nigeria, the problem 
that journalists have doing investigation is not actually the legal 
restraints. It is actually the inadequate knowledge. It is not the legal 
constraint when journalists don’t understand how to do it… And 
another issue is that even if you have the tip-offs, you don’t have the 
skills to be able to dig further… Then, knowledge of various sectors is 
another problem. If you don’t understand the petroleum sector you 
cannot write an investigative story in that sector.  
 
7.4 Understanding investigative shortfall in the Nigerian press:  
So far, we have examined the various ways in which organizational and wider 
political and economic structures shape and possibly limit the amount of 
investigative reporting in Nigerian newspapers. Berliner (2014: 481) has noted 
that the push for freedom of information legislation by journalists and civil 
society groups took almost 20 years to yield fruits by the passage of the law in 
2011. But civil society organizations and journalists did not waiver, believing that 
the end will be well worth it. Furthermore, Ojebode (2011: 278) has observed 
that various sections of Nigerian FOI legislation explicitly mentioned its 
implications for investigative reporters and whistle-blowers, two key 
collaborators that were believed would help further the endless fight against 
corruption in the country. However, we find here that the law has yet proved 
ineffective because, as Hazel and Worthy (2010: 358) observe, FOI legislation 
requires accompanying cultural change in government towards openness, but 
which takes time to build. But perhaps even more fundamentally, legislation 
requires existing or new bureaucratic mechanisms for its implementation. And 
as Roberts (2006) notes, institutional capacity for implementing FOI laws can be 
enormous: expertise, facilities and databases, money to cover costs of 
processing requests, and so on. Indeed, Roberts (2006: 114-118) highlights the 
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example of Britain which adopted the law in 2000 but it was only effective five 
years later in 2005 to allow time for public campaigns and administrative 
capacity building before operation begins. In addition, enforcement of laws 
often requires an active, well-informed and well-resourced civil society ready to 
test the limits of the law or to monitor compliance. For example, Calland and 
Bentley (2013) show that the persistence and activism of civil society 
organizations and journalists is responsible for the modest success of the law in 
India and South Africa. But even in India, where FOI legislation is known as Right 
to Information Act (RITA), journalists still do not seem to use it much or it does 
not seem to be effective for investigative reporting purposes, at least not 
particularly for journalistic investigations of corruption. In their analysis of three 
English-language Indian newspapers over the five years following adoption of 
the law there, Relly and Schwalbe (2013: 294) find that just “2% of the 221 
articles were from journalists’ investigative reports about corruption using the 
RTIA”. Thus, in his regression analysis of cross-sectional data for 191 countries, 
Nam (2012) finds that FOI legislation does not necessarily enhance press 
freedom in countries with weaker democratic institutions and poor resources 
for enforcing it. In other words, what journalists in Nigeria regard as non-
compliance needs to be understood within the context of these discussions.  
Moreover, we find that while newspapers are essentially free from political 
interference or legal harassment by politicians, the political and economic 
environment nonetheless curtail watchdog journalism, since politicians can 
exert influence in more subtle ways, in addition to the challenges of a developing 
economy for private media. These findings have implications for much research 
on press freedom and media ownership and their connections to watchdog 
journalism or corruption. Djankov et al (2003: 343-344), for instance, conduct 
regression analysis of a variety of media ownership data in 91 countries and find 
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that private ownership supports more press freedom. Also, in a regression 
analysis of Press Freedom Index (Freedom House) in 133 countries, Camaj (2013: 
37) concludes that ‘’media freedom is an important determinant of corruption, 
even after controlling for variables of horizontal accountability’’ such as the 
courts or parliaments. Similar research from public economics suggests that 
press freedom and media ownership are positively correlated with levels of 
official corruption. That is, the more private ownership, the higher the levels of 
press freedom in a country, which in turn results in lower corruption. (Camaj, 
2013; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013; Nam, 2012; Whitten-Wooding and James, 
2012; Shen and Williamson, 2005; Besley and Prat, 2006; Chowdhury, 2004; 
Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Djankov et al, 2003). But as the foregoing discussion 
of freedom of information legislation indicates, these assumptions are not so 
straightforward in the Nigerian case at least. First, private media are established 
to make profit, which, as McQuail (2005: 99-100) notes favours larger and richer 
advertising markets and therefore draws resources away from less profitable 
but more public oriented contents like investigative reporting. Secondly, press 
freedom is frequently understood in relation to the state (Kasoma, 1995). But as 
we find here, the state and its agencies generally do not interfere much with the 
press in Nigeria. But politicians and government agencies nonetheless exert 
possibly much more influence by subtler and presumably more effective means 
such as withdrawal of advertising which government controls and inducement 
of reporters, and all in a harsh business climate and poor pay for reporters. In 
this sense, the focus on political and legal aspects of press freedom potentially 
works only to “regress” (to borrow the same econometric term) other 
explanatory factors for press behavior in contexts such as Nigeria.  
Additionally, investigative reporting appears particularly unsuitable for 
organization of the media based on the profit motive, although Djankov et 
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above finds little evidence that public ownership of the media favours better 
public communication. However, for media, investigative reporting requires 
considerable resource commitment in in time and money; and yet with little 
guarantee for a story (Feldstein, 2017; Fink and Schudson, 2014). When it does 
lead to investigative stories however, it can have enormous impact for the 
society in terms of reforms (Hamilton, 2016), although this too can be blunted 
by legal and public relations tactics of corporate organizations (Raphael et al, 
2004). Moreover, in the long-term decline of journalism generally, investigative 
reporting is hardest-hit in terms of budget cuts, job losses, whole dissolution of 
investigative units and reduced membership of professional associations 
(Starkman, 2014; Walton, 2010; Stock, 2009). All this further explains relatively 
low amount of investigative reporting in the press. Indeed, Hamilton (2016) 
offers an interesting ‘economist’ perspective of investigative reporting to 
explain its rarity in news. For Hamilton, investigative reporting is the real deal in 
news; the ‘product differentiation’ in market terms. Beat reporting and agency 
copies only help to fill up space (ibid: 18-19). It poses a fundamental economic 
problem for media organizations however. Like drilling for oil, he claims, 
investigative journalism involves high transaction costs, is based on tips and 
conjecture, and may not even yield desired results in the end. But unlike oil 
drilling which if successful yields measurable proceeds for the company, 
investigative reports are public goods which cannot be monetized directly by 
media organizations. The whole society benefits from the reforms investigative 
reporting engenders, not just subscribers who pay for news. This therefore is a 
‘product failure’, since it benefits others, but not the firm that produces it (ibid: 
23-26). This fundamental economic problem of investigative journalism 
discourages media organizations from engaging in it, despite its huge benefits 
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to society.79 The question, then, is that to what extent does this general 
economic model explain investigative reporting output in Nigeria as observed 
above? My answer is that yes, and more. Political economic structures within 
which the press operates in Nigeria can, and do, limit the amount of investigative 
reports in newspapers, as the findings above amply demonstrate. However, as I 
understand it here, constraints of political economic structures have had one 
major consequence for investigating reporting in the Nigerian press. 
Investigative reporting occupies only one end of a wider spectrum of disclosing 
corruption in Nigeria. At the other end lie the corruption investigating agencies. 
When the scale of corruption disclosed is low, that is, for petty corruption, as we 
shall see, investigating reporting is present and active. However, when the scale 
of corruption is higher and involves more elite actors and therefore more 
clandestine, investigative reporting recedes to the background and at which 
point, corruption investigating agencies become more active and take the lead 
in disclosing corruption in the press. That is, for the specific case of exposing 
corruption in Nigerian newspapers, both independent journalism and 
information subsidy are to be understood as part of the same political culture of 
disclosing corruption in Nigeria, although with a division of labour of some sorts. 
Journalists and newspapers can and do investigate and report corruption to the 
extent that structural constraints observed in this chapter allow. But the 
outcomes of journalistic investigations of corruption tend to be fewer 
independent coverage in published news reports, at least in comparison to 
reports of corruption from information subsidy sources. This is illustrated by the 
data we have seen so far. Just about 10% of actual corruption cases are 
independently investigated by journalists and their newspapers. Yet, journalistic 
                                                          
79 Hamilton endeavours to calculate in dollar terms through several sophisticated examples the real value of 
investigative journalism to society.  
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investigation of corruption is not only low in terms of quantity of coverage. It is 
also low in terms of the scale of corruption involved in the stories independently 
reported, in comparison to those sourced through information subsidy 
practices. Another way of explaining this point is that corruption-investigating-
agencies (CIAs) supply more stories of corruption than newspapers investigate 
themselves by 90% of total corruption coverage, but equally significant, they 
supply more of the bigger cases of scandals than newspapers investigate. In 
effect, for stories of corruption in Nigerian newspapers, information subsidy 
works in two ways: both in terms of the quantity of scandal news, but also in 
terms of the scale of corruption involved in the stories supplied. In other words, 
I elaborate on the concept of strong watchdogs, weak investigators earlier 
advanced and discussed in chapter five by comparing the scale of corruption 
involved in stories independently reported or subsidized.     
Table 7.1 above shows a quantitative analysis, the number or frequency of 
scandals reported. But if we consider the scale of corruption exposed, a different 
comparative picture emerges. This is important because there are different 
types of corruption, and for Nigeria specifically, certain kinds of corruption are 
an aspect of everyday life for most citizens, unlike stealing $6 billion from 
security budget that John Kerry referred to in his speech at Davos. Petty 
corruption involves different sets of actors and differing social and political 
contexts and might yet have different impacts on society. In short, in the next 
section, I try to make sense of the question: what kinds of corruption are 
investigated by the press? I do this through a comparative analysis of scandals 
coded in the IMI category, that is, corruption stories originating from 
independent journalism and those investigated by other agencies and supplied 
to the press through information subsidy practices or channels (press release, 
briefing, leaks, etc). In this instance however, the focus of analysis is not quantity 
230 
 
or number of stories but the scale of corruption involved in each case. This is 
useful because as Hamilton (2016: 10) observes, while investigative journalism 
may be episodic and uncommon in the press, its significance to democratic 
governance does not lie simply in the number of investigations published, but 
also in its quality and impact, since a single investigative story can result in a 
massive impact for society, resulting from policy changes the story could inspire. 
Also, Lublinski et al (2016) could identify just 12 investigative stories in five 
African countries in 2010 (Kenya, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Côte 
d’Ivoire), but focus, not on the limited number of these stories but on their 
possible impacts on governance processes, of which they identify four, including 
getting an issue on the public agenda, helping to solve an immediate problem, 
and triggering structural changes in the short term (ibid: 1081). From these 
therefore, I assume that independent journalistic disclosures of grand 
corruption may well have more impact on governance structures and systems 
than exposure of petty corruption or lower scale corruption, which most people 
already know about anyway, given that it is widespread in societies like Nigeria. 
More importantly, exposure of grand corruption in this sense implies a more 
active overall watchdog performance for the press. 
7.5 Hard and soft model of investigative reporting in Nigerian press:     
Corruption is often distinguished in terms of its scale: the status of persons 
involved, and amounts extracted through illicit practices, as a measure of the 
trust breached or power abused. As Blackburn et al (2006: 2462) observe, 
corruption can “occur on various scales, in many shapes and forms, and at all 
levels within public office”. Also, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016: 11-12) 
distinguish between petty and grand corruption, although the two may be linked 
in a way that one furthers the other. Petty corruption is more widespread in 
society and “easier for citizens to observe and experience”, such as paying bribes 
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to access public services in schools, hospitals and so on, or other forms of 
extortion by officials of the state. As such it is usually perpetrated by officials on 
the lower rungs of the bureaucracy. Petty corruption is everywhere in Nigeria 
and is not necessarily limited to officials of government. Teachers or officials of 
private schools and hospitals, fuel attendants, mechanics, bank officials also 
engage in various forms of it. On the other hand, grand corruption involves 
higher-level officials such as ministers, lawmakers, heads of agencies etc. Also, 
grand corruption involves much larger sums and more secrecy. Rose-Ackerman 
and Paflika note that grand corruption ranges from contract inflation, kickbacks 
for awarding contracts, licenses or foreign direct investment projects to outright 
embezzlement or looting of public resources directly by highly placed officials or 
their cronies, or payments to lawmakers to make favourable legislations. Thus, 
it is more difficult for citizens to observe or experience directly. Moody-Stuart 
(1997: 2) observes that for developing countries, grand corruption of the sort 
perpetrated by ministers and heads of state tend to be more damaging both 
economically and socially. Indeed, when Nigerians complain or talk about 
corruption in the country, they tend to focus mostly on varying forms of grand 
corruption, perhaps because it is this form of corruption that is regularly 
portrayed in the media or investigated by anti-corruption agencies or 
commissions of inquiry. Therefore, to what extent do Nigerian newspapers 
independently report this sort of corruption?    
In an important sense, corruption is the object of investigative reporting and is 
implied in most definitions of it, however differently conceived by scholars. 
Investigative journalism entails the press digging into or discovering and 
exposing wrongdoing or abuses of power by officials entrusted to act on behalf 
of the public, which otherwise would have gone unreported. And for this reason, 
it is called ‘accountability reporting’ (Starkman, 2014). For example, Lanosga’s 
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definition which we adopt here states explicitly that it is “in-depth reporting 
about public affairs that involves wrongdoing, failure or social problems brought 
to light by journalists” (Lanosga, 2015a: 369).  Yet, studies of investigative 
reporting rarely consider what kinds of corruption or wrongdoing is investigated 
by journalists.  Coronel (2010: 112) notes that the “target” of investigative 
exposes can range from low-level to high-level public officials and the 
wrongdoing exposed could be small scale or large scale, “from petty officials like 
traffic policemen or clerks, but can just as well be on high-level political 
corruption involving millions, even billions of dollars, as in the case of dictators 
and kleptocracies in developing countries”. This is significant because it moves 
investigative reporting from abstract conceptualizations to the very specific 
social context where corruption takes place. Furthermore, it highlights which 
forms of corruption journalists can independently report, given variations of 
structural contexts, and since journalistic initiative is at the core of investigative 
journalism. In this sense, taking the scale of corruption into consideration in 
actual practice of journalism could be useful to better conceptualize 
investigative reporting. In their analysis of 757 investigative prize entries during 
1976-2012, Lanosga and Martin (2017: 8-9) find that 47.7% of the stories are 
about “government wrongdoing or problems”, while 29.7% involve actors in the 
private sector. Similarly, Carson (2014: 734) finds just 3 instances of corporate 
wrong doing out of 45 investigative stories in five Australian broadsheets over 
1956-2011. These are like our findings in Table 6.3 above that 59.38% of 
investigative stories in the sample involve wrongdoing in the federal 
government, 23.44% for state and local governments, and 9.38% for 
wrongdoing in the private sector. These indicate which sectors of society are 
more commonly investigated by journalists, or as Carson concludes, 
“investigations of corporate power are rare in the news” (ibid). However, Relly 
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and Schwalbe (2013: 291) provides a useful example of analysis of scale of 
corruption in investigative reporting samples. In their analysis of 221 
investigative articles from three Indian newspapers, they find that 56.56% of the 
stories are about ‘general corruption’ in which the wrongdoing is not specified, 
23.08% on ‘grand corruption’ involving high-level government officials, 10.41% 
on ‘petty corruption’ by low-level officials, 4.52% on ‘political corruption’ in 
which powerful actors sought to bend or change the rules for private again and 
5.4% of the stories were on ‘multiple types of corruption’, that is, a combination 
of any of the previous four types. In my view, such findings represent a 
significant shift in most empirical studies of investigative reporting as they 
indicate the kinds of corruption reported and therefore a more detailed analysis 
of media performance.  
(a) Comparative analysis of IMI and CIA corruption stories:  
Table 7.1 above shows that a total of 615 breaking news of corruption scandals 
were reported by the four newspapers combined during the 12-year period, 64 
of which are investigative stories, or 10.41% of this total. However, of the 64 
investigative articles, Daily Trust and The Punch reported 31 and 20 respectively, 
or a combined 79.69% of total between these two papers alone. Thisday and 
The Guardian reported 9 and 4 stories respectively, or 20.31% of total 
investigative coverage between them over the same period.  
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 below provide brief details for most of the investigative 
articles in Daily Trust and The Punch respectively. (Although I coded the stories 
by simple frequency counts to each category, I also took notes for majority of 
the stories coded, per chance additional details might be useful as illustrative 
examples or further analysis. I attach all the notes in the form of tables as 
Appendix C. They provide an expansive view of the various corruption scandals, 
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follow up stories and narrative of corruption stories and their various categories, 
and a hence additional illustration of the coding procedure).  
Table 7.2 Brief Notes on Investigative Media Investigations (IMI): The Punch 
 
 
1. IMI report on extortion by the security guards at the British Embassy, IMI, 
15/05/03 
2. MI on fraud and mismanagement of ticket sales in the Mass Transit 
Schemes, IMI, 20/06/03 
3. IMI report on corruption within Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) in 
Bayelsa State chapter, 3m gift from the Governor IMI, 07/08/03 
4. Punch investigates 16 abandoned projects worth N583m in the south east, 
IMI, 24/09/03 
5. Punch investigates N4.1bn fraud in banking sector. Really sketchy story, 
but with elements of investigation, probably a leak, IMI, 30/09/03 
6. Punch investigates N1.3bn secret annual Jumbo pay to special advisers of 
the president, IMI, 21/06/04 
7. Punch investigates illegal allocation of land in Lagos state, IMI, 19/11/05 
8. Punch investigates car gift to 18 legislators of the Oyo Assembly for 
removing Gov, IMI 12/04/06 
9. Punch investigate police stations charging money for writing reports for 
complainants, IMI, 12/05/06 
10. Punch investigates bribery of INEC officials in Ekiti elections IMI, 08/04/08 
11. Punch investigations reveal N102m scam over police dogs in the Nigeria 
Police, IMI, 22/11/08 
12. Punch further investigation of banks under CBN/NDIC investigations, IMI, 
02/02/09 
13. Punch investigates N4bn asphalt plants abandoned in FERMA offices, IMI, 
16/03/09 
14. Punch investigates case of $10m bribery by multinational oil companies to 
legislators to stall Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Story not as detailed as 
would be expected, probably a leak IMI, 11/05/11  
15. Punch investigations finds that 66 companies on the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange, NSE have not declared dividends to their shareholders since 
2008, not much detail in story, probably from a published or internal report 
IMI, 23/05/11 
16. Punch investigates cost of President Jonathan’s travels estimated at 
N3.35bn in 2 and half years, IMI, 07/07/12. Not coded as date not in sample  
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Table 7.3 Brief Notes on Independent Media Investigations (Daily Trust IMI) 
1. IMI report on missing 40 beds at Asokoro General Hospital (IMI, 20/05/02) 
2. IMI report on N250m Nigeria Airways land grab by Minister of Aviation, 
Kema Chikwe (IMI, 02/06/03) 
3. IMI on discrepancies in financial accounts in handing over notes of former 
Speaker Ghali Na’aba to new Speaker, Bello Masari (IMI, 20/06/03) 
4. IMI report on corruption at the Ajaokuta Steel Complex (IMI, 20/07/03) 
5. IMI report on corruption at the National Hospital, Abuja (IMI, 31/08/03) 
6. IMI report on abuse of monetization policy by civil servants retiring with 
official vehicles (IMI, 21/02/04) 
7. IMI report on allegations of N50m bribe to senators to support third term, 
IMI, 12/05/06 (probably a leak) 
8. IMI report on illegal allocation of 300 plots by former FCT minister in the 24 
hours before vacating office, IMI, 20/04/08 
9. IMI report on N6bn water contracts in Kano without water; IMI, 20/04/08 
10. IMI report on Governors spending N35m on adverts during President 
Yar’adua’s birthday, IMI, 19/07/08   
11. IMI report on N702m on missing Hajj funding intervention, IMI, 16/11/08 
12. IMI report on INEC payments to non-existing political parties, IMI, 28/12/08 
13. IMI report on corruption in Federal Housing Authority, corruption evident 
in story, no names IMI, 28/12/08;  
14. IMI report on Governors globe-trotting with state funds while states suffer, 
IMI, 03/05/09  
15. IMI report on grounded aircraft at several barracks of Nigerian Airforce 
despite huge annual budgets IMI, 09/05/09     
16. IMI report on N300m squandered on medical bills of the governor, IMI, 
20/06/09 
17. IMI report on Kano Governor Shekarau’s N50m Sallah gift to politicians 
18. IMI report on top govt officials lobbying to have their cronies buy up NITEL, 
IMI, 12/04/12 
19. IMI report on lobbyists delaying submission of report of House investigation 
on subsidy scandal, IMI, 18/04/12 
20. IMI report on fake hill demolition airport contract in Asaba, Delta State, IMI, 
24/04/12 
21. IMI report on N1.6bn Abuja CCTV contract, IMI, 06/05/12 
22. IMI report on Ibori making money while in prison, 12/05/12, IMI, 12/05/12  
23. IMI report on mismanagement of N14bn natural resources acct by previous 
presidents, IMI, 23/07/12 
24. IMI report on N140bn silos without grains, IMI, 21/10/12  
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We see from these brief details that the majority of the stories investigated by 
the newspapers (all in IMI category) are on the lower scale of corruption in 
Nigeria, both in terms of the amounts or other value extracted or attempted 
through corrupt means and in terms of individuals and institutions involved. 
Indeed, given the general extent of corruption in Nigeria, most of the actors 
involved in these stories could be said to belong to the fringes of corruption in 
Nigeria. In short, most of the stories are or petty corruption involving lower to 
mid-level officials or smaller sums, or of cases that could be investigated or 
inspired by personal observation, even if that does not take way the 
independent initiative of the journalists. For example, of the combined 40 
stories in the two tables above, only a handful could be described as ‘grand 
corruption’ in the context of Nigeria above. Some, in fact, are quite ‘petty’ cases 
(in the sense of being common and small scale) such security guards extorting 
bribes from visa seekers, officials stealing money from ticket sales of a public 
transport, or union leaders mismanaging a small donation from a politician, or 
for that matter bribing officials of the electoral commission in a state bye-
election (The Punch, stories number 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10 in Table 7.2 above), or 
missing beds in hospitals (Daily Trust, story number 1). These are everyday forms 
of corruption in Nigeria and happen openly at every conceivable hour of the day. 
Furthermore, investigative stories of abandoned projects (story numbers 4, 13 
in The Punch (Table 7.2) and numbers 9, 20, 24 in Daily Trust (Table 7.3), as well 
as several others about the reckless and unaccountable spending by political 
office holders (The Punch numbers 6, 8, 16 and Daily Trust 6, 10, 14, 16, 17) are 
all easily observable by most citizens as well, as they form part of the everyday 
patrimonial structure of the state itself. The point is that such forms of 
corruption are hardly secret in Nigeria, and therefore does not require much 
digging as journalists would suppose, although they still count as investigative 
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stories and are important. Other stories in the tables above that involve higher 
scale of corruption such as bribery allegations against legislators for tempering 
a bill, could well have been achieved through leaks by “aggrieved” insiders, 
again, illustrating the significance of sources to investigative reporting 
everywhere where. Speaking on this, one respondent- a senior editor at one of 
the papers- is of the view that:  
Well, there is nothing wrong with that. Fighting corruption is a 
collaborative approach. There are agencies, it is just like fighting crime 
generally. There are agencies that are specialized to do that and they 
have the authority and the means to get information more than the 
media can get. Okay, if a newspaper discovers the story about a fraud. 
How do you think they can get it? There is virtually only one way. 
Somebody within the organization leaks it to you. Of course, it is 
actually the only way. Which is why if the corrupt DGs in the ministries 
ensure that the money is shared properly and everybody is happy, the 
newspapers are not going to hear about it. Usually it is when you are 
lucky you have one upright person who refused to take part or more 
commonly there was a problem with the sharing of the proceeds of 
the corrupt act and somebody was short changed. So he will now 
speak to the newspapers…  
One illustration of the point this respondent is making is that the scale of 
corruption exposed independently by the newspapers in all the stories above 
put together, does not compare to even a single case of corruption investigated 
by anti-corruption agencies or commissions of inquiry set up by government, for 
example, the case of $214 million exposed by the ICPC as mentioned earlier, or 
for that matter of the $10 billion case of corruption investigated by a public 
hearing of the House of Representatives. Moreover, the statement above also 
illustrates the significance of sources and tips to journalistic investigations of 
corruption or wrongdoing. For example, in their content analyses of 
investigative reporting in the Slovenian press, Kovacic and Erjavec (2011: 329) 
observe that Slovenian reporters use what they call “semi-investigative 
reporting” which entails “creating an image of investigative reporting, rather 
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than actually performing it”. Reporters do this, Kovacic and Erjavec contend, by 
deploying strategies like “factism”, which involves using “excessive and overly 
detailed data” without interpreting same, extensive citing of authoritative 
official sources in the stories, over-reliance on anonymous sources, and appeal 
to common knowledge and common sense (ibid: 334-336). Furthermore, 
Lublinski et al (2016) conclude that a “decisive element of investigative 
journalism in Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be the involvement of and the 
interaction with other societal non-journalist actors”. In other words, perhaps 
due to more strenuous constraining factors in developing democracies, 
investigative reporters tend to rely on non-media sources than journalistic 
enterprise, and for good reasons as I have shown through the past few chapters. 
However, investigative reporting is generally source-dependent, regardless of 
status of democracy. Lanosga and Martin (2017: 9-11) earlier cited above, find 
that tips from sources account for 34.9% of the award entries, while journalistic 
enterprise make up 46.6% of the stories. They note further that 90% of the 
stories cited documentary sources in addition to human resources, which in 
comparison to the Nigerian case underlies the importance of records and data 
bases, as we have discussed earlier. In this sense, it is not surprising that stories 
of higher-scale corruption in the tables above appear to have been triggered by 
tips from sources. Even then, the stories lack the sort of details and in-depth 
reporting one would expect from such stories. In contrast, the lower-scale 
stories were sufficiently detailed, often running into several pages. Overall, 
there appears to be a marked difference in the scale of corruption reported 
independently by newspapers and those sourced from the CIAs like anti-
corruption commissions and parliaments. Newspapers and journalists do much 
of their investigative reports around small scale and readily observable forms of 
corruption. In other words, newspapers investigate the ‘soft’ cases of 
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corruption, for the most part, while established authorities investigate the ‘hard’ 
cases of corruption in Nigeria, which newspapers then actively and prominently 
report. The distinction between the two is not fixed however, as there are 
overlaps. This point is further supported by other kinds of investigative reports 
observed in the newspapers and by the examples of previous investigative 
reports that several respondents claimed to have done during my discussions 
with them. During the coding, I observed many other instances of investigative 
reporting, in terms of journalistic enterprise and possible impact, but the issues 
investigated were not ‘corruption’ as described above. Some of these stories are 
what Fink and Schudson call “social enterprise” stories in which the reporter 
aims to highlight the social conditions of a specific group, a good case of giving 
voice to the voiceless. Examples of these were on ‘motherless babies’ home’ in 
a northern state, ‘the agony of patients at a Kaduna Hospital’, (Daily Trust) or of 
ceaseless ‘electricity outages’, of drug addiction among youths in Thisday and 
The Punch respectively. In conclusion, the foregoing completes the picture of 
strong watchdogs but weak investigators role of the Nigerian press earlier 











Chapter Eight: Conclusion: 
8.1 Introduction:  
In this concluding chapter, I first review the premise and evidence of this study, 
as well as the specific areas it contributes to existing literature. In particular, I 
argue that given certain national circumstances, and more importantly, given 
the specific context of corruption news, information subsidy enhances, rather 
than compromises the fourth estate role of the press. In other words, 
information subsidy is not always a bad thing. In addition, I argue that strands 
of literature on scandal reporting and those in other areas which consistently 
find correlations between press freedom and corruption reduction could look 
beyond quantifiable variables to other equally salient aspects of a country’s 
political culture which may impact on revelations of corruption in the press. I 
conclude the chapter by highlighting the limitations of the research and areas 
for further questions for future research.  
For African countries like Nigeria, scholarly debates around democratization 
have focused on several key areas, among them the process of regime change, 
and following that, the performance of the new regimes. Democratization is said 
to have followed a bottom-up path of have grassroots mobilizations against the 
authoritarian state, championed by the press and other opposition groups 
within civil society (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). But since the African state 
itself is characterised by neopatrimonialism, in which it is not only authoritarian 
but also corrupt, democratic transition entails both rolling back authoritarianism 
and reducing corruption. Indeed, discourses of political freedoms and rights, as 
well as those of accountability and good governance, were a focal aspect of the 
civil mobilizations that dislodged single-party or military regimes that littered 
across much of Africa in the decade following independence up to the late 
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1980s. By implication, the role of the press in this process is then to further both 
democratic development and corruption reduction by exposing it and 
demanding governmental action against it (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011b; 
Lynch and Crawford, 2011). On the one hand, the media is or should be an anti-
corruption watchdog against the African (and Nigerian) state, and on the other, 
it is and should be a patron of democratic development by promoting values 
such as rule of law, human rights, accountability and constitutionalism (Tettey, 
2001). This programmatic idea (Mamdani, 1996) of the press promoting 
democratic values and change, and of ensuring state accountability is not 
restricted to Africa however. Jebril, Loveless and Stetka (2015) demonstrate that 
it is also the focus of much research and policy on media and democratization in 
other regions, including Latin America, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In 
Nigeria particularly, newspapers are said to have had a long history of 
confrontation against the state, and especially of corruption within it (Oso, 2013; 
Olukotun, 2004; 2002; Agbaje, 1993). Local press power, it is claimed, helped to 
successfully dislodge colonial power in the 1960s, just as it did three decades 
later in dislodging the military and ‘ushering’ in democracy. But at the same 
time, it has also fought against corruption and promoted accountability and 
human rights, even if, when occasion demanded, by going underground 
(Ojebode, 2011; Ojo, 2007; Olukotun, 2004; 2002; 2000; Ojo, 2003).   
Yet, these are a ‘refreshed’, rather than a new set of arguments. The idea that 
the press expands political rights and freedoms and champions accountability 
on behalf of citizens is as old as modern democratic theory and practice. It is also 
nearly universally influential, imagined, if not practiced, virtually everywhere. It 
forms the bedrock of much scholarship on press freedom and watchdog 
journalism, and by implication, for much political communication research. It 
finds expression and articulation in national constitutions and legislations, 
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independent reports and commissions on the press, and forms a core of 
professional journalism in most countries, in theory, if not in practice (Weaver 
and Willnat, 2012). Yet, its application to contexts other those of its origins, 
broadly defined, has tended to be problematic, often traumatic, as Omenugha 
(2004) and Thompson (2007) argue in the case of the role of the press in ethnic 
conflicts in Nigeria and Rwanda respectively. But the more significant question, 
for our purposes here, is how and to what extent has democracy fared in Africa 
and Nigeria so far after two decades? For the most part, this question is posed 
to and answered for institutions like legislatures and political parties, or 
democratic practices such as elections. In general, democratic performance 
leaves much to be desired, as African democracies are described with similar 
adjectives as are most third wave democracies elsewhere (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997). Omotola (2009a), for example, describes Nigeria’s case as a ‘garrison’ 
democracy in which the executive uses all means, fair and foul to rig elections 
and undermine legislative and judicial independence. Hence, the new 
democracy looks more like the military past than a democratic present. 
Furthermore, others contend that the problem with democratic consolidation in 
the country is simply and squarely, corruption, since, this argument goes, 
corruption erodes popular legitimacy, particularly at the grassroots level of 
governance (Lawal and Oladunjoye, 2010; Ogundiya, 2010a; 2010b; Fagbadebo, 
2007; Omotola, 2006). In short, any notion of a democratic media in Africa 
requires situating it in the wider context of democratization and corruption 
reduction. Hence, we asked the central question of how and to what extent 
Nigerian newspapers report corruption and what specific part, investigative 
journalism plays in that coverage. We also asked related questions such as how 
Nigerian journalists understand investigative reporting, the impact of freedom 
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of information legislation and specific aspects of Nigeria’s political culture in the 
coverage of corruption in the country.   
8.2: Empirical evidence:  
To approach these questions, we analysed 16, 613 front page news stories 
published in a randomly selected sample of 2746 newspaper from four national 
dailies in Nigeria (Daily Trust, The Guardian, The Punch, and Thisday) from 1 
January 2001 to 31 December 2012, in addition to 24 in-depth interviews and 8 
weeks of newsroom observation. We find that of the 16, 613 stories analysed, 
corruption is the subject of 1,345 of them, meaning that coverage of corruption 
is over 8% of total frontpage news and one-third of total lead stories. Nearly 10% 
of the sampled newspapers carries two or more corruption on the same front 
page. Coverage of corruption in is slightly above average in three of the 
newspapers, and below average in The Guardian in terms of frequency and 
prominence as lead stories. This indicates that most of the stories, but especially 
the scandals, are generated from the same sources through routine journalistic 
practices, rather than from different sources as would be expected where media 
competition and independent journalism are the driving force for reporting 
corruption. However, that corruption is not the only issue in Nigerian politics 
and society that merit front page attention, these findings illustrate that 
coverage of corruption is reasonably high in the newspapers. Over the study 
period, we find steady increases and significant variation from one year to 
another in newspaper coverage of corruption. Nearly two-thirds of all 
corruption stories (62.30%) were reported during 2005-2009. Coverage also 
varies significantly by type of corruption stories. Combined, follow-ups and 
narrative of corruption stories account for more than half the total corruption 
coverage (54.28%), further indicating the significance of corruption issues in 
Nigerian newspaper agenda. Stories of alleged or actual corruption or scandals 
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make up 45.72% of the total coverage. In addition, most of the scandals were 
generated by the investigations and reports of corruption-investigating-
authorities, such as anti-corruption agencies, national and state assemblies, ad-
hoc commissions of inquiries etc. These sources account for 86.34% of all 
scandals, or 39.48% of total corruption coverage in the sample. Investigative 
reporting of corruption by the four newspapers contribute just 10.41% of 
corruption scandals, or 4.76% of all corruption news, indicating a low 
investigative output. Equally significant, the scale of corruption in the stories 
sourced from CIAs tend to be higher than those independently investigated by 
journalists, illustrating the salience of powerful institutional sources in 
generating corruption scandals.  
In addition to these, Nigerian journalists understand investigative reporting in 
precisely much the same ways as their Anglo-American counterparts, that is, as 
a form of journalism in which the journalist demonstrates enterprise and 
initiative, requires ‘digging’ or doing ‘research’ to discover information about 
wrongdoing in the public interest. Being part of overall British colonial heritage, 
this is not surprising as Nigerian print journalism has long imbued liberal 
watchdog professional values, and journalists are exposed to British and 
American journalism models through journalism education, on the job training 
and cross-national networking. The journalists also claim that they enjoy 
significant autonomy from their editorial superiors and proprietors, although 
one respondent recalls an instance of editorial interference within the 
newspaper over an investigative story against a Governor’s spending claims. 
Furthermore, investigative stories are initiated by editors, tip-offs from whistle 
blowers as well as through personal observations or through sources cultivated 
that journalists have cultivated in strategic centers of news.  But operationally 
speaking, investigative journalism is not much institutionalized in the four 
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newspapers studied. Of the 24 journalists and editors interviewed and several 
more encountered during newsroom observation, just four reported being full-
time investigative reporters, all of them at one of the publications, the only one 
of the four publications with an investigative desk. The rest combine 
investigative reporting with regular beat reporting. There are no separate 
budgets specifically for investigative reporting, while investigative reporters 
earn much the same salaries and benefits as all other journalists. Externally, 
investigative reporting is constrained by three broad factors: ineffectiveness of 
freedom of information legislation, particularly the lack information and record-
keeping, corruption within journalist itself, and intimidation or inducement by 
politicians, businesses or institutions. In consequence, just 4.76% of overall 
corruption coverage and 10.41% of scandal stories were independently 
investigated by the newspapers. However, this reflects a general trend of low 
investigative out in several other countries, including those with more 
established democratic systems. As Fink and Schudson (2014) claim, 
investigative reporting is a rarity in the news.  
Journalism and the press have long been connected to disclosures of corruption 
and to its reform, as both political communication and other social science 
literature on corruption amply indicates (Holmes, 2015: 11; Johnston, 2014: 21; 
Camaj, 2013: 21; Mulgan, 2000: 563). For example, Hamilton (2016) refers to 
investigative reporters as ‘democracy’s detectives’ whose task is to uncover 
abuses of power or governance failure to bring about policy reforms. Similarly, 
Salminen (2013: 69) identifies the media as one of four “watchdog institutions” 
that have historically contributed to curbing corruption in Finland. The role of 
the media within this structure, he notes, is to “expose integrity violations 
through investigative journalism”, to create public awareness about the dangers 
of corruption, to spark debate about corruption in government and policy 
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circles, and to compel authorities to act where allegations of corruption are 
made (ibid: 72). However, as this research demonstrates, the media depends on 
external actors for much of corruption it exposes, through processes of 
information subsidy, particularly in a social and political context such as 
Nigeria’s, where the effective capacity of the press to conduct investigations into 
high profile ‘integrity violations’, to borrow Salminen’s phrase above, is severely 
constrained by structural factors like a lack of basis data about governance 
actions and processes.  
8.3 Research contribution:  
The present study contributes to three areas of existing research, most 
obviously in the idea of information subsidy and its implications for democratic 
media performance. As noted earlier, the relationships between journalists and 
sources have always been a complicated one. At one end, scholars understand 
this relationship as consensual or based an exchange model but in which sources 
who supply information to journalists hold the upper hand, while journalists, in 
turn, are no more than passive recipients. Herbert Gans’ (1979) much quoted 
metaphor of a tango dance in which sources lead typifies this position. At the 
other end, journalists are said to be more active and adversarial, and therefore, 
have more power than sources over the news they produce (Eriksson and 
Östman, 2013: 305; Davis, 2009: 205-206). An interesting conceptualization of 
this journalist-source relationship is Gandy’s (1982) idea of information subsidy. 
In this, public relations and other sources seeking media publicity subsidize the 
costs of news production and enhance profitability for the media by supplying 
journalists with the news they need through news releases, news briefings, 
facility visits, lobbying and so on (in Davis, 2009: 206;). More recent research 
speaks of information subsidy through disapproving labels ‘passive journalist’ 
‘churnalism’, ‘public relations democracy’, ‘crisis’, etc (Jackson and Moloney, 
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2016; Franklin, 2011; Reich, 2010; Davies, 2009; Lewis et al, 2008a; 2008b; 
O’Neill and O’Connor, 2008; Bro, 2008; Davis, 2000). However, other than in a 
few cases, studies critical of information subsidy rarely consider the specificity 
of the news subsidized (Kiousis et al; 2015: 365-366; O’Neill and O’Connor, 2008; 
Kiousis et al, 2006: 267-268). But as Carlson (2009: 539) observes, there is need 
to “probe special cases” of news and “distinct types of sourcing”. This research 
fills that gap by studying information subsidy in the case of newspaper coverage 
of corruption scandals in Nigeria. Furthermore, as the labels used to describe 
the consequences of information subsidy (churnalism, crisis, passive journalist) 
imply, it is thought to undermine the watchdog performance of the press. 
However, this research finds that this is not always the case. We find that 90% 
of corruption scandals are subsidized for newspapers by anti-corruption 
agencies, adhoc panels, congressional investigations, courts, foreign media etc. 
However, journalists find such sources more reliable and credible for exposing 
corruption than independent sources. Also, citizens tend to find these 
institutions and sources more effective for petitioning against corruption, while 
corrupt politicians themselves respond to these institutions than they do to 
independent journalistic inquiry. Indeed, Lanosga and Martin (2016: 11) find 
that investigative reports initiated by tips from sources tend to have more 
impact in terms of policy changes than those independently initiated by 
journalistic enterprise. In this sense, information subsidy may well enhance, 
rather than compromise watchdog role of the press. Third, information subsidy 
does not always preclude the possibility of watchdog journalism entirely and 
journalists are not always as passive as previously assumed, as several existing 
studies confirm. For example, in his process model of news production, based 
on interview and content analysis data, Reich (2006) contends that story 
initiative alternates between sources and journalists at different points in the 
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news production process: “sources lead first, journalists thereafter” (ibid: 497). 
Similarly, Eriksson and Östman (2013) report that journalists are more passive 
when interacting face-face with politicians during press conferences to ensure 
steady news supply, but become more active and independent at the point of 
writing the story. Also, Örebro (2002) find that while local reporters depend on 
municipal officials for most of their political news, there is nonetheless, a form 
of “mutual control”, between local politicians and reporters, resulting in four 
types of journalism. For documentary and promotional journalism, municipal 
politicians are more active, while journalists are more active in watchdog stories 
by seeking out additional, even counteracting perspectives to those supplied by 
the municipal actors. We find similar evidence to those above. While Nigerian 
journalists depend mostly on corruption investigating agencies for most 
coverage of corruption scandals, they nonetheless demonstrate watchdog 
functions. Journalists are aware of the broader politics of corruption and anti-
corruption, both within and beyond the CIAs and in response exercise discretion 
over what subsidized stories to publish and how. Furthermore, they appear to 
monitor these agencies by keeping certain corruption cases in the media 
agenda, particularly those cases that prove politically inconvenient for these 
agencies themselves, given that they too have their own limitations. As a former 
head of one of the anti-corruption agencies explains: 
Generally, the Nigerian media is vibrant when it comes to corruption 
issues. They are not solely dependent on anticorruption agencies as 
sources because most times, the news they get from those institutions 
are about cases that are being investigated… Often times, these are 
cases that are already under investigation. Take for example the case 
involving Fashola for the past two months80. It is a media thing. They 
                                                          
80 Former Governor of Lagos, Babatunji Raji Fashola (2007-2015), now Minister of Power and Housing (2015-). 
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picked it up and pursue it and this is what happens to a lot of 
politicians including this whole thing about Jonathan. Is there any 
agency investigating Jonathan81? No! But of cause the media has been 
awash with stories about his alleged corruption. The Diezani82 case is 
also there. It is purely a media thing too. The media has made her the 
symbol of corruption. Yes, you are right about the National Assembly, 
they have carried out certain probes but even these are in response 
to the media. When the media spotlights it, they pick it up. 
As we have already seen in the preceding chapter, this view is supported by 
several journalists, indicating a monitorial role by the press on the corruption-
investigating agencies, on which, as our quantitative findings above show, the 
press depends on for much of its corruption stories. Finally, by giving corruption 
stories front page prominence and with such regularity as demonstrated by the 
quantitative data presented here, newspapers are performing watchdog role. 
Indeed, all three types of corruption stories (scandals, follow-ups and corruption 
talk) variously highlight corruption as a major issue in Nigerian politics and 
society. Indeed, Entman (2012: 187-188) argues that impactful scandals are 
those repeatedly reported and framed by the press, and as such forms part of 
the watchdog role of the press, even if, as Nigerian case examined here, they 
are sourced mostly through information subsidy (Mellado, 2015; Coronel, 2010). 
In other words, information subsidy is not necessarily a determinant factor in 
news production as often assumed and may not altogether rule out watchdog 
journalism.  In this sense, our research reinforces existing findings (Lanosga and 
Martin, 2016; Eriksson and Östman, 2013; Reich, 2006; Örebro, 2002, etc) that 
                                                          
81 Immediate past President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015). 
82 Former Minister of Petroleum, Mrs Alison Diezani (2011-2015) who had several alleges of corruption against, 
mostly by the online newspapers, some of which were then further investigated by the national assembly.  
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calls for nuance in understanding relationships between journalists and sources 
with regards to democratic media performance.  
In addition, this research contributes to existing studies of scandal reporting, 
and to the understanding of the linkages between corruption, political culture, 
democracy and the press. As we have seen, corruption scandals are explained 
either as ‘crisis of democracy’ or through media-centric frameworks like 
competition, sensationalism and changing structures of media and technology 
(Tumber and Waisbord, 2004a; 2004b; Chalabi, 2004; Esser and Hartung, 2004; 
Tumber, 1993; Waisbord, 2004, etc.). However, our findings here suggest that 
aspects of political culture, that is, the historically entrenched tendency for 
Nigerian governments to make the ‘fight against corruption’ a focal point of their 
governance policy, either out of genuine concern for corruption or for political 
convenience, also contributes to generating corruption scandals in the 
newspapers. This occurs first in the establishment of numerous anti-corruption 
agencies and panels, which itself follows a historical trend, and then by the high-
profile investigations and reports of these agencies which feeds news of 
corruption in the press. Thus, our findings support those of previous studies who 
locate the rise of scandals conflict among various actors within the political 
system rather than the media (Marchetti, 2009; Adut, 2008; 2004; Waisbord, 
1996). Similarly, findings here have implications for the growing literature that 
finds correlation between democratic development, or aspects of it like press 
freedom, private media ownership and freedom of information legislation on 
the one hand, and exposure or reduction of corruption on the other (Kolstad 
and Wilg, 2016; Stanig, 2015; Camaj, 2013; Pellegata, 2012; Nam, 2012; Brunetti 
and Weder, 2003; Djankov et al, 2003). For example, Pellegata (2012) finds that 
elections and inter-party competition correlates strongly with lower levels of 
corruption. Stanig (2015) suggests that Mexican states with weaker defamation 
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laws tend to have higher coverage of corruption than those where defamation 
laws are more stringent against the press. Camaj (2013) finds that press freedom 
correlates strongly but indirectly with corruption, and its influence on corruption 
reduction is strongest where horizontal accountability is also strong. Most of 
these studies are concerned with connections between or conditions for 
horizontal (government to government) and vertical (citizens, civil society, 
media to government) forms of accountability. Thus, this presume some 
connections between exposure of corruption and its reduction in a given 
country, much the same assumption that underlies liberal watchdog theory. 
While our research here says nothing about corruption reduction, it does 
indicate that democratization and the relative freedom Nigerian media enjoys 
tends correlate with exposure of corruption. As our study period moves further 
away from the founding election of 1999, average annual coverage of corruption 
increases steadily in the newspapers, from slightly above 3% in 2001 to over 
8.10% in 2012, as indicated by the trend line in Figure 4.2 above83.  
Moreover, election years and high rates of turn-over of officials also tend to 
generate more news of corruption as new successors embark on investigations 
of the government and tenures of their predecessors, and thus explaining the 
rise and fall of coverage over time. In this sense, the present research provides 
more illustrative evidence for such studies Camaj (2013) and others above. 
However, unlike studies using quantifiable data like press freedom indexes, and 
rankings of democracy and corruption compiled by Freedom House, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Transparency International and so on, this research suggests 
more nuanced influences like political culture. As Dincer and Johnstone (2014) 
suggest, political culture also encourages disclosures of corruption in the media, 
                                                          
83 See Chapter 4.  
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if not its incidence or reduction. Finally, the research contributes to the 
immediate literature on investigative journalism and press coverage of 
corruption in Nigeria where existing research tends to highlight, perhaps too 
much, ethnic politics in the coverage of corruption. Findings here show that 
three newspapers from the south report corruption cases involving southerners 
as much as they do when the cases involve northerners also. At the most, ethnic 
considerations may be more evident in close critical scrutiny of individual or a 
handful of scandals than more quantitative long-term trends adopted here.  
8.4 Limitations of the study and future research: 
In retrospect, there are several things I could have done differently when 
designing and collecting data for this study. For one, a survey of journalists on 
various questions about investigative reporting, might have proved more useful 
than newsroom observation. Conversely, I could have spent more time on the 
observation, perhaps say 6 months or longer, rather than 8 weeks, investigative 
reporting is generally sporadic and conducted mostly in the field. Secondly, most 
of the findings here cannot adequately generalize across all Nigerian media, 
particularly online media. Broadcast media in Nigeria eschew a different 
professional value (development journalism) and are mostly owned and 
controlled by the government. Thus, assumptions about and practice of 
investigative journalism, and even coverage of corruption generally could well 
be different. More significantly, online media like Sahara Reporters and 
Premium Times tend to do a lot of investigative reporting, including 
investigations of grand corruption involving even the most powerful Nigerian 
officials. But these media are relatively new and generally do not archive or 
index news they published in ways that researchers can use, complicating my 
objective of a trend analysis. Also, interviews with politicians, especially those 
once in the centre of corruption scandals could have offered data not obtainable 
253 
 
by content analysis or interviews with journalists and officials of anti-corruption 
agencies. However, these are all issues to consider for future research, which I 
discuss below.  
The present research points to several new directions for further research, for 
example those of surveys of Nigerian journalism culture and role perceptions. 
Even most cross-country studies do not include Nigeria in their analysis and it 
will be interesting to see how Nigeria diverges from other African countries 
mostly included (Kenya, Uganda). Also, the rise of the internet and social media 
have made exposure of corruption in the media quite interesting. Sahara 
Reporters (New York) for example, is based on citizen journalism model and yet 
publishes investigative reports on corruption probably more than any media in 
Nigeria, and I’m not aware of any quantitative analysis of its investigations in the 
literature to date. A comparative analysis of online and print could highlight the 
potentials of the internet and new media to Nigeria’s democratic media. 
Furthermore, questions of gender and investigative reporting, or political 
reporting more generally could be interesting to explore. I observed that in 
almost all the newspapers, political reporters are predominantly men, while at 
the same time the women female reporters tend to be in beats like education, 
health, fashion and entertainment. This raises an empirical question: is political 
reporting in Nigeria gendered? More significantly however, this research 
highlights the need to re-examine the idea of information subsidy in light of 
different types of news, news sources or reporting practices. For stories of 
corruption or investigative journalism, information subsidy might have different 
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